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 The importance of comedy as a mode of political communication is widely recognized, 
and the correlation between exposure to political comedy and knowledge has been well 
documented.  Still, empirical research has produced decidedly mixed conclusions about whether, 
how and for whom political comedy might promote learning and influence attitudes.  This 
dissertation incorporates socio-psychological theories of humor into a model of humor-triggered 
cognition which produces theoretically derived expectations about the effect of comedy on 
political sophistication.  Political comedy is not merely an alternative news source but a unique 
communicative form which, by encouraging effortful processing and cognitive engagement, 
enhances learning and attitude constraint.  Further, the strongest effects are predicted not among 
apathetic citizens incidentally exposed to information, but among moderately sophisticated 
audiences capable of comprehending and appreciating humorous messages but generally 
unmotivated to think deeply about politics absent the potential emotional gratification of 
amusement. 
 These expectations are empirically tested using both experimental and survey 
methodologies.  A controlled experiment isolates the effect of comedy from the influence of 
exposure to information by manipulating the presence of humor in political news stories but 
otherwise holding content constant.  Consistent with the model of humor-triggered cognition, 
experimental results demonstrate that political comedy promotes learning and ideological 
constraint beyond exposure to identical information in hard news form, and its relative influence 
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is greatest among those with moderate prior political knowledge.  Learning is mediated by the 
experience of amusement, not perceptions that the (identical) information is more interesting.  
Secondary survey data are used to replicate experimental analysis and examine the relationship 
between real-world exposure to political comedy and the structure of political attitudes.  Self-
reported exposure to political comedy is strongly correlated with several alternative measures of 
ideological constraint, suggesting that experimental findings are generalizable. 
 Overall, results indicate that effects of political media depend on the way information is 
presented.  Political comedy enhances sophistication by not only providing important political 
information but also by arousing and engaging audiences so that they think more deeply about 
politics, become more ideologically consistent, and are potentially more capable of effective 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
 Democracy is best served by political media that are both informative and engaging, but 
shrinking audiences have inspired concern that traditional news is failing on both these counts.  
Understanding the effects of political comedy is critically important as citizens increasingly 
abandon traditional hard news media and turn instead to these alternative sources for information 
about politics and public affairs.  Substantial popular and scholarly attention has been paid to the 
adequacy and implications of political comedy as a source of political information. However, 
empirical investigations have drawn inconsistent and often contradictory conclusions: Comedy is 
informative (Baum, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Brewer & Cao, 2006), but not on matters of political 
importance (Baek & Wojceszak, 2009; Prior, 2003, 2005). Comedy shrinks the political 
knowledge gap by reducing motivational and resource barriers to learning (Baum, 2002, 2003a, 
2003b; Rottinghaus, Bird, Ridout & Self, 2008), but primarily attracts and disproportionately 
benefits sophisticated audiences (Cao, 2008; Landreville, Holbert & LaMarre, 2010; Morris, 
2009; Moy, 2008; Young & Tissinger, 2007; Young, 2008). It encourages viewers to seek further 
information (Cao, 2010; Xenos & Becker, 2009) from media they come to view as biased and 
untrustworthy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Holbert, Lambe, Dudo & Carlton, 2007).  Comedy 
draws attention to politically relevant cues (Kim & Vishak, 2008; Xenos, Moy & Becker, 2011; 
Young, 2004, 2006), yet has no discernible influence on political attitudes (Polk, Young & 
Holbert, 2009; Young, 2004; 2006; 2008).  Viewers are more likely to vote (Cao & Brewer, 
2008; Moy, Xenos & Hess, 2005a) in unfair elections (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), and report 
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warm feelings toward leaders (Baum, 2005; Moy, Xenos & Hess, 2005b) whom they view as 
incompetent and dishonest (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Guggenheim, Kwak & Campbell, 
2011). What should we make of all these findings as we explore the societal impact and value of 
new media forms in the political realm? 
 This dissertation attempts to bring clarity to our understanding of the effects of political 
comedy by offering a theoretical account of how exposure might influence knowledge and 
attitudes.  I will argue that a few simple factors—the total volume of factual information one has 
and nature of the attitudes derived from these considerations—are important building blocks of 
citizen competence.  Thus, evaluating the effects of political comedy on learning and ideological 
constraint allows the democratic consequences of this non-traditional mode of political 
communication to be better understood. 
 Well informed citizens are demonstrably better citizens.  They are better able to 
understand political discourse, fully recognize what is at stake in political controversies, form 
and articulate coherent attitudes that are meaningful reflections of personal interests and beliefs, 
and make rational political choices to effectively advance goals.  As a result, knowledgeable 
citizens have a decided political advantage over those who, because they are either unmotivated 
or unable to pay attention to and learn about public affairs, do not know or think much about 
politics.   
 Mass media play an important role in providing citizens with the information necessary 
for effective political engagement, but are often found to have “minimal effects” because chronic 
differences in motivation and ability determine what citizens learn and how they interpret and 
utilize information (Prior, 2007; Zaller, 1992).  From this perspective, the mass media 
environment provides opportunities for learning and determines the mosaic of information 
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available, but the social distribution of political knowledge is ultimately a function of individual 
consumption choices, particularly the choice between news and entertainment.   
However, political sophistication is not solely determined by the conscious, utilitarian 
decision to acquire information by consuming hard news.  In fact, many of the most politically 
aware citizens follow politics not out of a high-minded notion of civic duty or in furtherance of 
any particular goal but because they find politics entertaining (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Verba & Nie, 1972).  Though normative democratic theory places special value and significance 
on hard news, citizens engage politics through a variety of media, and there is no obvious 
conceptual distinction between political content delivered via the news versus entertainment 
programming. In the contemporary mass media environment, the line between news and 
entertainment is increasingly blurry.  Political relevance cannot be determined, a priori, by the 
source or format of information, but must take into consideration how media are utilized by 
citizens as they attempt to learn about and make sense of the mediated political world (Delli 
Carpini & Williams, 2001; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011).  
Perhaps now more than ever, entertainment media may play an important role in shaping 
what citizens know and how they come to understand politics.  In fact, the pursuit of 
entertainment or amusement does not preclude learning or meaningful engagement with political 
information.  “The idea that serious learning is incompatible with humor has disastrous 
consequences.  It has encouraged dull, ponderous, fact-overloaded presentations of political 
information in all types of mass media as well as in classrooms and public lectures.  Use of such 
user-hostile formats ignores the fact that learning is stimulated when audiences become involved 
and aroused” (Graber, 2008, p. 336).  Political comedy is not merely an alternative source for 
important political information but has the potential to enhance competence and sophistication 
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by presenting information is a way that interests and engages audiences.  To understand the 
democratic consequences of political comedy it is necessary to consider the patterns of cognitive 
processing and engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying this unique and 
complex form of political communication. 
 
Goals of This Dissertation  
 Though political comedy is assumed to be an important source of political information, 
its effects are not well understood.  Empirical work has produced decidedly mixed conclusions 
about the influence of political comedy relative to traditional news sources.  While some suggest 
that political comedy might inform audiences and enhance competence, others contend that its 
influence is at best minimal and at worst, by expanding gaps in knowledge and promoting a 
cynical perspective on the political world, may be potentially harmful.  Two primary questions 
related to the democratic consequences of political comedy motivate the current research:  
1.  How does political comedy affect political sophistication? 
2.  Do some citizens benefit, informationally or in other ways, more than others from 
political comedy? 
This dissertation addresses these questions and expands on previous work by incorporating 
socio-psychological theories of humor into a theoretical framework that explains how political 
comedy affects knowledge and attitudes.  Political comedy is not merely an alternative source of 
information but a unique and complex communicative form which promotes effortful processing 
and thoughtful engagement.   The model of humor-triggered cognition produces three general 
expectations about the effects of political comedy: 
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1.  Exposure to political comedy will boost learning and attitude constraint beyond 
exposure to identical information presented in traditional hard news. 
2.  Effects will be strongest among those with moderate levels of prior political 
knowledge. 
3.  The patterns of cognitive processing and engagement associated with humor 
comprehension and the experience of amusement will mediate learning and attitude 
effects. 
To test these expectations, this dissertation takes a multi-methodological approach, utilizing both 
experimental and secondary survey data to investigate the effects of political comedy on 
knowledge and attitudes.  A controlled experiment manipulating the presence of humor but 
holding information constant allows these effects to be evaluated relative to those stemming 
from exposure to identical information in hard news form and permits the precise causal 
mechanism driving effects to be examined.  Additionally, because prior political knowledge is 
exogenous, experimental exposure to comedy facilitates comparison of effects across levels of 
prior knowledge.  While experimental methodology establishes causality, replication with 
secondary survey data is used to assess the generalizability of effects in the real-world.  By 
leveraging both experimental and survey methodologies, the effects of political comedy on 
knowledge and attitudes can be fully explored. 
    
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 lays the theoretical groundwork for the current research.  I start by reviewing 
relevant literature about the importance of knowledge and ideological constraint as indicators of 
citizen competence and the factors shaping the distribution of political sophistication, focusing 
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on current debates about the role of mass media and the impact of changes in the media 
environment.  I then describe previous research examining the effects of political comedy on 
knowledge and attitudes.  There is no consensus about how political comedy might influence 
viewers or whether comedy ultimately expands or attenuates gaps in knowledge and 
sophistication.  To better understand the effects of political comedy, I incorporate socio-
psychological theories of humor into a model of humor-triggered cognition.  This model 
produces theoretically driven expectations about whether, how and for whom political comedy 
affects knowledge and attitudes. 
 The model of humor-triggered cognition described in Chapter 2 predicts that the patterns 
of cognitive processing and engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying humor 
will boost learning, enhance sophistication and promote ideological constraint.  Chapter 3 
describes a controlled experiment designed to test these expectations.  Experimental stimuli 
manipulating the presence of humor but holding information constant were developed to isolate 
the effects of comedy from the influence of exposure to information.  Pretest results establish the 
content equivalence of the news and comedy stimuli and rule out potentially confounding factors 
such as differing perceptions of information or patterns of emotional arousal that may bias 
results.  Experimental methods are well suited to identify media effects, establish causality and 
test the underlying mechanism driving effects. 
   The next three chapters describe empirical investigations of the relationship between 
exposure to comedy and political sophistication.  In Chapter 4, an experiment examines the 
effect of political comedy on information acquisition.  Results show that political comedy boosts 
learning beyond exposure to identical information presented in hard news form.  Consistent with 
my theory, learning is greatest among those with moderate levels of prior political knowledge.   
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Additionally, mediation analysis indicates that the experience of amusement is the key causal 
mechanism driving learning.  Overall, results are consistent with expectations derived from the 
model of humor-triggered cognition. 
 I then shift focus to the effects of political comedy on attitude consistency: the way 
opinions are organized and linked together in memory.  The model of humor-triggered cognition 
predicts that, compared to traditional hard news, exposure to political comedy will promote more 
ideologically consistent political attitudes.  Chapter 5 describes experimental tests utilizing 
several alternative measures of attitude consistency to demonstrate the effect of political comedy 
on ideological constraint.  Among those with moderate levels of prior political knowledge, 
exposure to political comedy results in greater ideological consistency of political attitudes than 
exposure to identical information in hard news form.  In Chapter 6, I use survey data from the 
2008 National Annenberg Election Survey to replicate the experimental results on a national 
sample.  Results indicate that the causal relationship between political comedy and ideological 
constraint can be generalized to the real-world.   
 The concluding chapter summarizes key empirical findings and elaborates on the 
contributions made by the current research and how results advance our understanding of 
political comedy as a source of information and mode of political communication.  I also discuss 
the limitations of the current study, identify several questions that remain unanswered, and 
suggest directions for future research.  I conclude with a consideration of the larger implications 
of the results for the role of political comedy and mass media, more generally, in democratic 
discourse.  By encouraging attention and thoughtful cognitive engagement, political comedy can 
promote sophistication and enhance competence.  When political information is presented in a 
way that is both intellectually and emotionally stimulating, citizens are more able to make sense 
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Chapter 2. Political Sophistication, Mass Media and Humor-Triggered Cognition 
In a 2009 TIME online poll, 44 percent of respondents rated Jon Stewart, host of Comedy 
Central’s fake news program The Daily Show, the most trusted newscaster in America.  When 
asked where they get information about politics, young people mention comedy programs as 
often as traditional news sources such as newspapers and network television newscasts (Pew 
2004, 2012).  Such anecdotes have inspired much curiosity and concern from both journalists 
and scholars about whether or not political comedy can provide viewers with the information 
necessary to fulfill their democratic obligations as citizens.  Political comedy is important not 
just for the presence of political information, but also because it is a unique communicative form.  
Comedy has a distinct structure and function, requiring particular patterns of cognitive 
engagement and processing to comprehend and enjoy.    A socio-psychological perspective on 
humor suggests that political comedy affects not only what people know but also how knowledge 
is structured in memory and utilized in political judgment. 
 
Political Knowledge and Attitude Formation 
 A reoccurring theme in evaluations of democratic functioning is concern about the 
implications of startlingly low levels of political information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Downs, 1957; Neuman, 1986).  When it comes to the distribution of information in American 
society, the mean is low and the variance high (Converse, 1990, 2000). Though the amount of 
information and engagement required for effective citizenship is the subject of contentious 
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debate, low levels of knowledge exhibited by citizens and its unequal distribution across the 
electorate are troubling (Neuman, 1986).   
 The uneven distribution of political knowledge is a cause for concern because 
information is the “raw material” through which citizens construct their understanding of the 
political world (Gamson, 1992).  In their seminal work, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) 
explain the centrality of political knowledge in normative expectations about democratic 
citizenship, “The democratic citizen is expected to be well informed about political affairs.  He is 
supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what 
alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are.  By such 
standards the voter falls short” (p. 308).  Investigating the phenomenon of partisan voting, 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) echo this concern, arguing that democratic theory 
assumes that citizens have the information necessary for rational decisions and that they are able 
to connect policy preferences to the partisan alternatives offered. But citizens with limited 
understanding of policy controversies may even fail to recognize the policy platforms of political 
parties. 
 The importance of political knowledge stems from the role information plays in 
preference formation.  For democracy to work as intended, the choices that citizens make must 
communicate information about their real interests and preferences.   Lacking sufficient 
information, citizens are less able to comprehend important political questions, form and 
articulate coherent opinions and fully appreciate the consequences of the choices they make 
(Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1922; Schumpeter, 1942).  “The less sophisticated the public, the 
less alert to its interests, the less active and unswerving in pursuit of them, and the less resistant 
to manipulation from above—the further, in short, from the democratic ideal” (Luskin, 1990, p. 
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333).  Society operates more democratically when citizens are well informed and political 
information is distributed more equitably (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). 
Some have countered concern about low levels of information in the electorate by noting 
that good decisions can be made even in the nearly complete absence of hard facts (Sniderman, 
Brady & Tetlock, 1991; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991, 1994). Citizens can 
compensate for limited knowledge by taking advantage of judgmental heuristics, decision-
making shortcuts that simplify complex choices and allow dependable decisions to be made 
efficiently and with relatively little information (Sniderman et al., 1991).  For example, voters 
may base decisions on their party affiliation (Lodge & Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1993), the 
“likability” of a candidate (Brady & Sniderman, 1985), affective responses to stimuli (Lodge & 
Taber, 2000) or attitudinal cues from trusted individuals and groups (Lupia, 1994).   
 While heuristics provide an efficient shortcut to decision-making, they do not ensure 
good choices and may actually increase the likelihood of judgment errors (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972, 1973; Mondak, 1994). In fact, citizens relying on heuristics make choices 
significantly different than those that would hypothetically be made given more complete 
information (Bartels, 1996).    Low information rationality models are problematic because they 
assume knowledge of where parties, interest groups or other opinion leaders stand on particular 
issues and in broader ideological terms, and many citizens lack the type of information necessary 
for effective use of decision-making shortcuts (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  Partisan or 
ideological cues are only useful to the extent that they are recognized and provide a reliable 
indicator of personal interests and political beliefs.  Knowledgeable citizens are more likely to 
encounter cues, are more familiar with the ideological principles, political beliefs and group 
interests that cues represent, and are better able to interpret and respond to relevant cues as they 
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make decisions and form opinions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992).  As a result, 
heuristic cues are more reliable judgment guides for well-informed citizens than for those with 
limited political knowledge (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). 
Online processing models suggest that the volume of information stored in memory is not 
a strong indicator of well-informed decision-making, and that good choices can be made by 
updating attitudes in response to new information, even if the specific information that inspired 
an attitude shift cannot be recalled later (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lodge, McGraw & Stroh, 1989; 
McGraw, Lodge & Stroh, 1990).  From this perspective, an individual may appear uninformed 
but still express attitudes that are well-reasoned and based on extensive information. 
Here to, however, knowledgeable citizens have a comparative advantage relative to those 
who are less politically aware.  For online processing to work as intended, new information must 
be immediately evaluated and used to update all potentially relevant attitudes.  Those who know 
and have thought more about politics possess a better understanding of how political ideas ‘go 
together’ and are more capable of recognizing and responding appropriately to elite cues about 
the implications of new information for personal interests, values and beliefs (Zaller, 1992).  
Relatively knowledgeable citizens are more likely to have immediately accessible summary 
evaluations and, thus, can most efficiently and effectively engage in online processing to make 
political judgments (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
 Whether it is processed online or stored for later use, new information is most beneficial 
to those with large stores of pre-existing information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  
Knowledgeable citizens have well developed, highly structured political belief systems that 
enable systematic and efficient organization and storage of information and guide decision-
making (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Judd & Downing, 1990; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Luskin, 
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1990; McGraw, Pinney & Neumann, 1991).  Conceived by Converse (1964), political belief 
systems are, “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by 
some form of constraint or a functional interdependence” (p. 207).  Political sophistication is a 
function of the total volume of information contained, range of topics covered and degree of 
interconnectedness or constraint within a political belief system (Luskin, 1987, 1990).  
 Knowledge and constraint are closely related because the retention and recall of a large 
volume of diverse information necessitates a highly structured organizational system (Campbell 
et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1987, 1990; Neuman, 1986). As Neuman (1986) explains,  
“one needs a conceptual hook in one’s head on which to hang new information, a cognitive 
cubbyhole in which to store, compare, and contrast arguments made at different times on similar 
issues” (p. 18). Political information is most efficiently organized using the same abstract 
ideological principles that structure elite political discourse.  For sophisticated citizens, ideology 
structures knowledge and provides the framework through which the political world is 
understood and evaluated (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Lusk & Judd, 
1988; Luskin, 1987, 1990). 
 Information held in memory constitutes the considerations available when forming 
political opinions (Zaller, 1992).  To the extent that they are organized by abstract ideological 
concepts, these considerations will produce attitudes that are constrained by ideology (Converse, 
1990).  As a result, knowledgeable citizens express attitudes that are stable, internally consistent 
and reflective of political interests and beliefs (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Converse, 1964; 
Lusk & Judd, 1988; Neuman, 1981; Zaller, 1992).  Most citizens, however, are unable to connect 
policy views in an ideologically coherent way, and instead base opinions on whatever 
considerations happen to be most immediately accessible in memory (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 
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1992). These top-of-the-head, nonattitudes do not meaningfully communicate information about 
citizens’ needs, interests or beliefs.  Thus, uninformed citizens are less able to effectively engage 
the political system or hold elected officials accountable for their actions. 
 Though political knowledge constitutes a valuable resource and facilitates more effective 
citizenship, only a small subset of the population chooses to become informed and actively 
engaged in politics.  There are three broad factors that jointly influence political knowledge: 
motivation, ability and opportunity (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990).  “To become 
highly sophisticated, we must encounter a certain quantity of political information, be 
intellectually able enough to retain and organize large portions of the information we encounter, 
and have reason enough to make the effort” (Luskin 1990, p. 335).  Motivation, ability and 
opportunity are shaped by a variety of individual characteristics, predispositions and contextual 
factors. 
 Because cognitive resources are limited, learning necessitates tradeoffs, and the costs of 
attending to information must be overcome by prospective benefits (Conover & Feldman, 1984; 
Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991).  
Among the primary motivations for attention and learning are self-interest and the perception of 
personal relevance (Citrin & Green, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1990, 1991), and the expectation that 
information will be useful in making some decision (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). However, the 
decision to become informed is not necessarily guided by this utilitarian calculus, and it is often 
possible to make good decisions on the basis of information acquired for reasons unrelated to 
any particular political question or choice problem (Fiorina, 1990).  A sense of civic duty drives 
some citizens to follow news about politics and public affairs (Almond & Verba, 1963; Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; McGraw & Scholz, 1991; Tetlock, 1983; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 
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1995).  Though not motivated to invest time or effort in staying informed, politically apathetic 
citizens may encounter low-cost political information as the accidental by-product of non-
political daily activities (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1990; Popkin, 1991).  Conversely, some citizens 
find politics interesting and are motivated to learn simply due to their enjoyment of politics as a 
social activity (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Verba & Nie, 1972).   
 Information inequalities stemming from differences in motivation and interest are less 
problematic than those attributable to differential resource constraints that impact citizens’ 
capability to become informed and politically engaged (Verba, 1996).  The unequal distribution 
of political information distorts the quality of representation as those who have this valuable 
resource are able to exert a disproportionate influence on government (Althaus, 2003; Verba, 
1996).  There is a troubling correspondence, “between the distribution of political knowledge 
across the public and the distribution of other valuable resources that are both the source of 
political power and a consequence of it” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 174).   Information is 
most abundant among those belonging to traditionally empowered groups—wealthy, educated, 
white men (Althaus, 2003; Bennett, 1988; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). 
 These demographic variables may play a causal role in determining the motivation, 
ability and opportunity to learn (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jennings, 1996; Luskin, 1990; 
Neuman, Just & Crigler, 1992).  For example, education expands opportunities for political 
discussion, improves one’s ability to find and process political information and may also increase 
the motivation to do so by fostering a sense of civic duty (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Nie, 
Junn & Stehlik-Barry, 1996).  Further, education leads to social connections, career 
opportunities, income and civic skills which enhance opportunities and ability for political 
engagement throughout one’s lifetime (Nie et al., 1996; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; 
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Schlozman, 2002; Verba et al., 1995).  Conversely, belonging to a traditionally disempowered 
group is associated with decreased opportunity and greater motivational and skills barriers to 
political engagement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990). 
 This perspective on political information is highly pessimistic because the variables 
correlated with knowledge are either unchangeable (e.g. race and gender) or highly stable over 
the lifespan (e.g. education and income).  Though some have suggested that information 
inequalities might be overcome through mobilization efforts and more equitable access to 
education (Converse, 1972), higher levels of educational achievement have not corresponded 
with increased aggregate levels of political knowledge (Bennett, 1989, 1996; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996; Pew, 2007).  In fact, rather than promote political sophistication, educational 
attainment may be a proxy for cognitive abilities, family background and early socialization 
experiences and could actually expand gaps in political knowledge and engagement present in 
pre-adulthood (Highton, 2009; Kam & Palmer, 2008).  Even political interest, among the most 
powerful dispositional predictors of political knowledge and behavior, is highly stable and 
resistant to influence (Prior, 2010). 
 These variables, however, do not tell the whole story.  Though much of the social 
distribution of political knowledge can be explained by “the usual suspects,” demographic 
variables such as age, income and education (Bennett, 1988), the media environment also 
influences what people know about politics and how information is utilized (Althaus, 1998; 
Bartels, 1993; Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970; Zaller, 1992).  Dramatic changes in mass 
media, including the expansion of available options through cable television, the Internet and 
other new media, may have a profound impact on political knowledge by altering opportunities 
to become informed, motivational barriers to attention and even the skills and abilities necessary 
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for learning (Baum, 2003b; Prior, 2007).  By changing the relative importance of these factors, 
new media, especially political entertainment media, might affect which citizens acquire 
information and become politically engaged.  There is debate, however, about how the changing 
information environment will ultimately impact the distribution of political knowledge. 
 
Informed Citizenship—The Impact of the (New) Media Environment 
 The traditional view is that the information environment is insufficient to offset 
inequalities because the “informationally rich get richer” (Price & Zaller, 1993, p. 138).  What 
one learns is dependent on what one already knows.  Not only is exposure to new information 
most likely among the politically engaged, prior knowledge provides the framework through 
which new information is understood and interpreted (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Tichenor et 
al., 1970; Zaller, 1992).  Those who are already knowledgeable about politics are better able to 
evaluate the implications of new information and more capable of incorporating it into long-term 
memory (Zaller, 1992; see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Thus, as new information enters the 
environment it is most likely to benefit those who are already well informed, resulting in an 
expanding knowledge gap (Tichenor et al., 1970).   
 While individual characteristics and predispositions powerfully shape how much one 
knows about politics, features of the information environment can also increase or decrease 
information inequalities by conditioning the importance of opportunity, motivation and cognitive 
skills.  Not all media are created equal in terms of the motivation and skills required for learning, 
and different formats can have very different effects on the way information is processed and 
whether and how it is later remembered (Neuman et al., 1992; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Some 
media can increase the information gap while the features of others may reduce information 
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inequalities (Jerit, Barabas & Bolsen, 2006; Neuman et al., 1992). While television brings 
political information to otherwise disinterested audiences, it does not seem to have the same 
positive effect on political knowledge as print media (Chaffee & Frank, 1996; Chaffee, Zhao & 
Leshner, 1994; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; McLeod et al., 1996; Neuman et al., 1992; 
Patterson & McClure, 1976).   Print news benefits those with high levels of education because 
they have stronger reading comprehension abilities and are better at identifying important pieces 
of information and storing key points in long term memory (Graber, 2004; Price & Zaller, 1993; 
Zaller, 1992).  Additionally, the inverted pyramid style of print journalism is concerned with 
efficient presentation of information, and newspaper stories typically lead with hard facts which 
require contextual knowledge to interpret (Neuman et al., 1992).  Focused on dramatic, 
emotional and visual elements, television news is more accessible to those with weaker skills and 
less prior knowledge (Graber, 2004; Jerit et al., 2006; Neuman et al., 1992).  As such, newspaper 
coverage tends to increase knowledge among the most educated and cognitively skilled, while 
television news has more universal benefits.   
 Of course, citizens are no longer limited to print newspapers and television news as 
sources of political information.  New media—mass communication forms with non-political 
origins that have acquired political roles by offering outlets for political discussion and 
engagement—have further expanded opportunities for political learning (Davis & Owen, 1998).  
It is unclear, however, whether greater opportunity to learn about politics will promote more 
universal engagement or primarily benefit citizens with pre-existing interest in politics and 
public affairs. 
Prior (2007) contends that the expansion of the media environment has adverse effects on 
the distribution of political knowledge because greater opportunity to learn about politics is not 
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coupled with increased motivation to do so.  “Two different paths—accidental exposure and 
enjoyment of politics—both lead to political learning.  Some people learn about politics because 
they are motivated to do so; others learn because they cannot help it and it is free” (p. 31).  
According to Prior’s (2007) Conditional Political Learning model, the new media environment 
has made the later path significantly more important than the former because the role of 
motivation is heavily dependent on the features of the information environment in which one 
acts.  In the era of broadcasting, even those with little interest in politics encountered some 
political information during the daily television news hour; but in the cable age, citizens with a 
preference for non-political content can more effectively opt out of the political information 
environment almost entirely.  With widely available entertainment alternatives, consumers can 
more effectively align media choices with personal interests.  As a result, only those with an 
interest in staying informed will do so.  Indeed, wider availability of political information has not 
coincided with a smaller knowledge gap because new sources are consumed primarily by those 
already engaged in politics (Davis & Owen, 1998; Pew, 2007).  In the high choice new media 
environment, citizens are divided by their preference for news versus entertainment, and a wide 
gap in political knowledge has developed between these groups (Prior, 2007). 
 However, the new media environment provides not only more opportunities to stay 
informed about politics, but also a greater variety of formats in which political information is 
available.  Recognizing that the way information is presented can affect the ease with which it is 
learned, Baum (2003b) suggests that new media may motivate interest and lessen the cognitive 
demands for learning so that the political knowledge gap shrinks.  He identifies a puzzle that 
cannot be explained by the Conditional Political Learning model.  Specifically, whereas Prior 
(2005, 2007) contends that the media environment should strengthen the link between interest 
20 
 
and information, in the area of foreign affairs, the opposite seems to be true.  That is, despite 
declining concern about international politics in the post cold war era prior to 9/11, attentiveness 
to foreign affairs increased. 
 To explain this phenomenon, Baum (2002, 2003a, 2003b) notes that the line between 
entertainment and information has blurred and non-traditional media play an increasingly 
important role in shaping how citizens learn about and understand politics.  Whereas knowledge 
studies have traditionally emphasized the distinct civic function of news as an information 
gatekeeper, “the opposite of news is not entertainment” (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001, p. 162, 
emphasis in original).  Soft news is a news-entertainment hybrid characterized by sensationalized 
stories, personality-centered coverage, and emphasis on human-interest themes and dramatic 
subject matter (Baum, 2002, 2003b; Patterson, 2000).  Baum (2003b) traces the development of 
soft news programming to the introduction of cable, satellite broadcasting, the Internet, and a 
more relaxed regulatory environment, the combined impact of which was a highly competitive 
media marketplace in which broadcasters could no longer rely on a large audience for 
dispassionate nightly newscasts.   Instead, networks sought to increase news profitability by 
making it more entertaining and accessible to politically disinterested audiences. In doing so, 
news was transformed from a civic oriented loss leader into an inexpensively produced, 
profitable entertainment format.  
 Several studies find a correlation between exposure to entertainment oriented news 
programs and knowledge (Baum, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Brewer & Cao, 2006; Cao, 2008; Kim & 
Vishak, 2008; Pew, 2004, 2012).  According to Baum’s (2003b) Incidental Exposure Theory, 
soft news reduces the cost of receiving political information and, thus, viewers learn as a bi-
product of being entertained.  The development of softer, more entertaining, user-friendly news 
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formats, “render[s] any tradeoff between being entertained and learning about politics moot by, 
in effect, transforming a select few of the major political issues of the day into the entertainment 
that people seek” (Baum, 2002, p. 96, emphasis in original). Soft news viewers are not otherwise 
motivated to learn about politics; however, because political information is presented in an easily 
digestible, entertaining way, motivational and cognitive requirements are significantly lower than 
for more complex, hard news formats.  Audiences learn as a result of incidental exposure to 
political information presented within entertainment oriented programming.      
Baum (2002, 2003a) finds evidence for incidental exposure looking specifically at 
foreign policy issues, an area where Americans are consistently found to be woefully uninformed 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Converse, 1964).  Examining a unique case of foreign policy 
coverage where soft news programs pointed out similarities between the plot of just released 
movie Wag the Dog and President Clinton’s decision to bomb terrorist targets in the midst of the 
Lewinski scandal, Baum (2003a) finds that those exposed to this coverage, particularly those 
who would not otherwise follow foreign affairs, reported higher levels of attention to and were 
more likely to have an opinion about the issue.  He finds similar increases in attention in 
response to soft news coverage of other international affairs issues (2003b).   
  Politically oriented entertainment can directly impact knowledge through incidental 
exposure to information, or indirectly promote learning by boosting interest in politics and 
encouraging further information seeking.   The gateway hypothesis predicts that the learning 
effect of political entertainment is mediated by awareness and interest, and that soft news may 
decrease the knowledge gap by promoting attention to politics among those who might otherwise 
turn away  (Baum, 2003b; Xenos & Becker, 2009).  Audience analysis showing soft news to be a 
supplement to rather than replacement for hard news (Young & Tisinger, 2006) as well as 
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experimental research showing that exposure to political entertainment leads to information 
seeking behavior (Xenos & Becker, 2009) lend support to the gateway hypothesis.   
Nonetheless, skeptics contend that soft news at best mitigates broader trends of 
disengagement from news and political information (Prior, 2003, 2005, 2007).  Increased interest 
and awareness do not necessarily translate into greater recall of factual information (Hollander, 
2005; Prior, 2005), and information acquisition from soft news is often less than that resulting 
from exposure to hard news (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Kim & Vishak, 2008; Prior, 2003, 
2005).  Prior (2007) maintains that despite the development of soft news alternatives, incidental 
exposure is less likely in the high choice media environment than when options were more 
limited.  After all, “for some of the entertainment-seekers, soft news offers the preferred mix of 
news and entertainment.  The important point is that they are former hard-news consumers” (p. 
281).  Thus, the net effect of soft news should be an expansion of the knowledge gap. 
Further, critics indict the content of soft news (Niven, Lichter & Amundson, 2003).  
Almost by definition, the political content of soft news tends to be limited to scandalous events, 
relies on cheap, moralistic frames, and emphasizes personality over policy.  Consequently, some 
argue that knowledge gain is limited to trivial matters of personality and scandal as opposed to 
the type of politically relevant policy issue information assumed in normative models of 
enlightened democratic citizenship (Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; 
Prior, 2003, 2005).  Moreover, there is great variance in the amount and type of political content 
within and characteristic audiences for different political entertainment formats, leading some to 
call for a more nuanced view of the entertainment landscape and subsequent effects (Delli 
Carpini, 2012; Feldman & Young, 2008; Holbert, 2005). This is particularly true of a distinct 




Effects of Political Comedy on Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior 
While certainly not a ‘new’ form of communication, political comedy programs have 
peaked much scholarly interest given the popularity of television shows like The Daily Show 
with Jon Stewart, The Colbert Report and Real Time with Bill Maher,
1
 as well as the resurgent 
popularity of Saturday Night Live during the election season.  The Pew Research Center for The 
People and the Press has documented the growing importance of comedy programs as sources of 
political information and exceptions to the general trend of news abandonment by young 
Americans (2004, 2008, 2010, 2012).  By 2012, The Daily Show and Colbert Report were among 
the most frequently identified sources of political information for those under 30 (Pew, 2012). 
Content analyses have shown that comedy programs such as The Daily Show and Colbert 
Report discuss important stories with similar depth to the coverage found in traditional television 
news (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Fox, Koloen & Sahin, 2007; Jones, 2005, 2010; PEJ, 2008; 
Zukas, 2012).  The Project for Excellence in Journalism at the Pew Research Center examined an 
entire year of content from The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and found an agenda closely 
resembling that of mainstream news sources.  However, the political comedy program operates 
outside of the daily news cycle, and blunt commentary, cutting criticism of the press and partisan 
imbalance more closely resemble cable news and talk radio than traditional, civic-oriented hard 
news.  They conclude that despite substantive, journalistic coverage of public affairs, The Daily 
Show does not provide a factual accounting of current events and is primarily entertainment 
rather than news (PEJ, 2008). 
Others contend that the entertainment orientation heightens the informative power of 
political comedy programs.  Jones (2005, 2010) considers The Daily Show from a cultural studies 
                                                 
1
 Previously Politically Incorrect 
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perspective and, though the implied effect is not empirically tested, argues that the juxtaposition 
of humor with the serious conventions of reporting and interviewing conveys important 
information while comically “processing” the news to help audiences make sense of complex 
political issues.  Despite humor and jokes, election coverage on The Daily Show is no less 
substantive than its hard news counterparts, which tend to emphasize the “hype and hoopla” 
surrounding campaign events (Fox et al., 2007).  In fact, the responsibility and morality frames 
utilized by Jon Stewart are perhaps more useful to viewers than the much maligned horse-race 
and strategy framing that characterizes most traditional election news coverage (Zukas, 2012).  
Further, by prominently featuring substantive issue frames in discussions of important political 
stories and events, The Daily Show may enhance political knowledge and promote critical 
thinking (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007).  Not only does comedy present politically relevant 
information, it does so in a way that may help viewers contextualize information so that it is 
better understood and more useful in formulating political judgments. 
 Studies consistently find a correlation between exposure to political comedy and political 
knowledge, often on par with that associated with hard news (Brewer & Cao, 2008; Cao, 2008; 
Feldman & Young, 2008; Graber, 2008; Hollander, 2005; Parkin, 2010; Xenos & Becker, 2009; 
Young & Hoffman, 2009). Relative to similar non-viewers, late-night comedy viewers have 
higher overall levels of campaign knowledge and are more informed about candidate 
backgrounds and issue positions (NAES, 2004). Comparing audiences for a variety of traditional 
and alternative sources of information, Pew surveys find regular viewers of The Daily Show and 
Colbert Report are among the most informed, with levels of political knowledge rivaled only by 
those who regularly read major newspaper websites (Pew, 2007, 2012).   
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 Critics raise the reasonable concern that these correlations are spurious.  Programs such 
as The Daily Show and Colbert Report appeal to audiences that are wealthy, educated and 
politically engaged (Morris, 2009; Moy, 2008; Moy et al., 2005a; Pew, 2008, 2010, 2012; Young 
& Tisinger, 2006), characteristics commonly associated with political knowledge.  In addition, 
political comedy tends to be used as a supplement to rather than replacement for traditional 
political media (Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 2005a; Young & Tisinger, 2006). This 
suggests that the relationship between comedy use and political knowledge is simply the result of 
audience characteristics and patterns of behavior and not evidence of a media effect. 
 Rather than engaging and informing politically apathetic audiences, political comedy 
might give greater information advantages to those who are already knowledgeable.  “Viewers 
who rely on The Daily Show as a source of information must already know enough about the 
story and the pop culture reference to get the joke” (PEJ, 2008, p. 14).  Young (2008) suggests 
that the cognitive burden associated with understanding humor may distract from substantive 
messages and hinder learning among those with limited political knowledge and experience.  
Several studies predict a linear relationship between pre-existing knowledge and learning from 
political comedy, with individual skills and resources moderating this effect so that sophisticated 
citizens benefit most (Cao, 2008; Landreville et al., 2010; Moy et al., 2005b). 
 Others accept that comedy can help citizens learn about politics, but are cautioned in their 
assessment of the magnitude of the effect.  Utilizing data from the 2004 Pew Political 
Communication Survey, Hollander (2005) identifies a relationship between comedy use and 
awareness of campaign events but not recall of factual information about candidates, and 
questions whether competence is meaningfully enhanced by the modest amount of information 
gleaned.  Echoing this concern, Baek and Wojcieszak (2009) analyze data from the 2004 
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National Annenberg Election Study from the perspective of Item Response Theory.  They find 
comedy viewing to be associated with knowledge among relatively inattentive viewers, but that 
performance improves primarily on easier knowledge items.  Though correlational studies 
identify modest learning effects among politically apathetic viewers, it is possible that effects on 
more sophisticated audiences are difficult to detect because of endogeneity in measures of 
engagement, knowledge and self-reported exposure to political comedy. 
 Despite these caveats, political comedy may be a viable information source which can, 
directly or indirectly, promote learning.  Whereas politically apathetic young viewers struggled 
to make sense of dull, hard news, The Daily Show was recognized as an interesting and 
accessible alternative for quality news and information (Rottinghaus et al., 2008). Kim and 
Vishak (2008) find that both news and comedy produce sizable learning effects, but that the type 
of information recalled differs significantly.  News encouraged memory-based processing and 
was associated with slightly greater correct recall of factual information.  Comedy enhanced 
memory for opinion statements and information recall was more closely associated with 
evaluations of political leaders, which they interpret as evidence of online processing.  However, 
this pattern of results is also consistent with the alternative interpretation that the comedic 
presentation enhanced viewers’ motivation and ability to recognize the meaning and implications 
that discrete pieces of information held for political judgments.  Indeed, others find that the 
comedic context enhances information acquisition (Parkin, 2010), especially among those 
positively oriented toward political comedy (Young & Hoffman, 2009).  These studies suggest 
that learning is not the result of incidental exposure to information that might not otherwise be 
encountered, but that political comedy has particular features which may enhance knowledge.  
27 
 
However, because informational content has only been loosely controlled, if at all, experimental 
research has not been able to identify the precise mechanism driving effects. 
 Rather than directly informing otherwise disinterested audiences, political comedy may 
boost learning indirectly by enhancing interest and attention (Baum, 2003b; Cao, 2010; Feldman 
& Young, 2008), promoting information seeking (Xenos & Becker, 2009), encouraging 
interpersonal discussion (Landreville et al., 2010) and reducing the motivational and resource 
requirements for following complex policy issues (Feldman, Leiserowitz & Maibach, 2011; 
Xenos & Becker, 2009).  Two related experiments by Xenos and Becker (2009) empirically 
demonstrate the mediation of learning by engagement and the knowledge equalizing effect of 
political comedy.  In the first experiment, participants were exposed to comedy, news or a hybrid 
video stimulus and subsequent information seeking behavior was tracked.  Participants with low 
pre-existing interest in politics sought more politically relevant information after exposure to 
comedy than similar participants receiving only hard news.  In a related experiment, participants 
were exposed to a comedy or news clip discussing either the economy or steroids in baseball 
followed by news stories covering both these topics.  Consistent with the gateway hypothesis, 
disinterested subjects exposed to comedy were better able to learn from subsequent media 
exposure and knew more about economic issues than those exposed only to news.  However, this 
effect was found regardless of the topic covered in the initial clip, indicating that political 
comedy did not simply prime relevant information, but enhanced learning and comprehension 
through a more complex cognitive mechanism. 
 Attitudinal studies find that political comedy enhances viewers’ perception of their own 
competence and ability to understand and participate in the political world.  Internal efficacy is 
positively associated with exposure to political comedy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Becker, 
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2011; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009), and functions as a mediator between political comedy and 
hard news media use (Cao & Brewer, 2008), gratifications derived from news (Holbert et al., 
2007), and civic and political participation (Cao & Brewer, 2008; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; 
Hoffman & Young, 2011). 
 There is disagreement, however, about whether comedy boosts internal efficacy because 
viewers are better able to understand politics or merely because they perceive themselves this 
way.   Some contend that political comedy enhances feelings of competence by presenting a 
simplified rendering of events that makes politics seem more comprehensible (Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006; Rottinghaus et al., 2008). From this perspective, political comedy, “paints the 
complexities of politics as a function of the absurdity and incompetence of political elites, thus 
leading viewers to blame any lack of understanding not on themselves but on those who run the 
system” (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, p. 362). Though Becker (2011) finds comedy to be 
associated with more positive assessments of political competence and understanding, the 
relationship is stronger for more complex, satirical comedy, such as The Daily Show or online 
newspaper The Onion, than for simpler, more broadly accessible late-night and sketch comedy 
shows.  Further, Feldman (2013) finds that effortful processing enhances learning from political 
comedy relative to more passive viewing.  In summary, political comedy may be an accessible 
source of information or may promote learning by challenging viewers to think more deeply 
about politics. 
  Though political comedy may enhance self-confidence, negative portrayals of 
politicians, the political system and news media might also have deleterious effects on 
democratically consequential beliefs and attitudes.  Political comedy viewers, especially young 
viewers and those with weak partisan attachments, tend to be more cynical about the political 
29 
 
system and express less trust in political leaders and the news media (Baumgartner & Morris, 
2006; Guggenheim et al., 2011; Morris & Baumgartner, 2008).  The biting satire on programs 
like The Daily Show has particularly negative consequences for how viewers perceive politics 
and political leaders (Becker, 2011; Guggenheim et al., 2011).  In fact, Daily Show viewers 
frequently list the government itself as the most important problem facing the nation (Cao & 
Brewer, 2009).  This correlation evidence cannot support causal claims about effects; however, it 
does suggest that political comedy might influence broader political world-views. 
 Not only does political comedy convey important information, it does so in a manner 
which might powerfully shape political attitudes and perceptions.  Though regularly subject to 
ridicule, candidates increasingly utilize political comedy programs to communicate directly with 
voters and highlight positive personal characteristics (Baum, 2005; Moy et al., 2005b). Brewer 
and Cao (2006) find late-night comedy programs to be the most frequently identified source of 
exposure to candidate interviews, more likely to be seen than appearances in any other forum, 
and that viewers acquire important campaign information by watching these appearances.  
Further, candidates can prime favorable considerations and shape evaluative criteria more 
successfully through non-confrontational guest appearances on comedy programs than by 
participating in traditional hard news interviews (Parkin, 2010), and those appearing on political 
comedy programs improve favorability ratings and increase candidate vote shares (Baum, 2005; 
Taniguchi, 2010).  Fowler (2008) investigates what comedian Steven Colbert often refers to as 
“the Colbert Bump” achieved by political leaders who appear on his program.  Perhaps hoping to 
reverse their fortunes, candidates appearing on The Colbert Report tend to be struggling 
financially.  Immediately prior to their appearance, guests raise more money than similarly 
situated candidates.  For Democrats, fund raising success continues in the weeks following their 
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appearance.  Republicans, however, suffer from what Fowler calls “the Colbert bust” in 
campaign contributions after appearing on the show. 
 Though appearances may have potential strategic value for some candidates, political 
comedy programs are an unlikely forum for outreach efforts given the generally negative 
portrayal of politicians and tendency of comedians to focus on the least admirable characteristics 
of political leaders. “The stance of late-night humor is fundamentally cynical; each politician is 
defined only by his or her most glaring weaknesses, and the system produces only venal, corrupt 
candidates unfit for office” (Jamieson & Waldman, 2003, p. 68). While engaging in self-parody 
can make a politician seem more likeable, ridicule by comedians has been shown to decrease 
favorability ratings even more than attack ads (Becker, 2012).  The negative portrayal of political 
leaders may increase the salience of caricatured traits in the minds of viewers, resulting in more 
negative evaluations, particularly among low knowledge viewers and strong partisans rating 
candidates from the other political party (Esralew & Young, 2012; Young, 2004, 2006).   
 Empirical results do not support these predictions and have, instead, shown that political 
comedy has only a limited, trait and candidate specific influence on ratings, and that the direction 
and magnitude of effects are inconsistently related to political knowledge and partisanship.  
Young (2004, 2006) finds that exposure to comedy is related to ratings on only a select few of 
the traits most commonly featured in late-night caricatures, and only among viewers with low 
levels of political knowledge.  Further, these effects are inconsistently related to partisan 
predispositions (Morris, 2009; Xenos et al., 2011; Young 2004, 2006).  In fact, some studies 
have identified a paradoxical decrease in viewers’ ratings of politicians from their own political 
party, while leaders from the other party are evaluated more favorably (Young, 2004; Xenos et 
al., 2011). These inconsistent findings suggest that political comedy does not simply prime 
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negative considerations but has a far more complex relationship with political attitudes than 
previously recognized. 
 The limited influence of political comedy on attitudes may be due in part to the widely 
recognized traits reflected in comic caricatures.  Indeed, content analyses show that the traits 
mocked by comedians are remarkably consistent across programs (Center for Media & Public 
Affairs, 2010; Niven et al., 2003; Young, 2004).  In the 2008 campaign, the impersonation of 
Sarah Palin by comedian Tina Fey received a great deal of acclaim, leading researchers to 
investigate the effects of such parody on perceptions of the Vice Presidential candidate.  Relative 
to debate coverage in other sources, seeing the SNL sketch satirizing Palin’s debate performance 
significantly decreased approval of her selection and the likelihood of voting for McCain, 
particularly among Republicans and Independents (Baumgartner, Morris & Walth, 2012).  
Nonetheless, the words used to describe Palin by those exposed to Katie Couric’s interview with 
the candidate were no different than the descriptions given by those watching the SNL parody of 
this interview (Ersalew & Young, 2012).  No matter the source of coverage, questions arose 
about Palin’s intelligence, competence and experience.  Even her rural background, ridiculed by 
SNL, was no more important in the minds of comedy viewers than those exposed to the original 
CBS interview.  Analysis of the Palin parody suggests that rather than directly affecting trait 
ratings or altering evaluative criteria, political comedy may reinforce pre-existing perceptions of 
political leaders. 
 In light of inconsistent findings, persuasion researchers contend that comedy is far more 
complex than recognized by those emphasizing the simplified caricatures and appealing nature of 
comedy to explain effects (Holbert, Hmielowski, Jain, Lather & Morey, 2011; Polk et al., 2009; 
Young, 2008).  Editorials may be more persuasive when accompanied by a political cartoon than 
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when presented on their own (Brinkman, 1968).  However, the challenges associated with 
interpreting comic messages, even for relatively sophisticated audiences, lessens their persuasive 
power.  Carl (1968) asked respondents to interpret the meaning of political cartoons and found 
that neither small town residents nor a more sophisticated sample of respondents from a 
university city consistently offered interpretations matching the cartoonist’s intent.  Studies show 
that The Colbert Report is particularly prone to misinterpretation and viewers often mistake 
Colbert’s satire for serious political commentary (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; LaMarre et al., 
2009).  Because humorous messages are difficult to interpret, political comedy may have an 
inconsistent effect on attitudes. 
 The comprehension and appreciation of political comedy may depend on the breadth of 
political content, the complexity of humor and the demographic, attitudinal and behavioral 
characteristics of audiences (Delli Carpini, 2012; Holbert et al., 2011; Polk et al., 2009).   
Satirical comedy shows like The Daily Show appeal to audiences that are political interested, 
knowledgeable and heavy news consumers, but more traditional late-night comedy is unrelated 
to these forms of political engagement (Hoffman & Young, 2011; Moy, 2008; Young & 
Tisinger, 2006).  Moreover, the ability of viewers to make sense of and enjoy comedy depends 
on the type of humor used and the cognitive engagement and the depth of thought it inspires 
(Holbert et al., 2011; Polk et al., 2009).  Comedy varies in the amount of prior knowledge 
required for understanding; and the type of humor one finds most appealing is partially 
dependent on the amount of prior knowledge one has (Holbert et al., 2011).  Efficacious viewers 
tend to prefer complex humor like irony, which they find intellectually engaging and thought 
provoking, to more simplistic sarcasm, preferred by those with less confidence in their abilities 
(Polk et al., 2009).   
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 Though meaning is generally implicit and prone to misinterpretation, the challenge 
involved in humor comprehension may actually enhance the persuasive potential of comic 
messages.  Young (2008) argues that understanding humor is a cognitively demanding activity 
and, “this condition of high cognitive load may subsequently reduce cognitive resources 
available to scrutinize message arguments” (p.122).  Her counterargument disruption hypothesis 
predicts that comedy leaves audiences susceptible to influence by focusing cognitive energy and 
attention on message comprehension and disrupting critical processing of underlying arguments.  
While research does identify a significant reduction in argument scrutiny resulting from political 
humor, counterargument disruption does not subsequently promote persuasion (see also Polk, et 
al., 2009). 
 Comedy may decrease argument scrutiny not because cognitive resources are limited but 
because messages are discounted as ‘just a joke,’ intended to entertain rather than inform and not 
relevant to judgments about important political issues (Nabi, Moyer-Guse & Byrne, 2007).  
Though they recognize persuasive intent and acknowledge that the attitudes and beliefs of others 
may be affected, comedy viewers feel personally immune from influence and perceive comic 
messages to be weaker than more traditional editorial arguments (Becker, Xenos & Waisanen, 
2010; Holbert et al., 2013).    Nabi and colleagues (2007) find that experimental exposure to 
humorous social issue messages enhanced attention and decreased counterargument but also 
increased message discounting so that messages had little initial persuasive effect.  However, 
humorous messages were highly memorable, encouraged deep, prolonged thought and, as a 
result, continued to influence attitudes over time. The researchers identified a persuasive “sleeper 
effect,” with humorous social issue messages strongly influencing attitudes measured one week 
after initial exposure.  
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 Though studies of entertainment media have effectively expanded thinking about political 
information beyond traditional hard news, researchers have struggled to explain how political 
comedy might influence the way citizens learn and think about the political world.  Certainly, 
political comedy programs provide an alternative forum in which important political information 
is available.  However, one key question that remains unanswered is whether or not, “the civic 
skills necessary for consuming politically relevant entertainment media [are] different from those 
needed for watching the evening news” (Delli Carpini, 2012, p. 16).  Persuasion research 
indicates that the audience demands associated with political comedy are quite different than 
those for more traditional sources of political information, but the ultimate impact of these 
differences remains unknown.  Even if comedy does not directly affect political attitudes, the 
patterns of cognition involved in humor comprehension might still be consequential in shaping 
the way audiences engage, understand and utilize information. 
 
Psychological Origins and Nature of Humor 
 To date, most research treats political comedy no differently than any other source of 
political information and offers little theoretical explanation of how exposure to comedy might 
affect knowledge and attitudes.  Those who do recognize comedy as a distinct communication 
form make conflicting theoretical predictions and have, so far, been unsuccessful in indentifying 
the effect that these differences may have (e.g. Polk et al., 2009; Young, 2006, 2008).  The 
primary contention of this dissertation is that the effects of political comedy are directly related 
to the patterns of cognition involved in humor comprehension and the associated emotional 
experience of amusement.  Comedy promotes attention and cognitive elaboration, encouraging 
viewers to play with ideas so that knowledge becomes more organized and information is more 
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easily recalled and utilized when forming political opinions.  As a result, exposure to political 
comedy will enhance not only information retention but also attitude constraint.  
The effect of information is determined, in part, by the emotional reactions produced.  
There is now widespread recognition that what we think about and how we respond to politics 
are guided not only by long-term, stable predispositions but also by short-term feelings about the 
political environment.  Indeed, emotion is now seen as playing an important role in what people 
pay attention to, learn and believe about politics (Brader, 2005, 2006; Marcus & MacKuen, 
1993; Marcus, Neuman & MacKuen, 2000; Rudolph, Gangl and Stevens, 2000).   
A two-dimensional model of affect provides the framework for much existing research on 
the role of emotion in politics.  Such models posit that basic positive and negative emotions play 
a preconscious role in decision-making by providing a general “gut-feeling” about new 
information.  In their Affective Intelligence Theory, Marcus and colleagues (2000) identify two 
primary brain subsystems that guide political thought—the disposition system, which holds the 
predispositions, beliefs and habits that guide behavior, and the surveillance system, which 
constantly scans the environment for novelty and triggers anxiety in response to threats.   
Anxiety disrupts habitual patterns of behavior, focuses attention on threats, and encourages a 
reevaluation of political beliefs to incorporate new information.  Positive emotion takes on a 
lesser role in this model and is generally seen as a response to evidence that things are going well 
and goals are being met (Brader, 2005, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000).   
Though some recent scholarship discriminates between different negative emotions, 
particularly anger and anxiety (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; 
Valentino, Gregorowicz & Groenendyk, 2009; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011), positive emotions, 
such as pride, hope, excitement and happiness, are grouped into a single measure of enthusiasm, 
36 
 
and the political consequences of positive emotions have received much less attention.  Theories 
often downplay the importance of specific positive emotions because action tendencies are more 
general than those associated with negative emotions (Fredrickson, 2004).  The immediacy of a 
threat necessitates that responses to negative emotion be specific, automatic, and goal directed.  
The action tendencies associated with positive emotion tend to be less focused and, thus, difficult 
to incorporate into general theories of emotion (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).  
Nonetheless, positive emotion has far reaching consequences for cognitions and behavior.  
According to Fredrickson’s (1998, 2001, 2004) “broaden-and-build” theory of positive emotions, 
“positive emotions broaden an individual’s momentary thought-action repertoire...[and] promote 
discovery of novel and creative action, ideas and social bonds, which in turn build that 
individual’s personal resources; ranging from physical and intellectual resources, to social and 
psychological resources” (2004, p. 1367 emphasis in original).  While negative emotions tend to 
focus attention and energy on immediate threats, positive emotion can broaden the repertoire of 
cognition, encouraging more global assessment of situations (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994) and 
integration of diverse information (Isen, 2000).  The gratifications associated with the experience 
of positive emotions can motivate attention to information and may expand rather than constrain 
thought. 
One particular emotion associated with enhanced attention to information is amusement.  
The nature of amusement and its consequences are not well understood because of the 
complexity of the emotional experience and its close linkages with comedic stimuli and the 
outward expression of laughter (Martin, 2007).  However, amusement should be recognized as a 
discrete emotion because it is associated with particular antecedent conditions, processes of 
cognition and action tendencies, all of which have evolutionary origins.  Broadly speaking, 
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amusement is an emotion experienced in response to humor or comedy.  Comedy promotes 
attention to and elaboration about information in order to achieve the emotional gratification of 
amusement.  
Its evolutionary origins suggest that amusement may have an important function within 
the emotional systems that structure cognition.  These origins were documented by Darwin 
(1872), himself, who noted the laughter-like vocalizations of primate species.  The open-
mouthed “play panting,” which facilitates playful interaction among chimpanzees, is recognized 
as a precursor to human laughter (Gervais & Wilson, 2005).  Though norms of expression differ, 
humor and laughter are observed in all human cultures and societies (Apte, 1985; Darwin, 1872; 
Polimeni & Reiss, 2006; Weisfeld, 1993).  Laughter is the second vocalization that a child 
learns, shortly after crying (Deacon, 1997; Gervais & Wilson, 2005; Weisfeld, 1993).  In fact, 
“every normal human being is strongly genetically predisposed to develop the ability to produce 
and perceive laughter” (Gervais & Wilson, 2005, p. 398).  Even deaf and blind children, with 
limited ability to perceive or learn laughter from others, laugh in response to humorous stimuli 
(Provine, 2000).  Additionally, amusement engages the same neural pathways, including the 
hypothalamus and limbic structures, as other evolved emotions (Weisfeld, 1993).  This suggests 
that amusement is a fundamental emotion with a more important role in human cognition than 
often recognized. 
With evolutionary origins in rough and tumble play, the primary benefit of amusement is 
learning (Alexander, 1986; Gervais & Wilson, 2005; Polimeni & Reiss, 2006; Weisfeld, 1993).   
“Humor provides the recipient with information or stimulation that later enhances fitness” 
(Weisfeld, 1993, p147).  At its most basic level, play provides children the opportunity to 
practice survival skills such as fighting, predator avoidance, and hunting (Weisfeld, 1993).  The 
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most prominent example of this is tickle-play.  Because the places on the human body most 
vulnerable in an attack are also the most ticklish, tickling is not just a fun game but also teaches a 
child, in a non-threatening manner, to protect those susceptible areas (Gervais & Wilson, 2005).  
The universal pleasure children derive from mocking adults also evidences the importance of 
comedy in learning social roles (Weisfeld, 1993). The outward expression of laughter further 
encourages children to practice and learn these important skills because it signals that an 
interaction non-threatening and triggers the release of pain reducing opioids (Gervais & Wilson, 
2005; Pankseep, 2000; Polimeni & Reiss, 2006; Weisfeld, 1993).  Thus, laughter can transform a 
threatening physical attack into pleasant roughhousing or a game of chase.   
Of course, the humor that older humans enjoy is significantly different and more 
complicated than the physical play resulting in amusement and laughter in very young children.  
Even among children, the things that produce amusement and laughter evolve in cognitive 
complexity, from simple tactile and auditory stimuli among infants to more complex visual and 
social stimuli as a child ages (Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972).  Rather than physical play, the more 
complex forms of humor enjoyed by adults involve playing with ideas.  
Learning from comedy stems from the way that information is cognitively processed.  
There is a general consensus that incongruity or unexpectedness is a critical part of what makes 
things funny (Gervais & Wilson, 2005; Martin, 2007). Incongruity theories of humor propose 
that amusement is created when a surprising discrepancy exists between two mental 
representations (Nerhardt, 1976; Raskin, 1985; Suls, 1972, 1983), and two normally disparate 
planes of thought or meaning are simultaneously applied to the same piece of information 
(Koestler, 1964). More specifically, humor follows when some expectation (derived from the 
joke setup) is incongruent with some other construct or expectation (revealed in the punch line). 
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Raskin (1985) provides the following example: “Is the doctor home?” the patient asked in his 
bronchial whisper. “No,” the doctor’s young and pretty wife whispered in reply. “Come right in.”  
Here, the first part of the joke creates an expectation of a medical script, whereas the punch line 
brings to mind a sexual script, and the juxtaposition of these two incongruent elements makes the 
joke funny.  Apter (1992) discusses humor in terms of synergy, where the observer playfully 
manipulates ideas by concurrently holding contradictory images or simultaneously perceiving 
some object in different ways, as is the case in the previous joke when the idea of a “house call” 
is viewed from two different perspectives.   
Further elaborating the cognitive processes involved in humor appreciation, theories of 
incongruity resolution propose that amusement requires both the recognition and resolution of 
incongruity (Koestler, 1964; Shultz, 1972; Suls, 1972, 1983).  The perception of information that 
is incompatible with initial understandings prompts the observer to search for alternative ways of 
interpreting a situation so that the punch line makes sense (Shultz, 1972).  Suls (1972, 1983) 
proposes a two stage model of humor appreciation.  The setup of a joke establishes general 
expectations about the type of information to follow.  The punch line of a joke deviates from 
these expectations, providing new information incongruent with initial understandings.  The 
second stage of humor appreciation involves the search for a cognitive rule allowing new 
information to be understood in the context of the old.  This two stage model likens comedy to 
an intellectual puzzle solving game where the observer must figure out how incongruent 
elements fit together. 
Expanding on this notion of humorous puzzle solving, Wyer and Collins (1992) 
incorporate theories of schematic processing into their comprehension-elaboration model of 
humor appreciation.  Generally speaking, knowledge is structured by associative networks 
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consisting of interconnected concepts and schema representing the characteristics and exemplary 
cases which define a particular domain of knowledge (Anderson, 1983; Conover & Feldman, 
1984).  According to Wyer and Collins (1992), a joke is initially understood based on the 
constructs and schema most immediately accessible in memory.  Humor disrupts schematic 
processing because new, incongruent information cannot be interpreted using concepts and 
schema contained in the domain of knowledge initially activated.  Humorous reinterpretation 
involves the simultaneous activation of contradictory concepts and schema, often from 
seemingly disconnected domains of knowledge, which create new meaning and allow a situation 
to be understood as a whole.  
Further, amusement is enhanced by cognitive elaboration about the implications of a 
humorous reinterpretation and the generation of inferences beyond those involved in initial 
humor comprehension (Wyer & Collins, 1992).  For example, amusement is initially experienced 
when Colbert’s praise of President Bush for “believing the same thing on Wednesday that he 
believed on Monday, no matter what happened Tuesday,” is reinterpreted as criticism.  Pleasure 
is then heightened by subsequent elaboration regarding what the joke means about the 
administration’s leadership and ideologically driven policy making.  Amusement is a function of 
not only the recognition and resolution of incongruity required for humor comprehension, but 
also the cognitive elaboration that a humorous reinterpretation inspires.   
Because comedy is a puzzle solving game, humor comprehension and enjoyment 
necessitates individual skills and resources.  Understanding comedy requires sufficient prior 
information to not only recognize that expectations have been violated, but also identify a rule to 
resolve the incongruity.  A joke will be perceived as funny only if such a rule can be found.   
Take the following joke: Three statisticians go deer hunting together.  A large buck approaches.  
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The first statistician fires a shot 2 feet to the left.  The second fires a shot 2 feet to the right.  The 
third statistician exclaims, “We got him!” Though the third statistician’s excitement is clearly 
inconsistent with information about the first two statisticians’ aim, the joke is unlikely to amuse 
those lacking the basic statistical knowledge necessary to resolve this incongruity.  The challenge 
involved in comprehending a joke may enhance or reduce amusement, “as comprehension 
difficulty increases up to a point, recipients feel more challenged, and their success in 
comprehending the information is rewarding.  Beyond this optimal level, however, recipients 
might begin to feel stupid or incompetent, so their enjoyment decreases” (Wyer & Collins, 1992, 
p. 674).  Jokes are unamusing if they are too challenging or if incongruity is too easily resolved 
(Suls, 1983), hence the limited appeal of silly puns, knock-knock jokes and other low-complexity 
humor.   
Further, research on brain-damaged patients shows that multiple, integrated brain systems 
are required for humor comprehension (for review see McGhee, 1983).  Left hemispheric 
damage hinders recognition of incongruity, while those with damage to the right hemisphere are 
able to recognize incongruity but cannot differentiate between jokes and non-sequiturs.  More 
recent fMRI studies show that both the right frontal lobe (involved in processing negative 
emotion) and left frontal lobe (important in positive emotional processing) are utilized in 
comprehending and appreciating humor (Bartolo et al., 2006).  Comedy presents an intellectual 
puzzle demanding high level cognitive skills and resources to solve.   
In addition, the challenges associated with understanding comedy influence the extent 
and nature of elaboration and the amount of amusement experienced.  The time and effort 
devoted to humor comprehension trade off with that devoted to subsequent cognitive elaboration 
(Wyer & Collins, 1992).  Certainly, inability to understand a joke prevents elaboration about the 
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implications of a humorous reinterpretation.  Humor that is difficult to comprehend may 
stimulate humor-irrelevant elaborations about one’s own competence and abilities (Wyer & 
Collins, 1992), and such distractions from entertainment goals decrease amusement (Apter, 
1982).  Some jokes, especially those that are easily understood, may produce little amusement 
because humorous reinterpretations have low elaborative potential. 
Elaborative potential refers to the implications humor holds for the persons or objects 
directly involved as well as the events surrounding them.  Amusement is maximized by humor 
with low to moderate comprehension difficulty but high elaborative potential (Wyer & Collins, 
1992).  Take the classic childrens’ joke: What’s black and white and red all over? A newspaper.  
Amusement is created when the color ‘red’ is reinterpreted as the verb ‘read’ so that the initial 
statement can be understood in reference to a newspaper.  The elaborative potential of this joke 
is low, however, because the reinterpretation holds little meaning outside the immediate context; 
it does not speak to the changing role of newspapers, nature of journalism or broader issues in 
news media that more complicated humor may address.  Conversely, though it involved 
relatively simple word-play, Steven Colbert’s now famous “truthiness” sketch had far reaching 
implications and lead to extensive elaboration about the nature of truth in modern political 
discourse.
2
  Amusement was less a function of the joke itself than the subsequent elaboration it 
inspired. 
 
The Effect of Political Comedy on Knowledge and Attitudes 
In examining the effects of political comedy it is important to recognize not only the 
presence of political information but also the form that political information takes.  Concern 
                                                 
2
 Following the sketch, truthiness was discussed extensively by political commentators and inspired numerous 
stories in The New York Times and other news outlets.  Cementing its cultural significance, the term was eventually 
included in The Oxford English Dictionary. 
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about the capacity of ordinary citizens to fulfill their civic obligations, resist manipulation and 
protect the public good led democratic theorists and political communication researchers to 
distinguish between entertainment and news.  Public affairs were the exclusive domain of civic-
oriented, news media, solely responsible for providing the factual, public affairs information 
necessary for effective political engagement.  Conversely, entertainment media were seen as a 
distraction from the serious business of citizenship (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; Jones, 
2006; Schudson, 1998; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011).   
More recently, changes in the media environment have eroded this distinction, and many 
have called for greater recognition of the political relevance of entertainment media (Baum, 
2003b; Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; Jones, 2006).  As Jones (2006) puts it, “engaging 
politics through media need not be the proverbial equivalent of eating one’s vegetables” (p.377).  
In fact, information acquisition is but one of many potential reasons for consuming political 
media, and entertainment offers meaningful opportunities for political engagement. 
A strictly utilitarian, information oriented conceptualization of the democratic role of 
media limits our understanding of how citizens come to learn about and understand politics.  
Citizens are best served when media present information in a way that is both informative and 
engaging.  Indeed, socio-psychological theories of humor suggests that it is precisely by 
stimulating emotional arousal and cognitive involvement that political comedy may influence 
knowledge and attitudes.  
Learning from traditional, hard news requires a general curiosity or interest in politics 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Fiorina, 1990; Verba & Nie, 1972), an expectation of information 
utility in decision making (Lupia & McCubins, 1998), the perception of personal relevance 
(Green & Citrin, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1990, 1991), a sense of civic duty (Almond & Verba, 
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1963; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; McGraw & Scholz, 1991; Tetlock, 1983; Verba et al., 1995) 
or some other external source of motivation.  The emotional gratifications derived from comedy 
provide intrinsic motivation to pay attention (Apter, 1992; Martin, 2007).  Moreover, emotional 
rewards are achieved only through recognition and resolution of incongruity (Koestler, 1964; 
Shultz, 1972; Suls, 1972, 1983) and elaboration about the meaning and implications of humorous 
messages (Wyer & Collins, 1992).  Experimental studies show that the patterns of cognitive 
engagement involved in comprehending and appreciating humor enhance recall of humorous 
images and statements (Schmidt, 1994, 2001).  By motivating attention, encouraging cognitive 
engagement and increasing the depth and complexity of thought, political comedy should boost 
learning.    
Further, humor comprehension requires the integration of ideas and elaboration about 
how seemingly disparate pieces of information relate (Koestler, 1964; Suls, 1972, 1983; Wyer & 
Collins, 1992).  These patterns of cognitive processing can influence the way information is 
encoded and organized in long term memory.  The simultaneous activation and subsequent 
salience of concepts and schema from otherwise disconnected domains of knowledge (Koestler, 
1964; Wyer & Collins, 1992) may help build associated networks and enhance political 
understanding.  As a result, political comedy may boost knowledge because information is more 
readily recalled when it is incorporated into well organized knowledge structures.   
 By shaping the way information is encoded and structured in memory, political comedy 
might also influence political attitudes.  Most attitude studies focus on the persuasive power of 
political comedy, but its potential influence on how politics is understood more broadly has yet 
to be investigated.  It is in shaping how viewers think about politics that comedy has the most 
potential to influence attitudes and beliefs.  Comedy calls attention to situations that are well 
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known and extensively covered in traditional media and, rather than contributing to new 
knowledge, humorous re-presentation of widely available information may refresh memory and 
generate new insights that enhance and deepen knowledge and understanding (Graber, 2008).  
Indeed, emotionally engaging and often repeated, comedy can influence how the public 
collectively understands and remembers political events. 
The processes of cognition associated with comedy should not only increase the volume 
of information one has, but may also influence the way knowledge is structured in memory, 
thereby enhancing political sophistication and attitude constraint.  Sophistication is a function of 
both the total amount information available and the way this information is organized (Luskin, 
1987, 1990), and highly organized knowledge is associated with more reliable, internally 
consistent attitudes (Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1987; Zaller, 1992).  By simultaneously eliciting 
contradictory schema, highlighting interconnections, promoting deep and sustained thought 
about political relationships and the implications of information across domains of knowledge, 
comedy should encourage more sophisticated political thought and greater attitude constraint. 
 Additionally, political jokes come in standard forms, are largely consistent in focus and 
are frequently repeated with only minor revisions over time and across platforms (Center for 
Media & Public Affairs, 2010; Niven et al., 2003; Young, 2004).  This repetition may enhance 
the influence of comedy by promoting further elaboration about the meaning and implications of 
a political joke. “If a joke has high-elaboration potential, all potential elaborations of it are 
unlikely to be considered at the time the joke is first encountered.  To this extent, repeating the 
joke may stimulate a different subset of implications than it did the first time, and these new 
implications may elicit humor” (Wyer & Collins, 1992, p. 678).  Though specific attitudes may 
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be unchanged, attitudes should be more interconnected as a result of cognitive elaboration about 
the implications of humorous messages across a wide variety of domains. 
 The effects of comedy on knowledge and comprehension depend on the skills and 
resources of individual viewers.  Though they may derive great pleasure from the puzzle solving 
exercise, political comedy is unlikely to benefit sophisticated citizens given their well-developed 
schema, understanding of abstract political concepts and frequent engagement with non-
humorous sources of political information.  While political comedy may provide some 
information to which those lacking political interest might not otherwise be exposed, limited 
prior political knowledge makes comprehending humor particularly challenging.  Even if humor 
is understood, the time and energy expended on comprehension diminish these viewers’ ability 
to engage in the cognitive elaboration that maximizes informational benefits.   Standing to gain 
the most from political comedy are those with sufficient knowledge and ability to comprehend 
jokes and elaborate on implications, but who are unlikely to think deeply about politics absent 
the emotional gratifications that comedy provides for doing so.   For these moderately 
sophisticated citizens, political comedy should boost learning and attitude constraint by 
promoting attention to and cognitive elaboration about information beyond that inspired by more 
traditional hard news sources. 
 These expectations about humor triggered cognition will be further developed in 
subsequent chapters.  Both experimental and survey methods are employed to test specific 
hypotheses about the effects of political comedy on knowledge and attitudes.  Comedy is not 
only an alternative source of information but a distinct communication form which presents 
information in a way that is fundamentally different than hard news.  Because they are thought to 
stem directly from the unique way information is presented and subsequently processed by 
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audiences, the effects of political comedy must be evaluated relative to those associated with 
exposure to information in more traditional news outlets.  The following chapter describes the 
development of experimental stimuli allowing the influence of comedy to be isolated and the 
experimental methodology used to examine effects.  
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Chapter 3. Experimental Pretest and Methods 
Media effects can best be measured through controlled experiments.  This chapter 
describes the development and pretesting of stimuli and the experimental methodology used to 
test predictions derived from the model of humor-triggered cognition.  Because effects are 
thought to result from the patterns of cognitive processing and engagement associated with 
comprehending and enjoying humor, the effects of comedy on political sophistication can only 
be assessed by comparing changes in knowledge and attitudes following exposure to comedy to 
those resulting from exposure to identical information presented in hard news form.  Content 
analyses have shown that, in the aggregate, political comedy and traditional television news 
programs are quite similar in substantive issue content (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007; Fox et al., 
2007; Jones, 2005, 2010; PEJ, 2008; Zukas, 2012).  However, to isolate the effect of humor from 
the influence of exposure to information, itself, it was necessary to create video stimuli that 
manipulated the presence of humor but otherwise held information constant.  Comedy and news 
videos were edited to achieve content equivalence, holding factual information, political 
perspectives, imagery, sound-bites, subjective assessments of issues and overall issue frames 
constant so that the news and comedy versions of stories varied only on humor.  
 The stimuli were developed from segments aired on The Daily Show, Colbert Report, and 
nightly network news between November 2009 and January 2010.  It was critical to identify 
news and comedy segments that, 1. focused on politically pertinent topics and issues; 2. covered 
these issues in similar ways; and, 3. would remain relevant throughout the course of the study.  
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Though most news is event-oriented (Iyengar, 1991), episodically framed coverage tends not to 
have a comedic counterpart (PEJ, 2008) and the information is quickly rendered obsolete.  
Instead, it was necessary to identify clips containing thematically framed discussions of 
persistent, contemporary political controversies.  In both news and comedy television programs, 
the primary topics receiving such treatment during this time period were issues related to the 
economic recovery and healthcare reform. 
 To create stimuli for the experiment, all comedy and news programs airing between 
November 2009 and January 2010 were recorded.  From this sample, I identified comedic and 
news stories that provided thematic coverage of economic and healthcare issues and contained 
information likely to remain pertinent through the course of the study.  Microsoft Movie Maker 
media editing software was used to edit content into and out of individual segments to create 
content identical news and comedy versions of five stories. 
The editing of comedy videos involved manipulation of the news clips and quotes used 
within comedy segments to set up jokes or identify the object of disparagement. Whenever 
possible, I identified the complete, original version of the news story from which clips were 
drawn.   When complete source stories were available, the brief clips featured in comedy 
segments were replaced with longer, content rich versions of the original.  In other instances, 
news montages from the original comedy segments were supplemented or replaced by news clips 
used in the non-comedic versions of the story. 
The news stimuli were edited in a similar fashion, with clips from several different news 
stories and sources intermixed as necessary.  To maintain realism and minimize the impact of 
edits, the race and gender of the reporter were held constant throughout each video and changes 
in journalist or network were masked using sound-bites or images as transitions.  I also removed 
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time-sensitive information and other cues that could potentially affect perceptions and confound 
results.  The final stimuli included identical news stories supplemented with jokes and humor in 
the comedy versions. 
 I was ultimately able to develop five complementary pairs of content identical news and 
comedy videos that were considered for use as experimental stimuli.  Efforts were made to match 
the length of each version; however, making videos of identical length would require variation in 
the amounts of substantive information presented.  Because they contain jokes and humor in 
addition to the content-matched information, the comedy videos are slightly longer than their 
news counterparts.   
The first pair of stories addresses the issue of banking industry reform.  The comedy 
version of this story is based on two The Daily Show
3
 segments originally aired January 12 and 
26, 2010, and a January 18, 2010 piece from The Colbert Report.
 4
 The news version was created 
from two stories that aired January 21, 2010 on NBC Nightly News.
 5
  Both the comedy and news 
versions frame the debate over banking reforms as a conflict between the interests of Wall St. 
versus Main St. and accuse wealthy bankers of holding taxpayers hostage.  Investment banking 
institutions are blamed for causing the economic crisis and accused of exploiting taxpayers by 
leveraging federal bailout funds into record profits and large employee bonuses while doing little 
to alleviate the economic suffering of the average citizen.   These clips also outline President 
Obama’s banking reform plan and note strong resistance to the plan from financial institutions.  
The comedy and news videos run 6 minutes and 5 minutes, respectively.  Again, it is the 
                                                 
3
 The Daily Show Episode #15006, “Clusterf#@k to the Poor House--Wall Street Bonuses” and Episode #15014, 
“Obama Takes on Bankers”  
4
 The Colbert Report Episode #06009, “Own a Piece of Histor-Me—Original Interview Table” 
5
 NBC Nightly News, Thursday, January 21, 2010, “President Obama ready to fight banks over status quo” reported 
by Chuck Todd and “Goldman Sachs to give out bonuses” reported by Anne Thompson 
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presence of comedy in addition to factual information, which is held constant across conditions, 
that accounts for this difference in length. 
 The second complementary pair of news and comedy clips discusses a December 14, 
2009 meeting between CEO’s and the President.  An ABC World News
6
 story broadcast the 
evening of the meeting and a segment from The Daily Show
7
 that aired the following day form 
the basis of the news and comedy videos.  These stories emphasize the incongruity between 
Obama’s public vitriol toward big business and his tendency to capitulate to their demands.  The 
failure of several CEO’s to attend the meeting is interpreted as evidence of both the ineffectuality 
of the President and the arrogance of the wealthy business elite.  Total runtime is 3 minutes, 40 
seconds for the comedy video and 2 minutes, 30 seconds for the news video. 
The third pair of stories focuses on healthcare reform.  The comedy version of this story 
was developed from a piece originally shown on The Daily Show
8
 on December 16, 2009.  The 
news version was based on two CBS Evening News
9
 stories from December 15, 2009.  Emphasis 
is on conflict within the Democratic Party as leaders worked to sure up support for a healthcare 
reform bill.  Both versions of the video cast Senator Joe Lieberman as a problematic 
obstructionist—a crucial swing voter with undue influence who undermines negotiations by 
capriciously withholding support for a Medicare buy-in option which he once supported.  Also 
hindering progress is the intensity of Republican opposition, evident in vitriolic speeches and 
impassioned anti-reform protests.   The comedy healthcare video runs 5 minutes, 15 seconds, the 
news version, 4 minutes, 40 seconds. 
                                                 
6
 ABC World News, Monday, December 14, 2009, “Payback Time; Tough Talk” reported by Jake Tapper 
7
 The Daily Show Episode #14160, “Clusterf#@k to the Poor House--Flight Delay” 
8
 The Daily Show Episode #14161, “The D. C.” 
9
 CBS Evening News, December 15, 2009, “Health Care Reform” reported by Chip and “Lieberman Compromises 
Senate Compromise Bill” reported by Nancy Cordes 
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For reasons explained in the subsequent discussion of pretest results, two additional story 
pairs, one describing informational errors on Recovery.gov, a website designed to track stimulus 
funded projects, and another detailing proposals for the use of TARP surplus funds, were 
pretested but not included as part of final experimental stimuli. Problems with the stimulus 
website were the focus of a November 16, 2009 story on ABC World News.
10
  This story was 
satirized on the Colbert Report
11
 in a piece that aired December 1, 2009. The comedy version of 
the Recovery.org story runs 2 minutes, 25 seconds, the news version, 2 minutes, 10 seconds.  
Surplus TARP funds were discussed on The Daily Show
12
 and ABC World News
13
 on December 
7, 2009.  The edited comedy and news TARP surplus videos run 2 minutes, 35 seconds and 2 
minutes, 15 seconds, respectively.   
 
Pretest Methods 
 Though carefully edited to establish content equivalence, the videos were also pretested 
to ensure that viewers perceived news and comedy versions to be equivalent but for humorous 
content.  Ideally, evaluations of the news and comedy versions of each video would differ only in 
the degree to which respondent found them funny but not on perceptions of information or other 
patterns of emotional arousal.  The manipulation check was conducted in February 2010, 
immediately prior to the start of experimental data collection. A total of 51 pretest respondents 
were recruited from the Communication Studies Participant Pool at the University of Michigan.  
Respondents were randomly assigned to view either the news or comedy version of each of the 5 
stories, and all were given a mix of story formats over the course of the pretest.  Respondents 
                                                 
10
 ABC World News, Monday, November 16, 2009, “Stimulus Money; Stimulus Glitch” reported by Jonathan Karl 
11




 The Daily Show Episode #14155, “American Idle” 
13
 ABC World News, Monday, December 7, 2009, “Bailout Money; Money Back” reported by Jake Tapper 
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ranged from 18 to 20 years of age, with an average age of 18.6 years.  Seventy-three percent 
were women.  The majority (87%) were white, with 4% black, 4% Hispanic and 6% Asian.  The 
sample skewed wealthy, with 37% estimating their family income to be 125K or greater, only 
10% estimating a family income of less than 50K, 34% estimating a family income between 50K 
and 125K, and 19% reporting that their family income was unknown.  Respondents were 
generally engaged in politics, reporting reading news on the Internet on average 4.1 days per 
week, watching TV news 1.78 days per week, and watching political comedy programs 1.78 
days per week on average.  Asked to assess their knowledge of politics, the majority (51%) put 
themselves at the midpoint of a 5 point political knowledge scale.  Similarly, respondents 
reported moderate levels of political interest, with 44% placing themselves at the midpoint of a 5 
point political interest scale.  The sample was mixed in terms of political identification, with 
44% reporting identification with the Democratic Party, 20% identifying with the Republican 
Party, and 19% identifying as independent. 
To ensure that each clip was watched in its entirety, respondents were not able to fast-
forward or rewind the video.  Additionally, the final frame of each clip included a numeric code 
that had to be correctly entered in order to move ahead to follow-up questions. Immediately 
following each video, respondents were asked several questions about their reactions to and 
perceptions of the video that they had just watched. Using a 7-point scale, respondents were 
asked to rate how well several words—entertaining, informative, funny, interesting, and 
confusing—described each video, and how intensely they felt 6 emotions—angry, sad, afraid, 
amused, excited, and happy—while they were watching.  They were also asked how much they 
agreed or disagreed with several statements: The video I just watched contained a lot of 
important political information; The video contained facts and statistics about the issue; I know 
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more about the issue discussed in the video now than I did before I watched; All the claims made 
in the video were backed up by evidence; and, The video contained information about what both 
sides of the issue think.  Response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree).  Two additional questions were used to measure perceptions of the political perspective 
presented in the videos.  Respondents were asked to rate the ideological perspective of the video 
on a 7-point scale where 1 meant that the video was Conservative, 7 meant the video was 
Liberal, and 4 meant that the video was not closer to one side or the other.   Finally, an open-
ended question asked respondents asked to indicate the percentage of the video dedicated to the 
Democratic side and the Republican side of the issue.  Complete question wording can be found 
in Appendix 3A. 
 
Pretest Results 
Based on pretest responses, three stories—banking reform, healthcare reform, and the 
CEO meeting—were deemed appropriate for use in the experimental stimuli.  Only on humor 
related questions did the videos receive significantly distinct ratings across conditions.  Table 3.1 
shows ratings of the three clips included in the final experimental stimuli on measures of funny, 
amused and entertaining. The largest differences are seen in descriptions of the videos as funny, 
with comedic versions rated 10 to 25 times funnier than the news versions of each story.  
Respondents also experienced significantly more amusement while viewing the comedy as 
compared to news version of these stories.  Though many did find news to be entertaining, these 
ratings are significantly lower than those for the comedy versions.  Comedy versions scored 
much higher on all humor related measures. 
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For the experimental manipulation to be valid, stimuli also needed to be equivalent on all 
dimensions except humor. The pretest affirms the content equivalence of the news and comedy 
videos, identifying only small differences in the perceived quantity and quality of information 
presented across versions of each story. Table 3.2 shows ratings of the news and comedy 
versions of the three stories included in the final experimental stimuli on measures related to 
perceptions on the informational content.   Overall, the comedic versions were somewhat more 
interesting than the news versions of stories, but the videos were generally perceived to be 
equivalent in informational content.   Whether they viewed the comedic or news version of a 
story, respondents reported little confusion and felt that they knew more about an issue after 
watching the videos.  Respondents strongly agreed that all videos contained important 
information, presented facts and statistics about the issue, and provided evidence to support 
claims.  Though there are some statistically significant differences in evaluations of the 
informational content, these differences are substantively small. The comedic healthcare story is 
rated only about 20% lower than the news version on informational content questions, and 
differences for the CEO meeting and banking reform stories are even smaller.  These small 
differences are of little concern because the informational content of the stimuli were tightly 
controlled through the editing process.  More importantly, if news does contain more substantive 
information than comedy, then the experiment will underestimate the comedic learning effect.  
That is, the stimuli are biased in favor of producing false negative as opposed to false positive 
results in favor of the stated hypotheses. 
More problematic would be differences in total emotional arousal or perceived partisan 
bias that might affect information processing and retention.  Overall, the pretest results reduce 
concern that overall emotional arousal confound experimental results. Table 3.3 shows emotional 
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reactions to the news and comedy versions of the CEO meeting, healthcare and banking reform 
stories.  Negative arousal was similar across versions. There are no significant differences in the 
extent to which the news and comedy videos make people feel angry.  Only in the banking 
reform story is there a marginally significant difference in reactions of sadness or fear; and these 
differences are substantively quite small, with news producing only about 10% more sadness and 
fear than comedy.  Additionally, pretest results show that the news and comedy versions differ 
on humor but not general positive emotional arousal.  Respondents exposed to comedy did report 
feeling somewhat more excited and happy than those exposed to news; however, comedy elicited 
these emotions at half the strength of amusement, and, across all stories, only low levels of 
excitement and happiness were stimulated by either the comedy or hard news versions. The 
comedic version of the banking reform story produced the highest overall positive arousal, yet 
even this video was rated less than 2 points higher than the news version on measures of 
excitement and happiness. Pretest analysis affirms that any differences in knowledge and 
attitudes found in the experiment are the result of humor and not general patterns of overall 
emotional arousal. 
The partisan perspectives presented were also judged to be comparable across versions of 
each story.  As shown in Table 3.4, there is little difference between news and comedy videos in 
levels of agreement that both sides of an issue are presented, estimates of time dedicated to the 
Democratic versus Republican side, or perceived ideological perspectives.  Further, concern is 
not about perceptions of equivalence, per se, but that the political perspectives in the comedy and 
news versions are actually identical. Given that most citizens have a limited understanding 
ideological relationships, and that only those with high levels of political sophistication can 
consistently recognize ideological cues (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992), highly sophisticated 
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respondents should provide more valid and reliable assessments of the political perspective in the 
clips.  Highly sophisticated respondents were identified using a measure of prior political 
knowledge—knowledge of basic civics facts
14
—which has been shown to be a good indicator of 
underlying political sophistication (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1991, 1996; Zaller, 1992).  
Table 3.5 shows answers to the political perspective questions for respondents with the 
highest levels of political knowledge.
15
  Ideological parity is perceived even by these 
sophisticated respondents whom theory suggests should be best able to evaluate political 
perspective. The news version of the healthcare reform story is rated as slightly more balanced 
that the comedy version, which, according to the estimates of sophisticated respondents, 
dedicates a slightly larger percentage of time to the Democratic perspective. However, no 
differences are detected in the amount of time spent discussing Republican views or the overall 
ideological perspective of the news versus comedy version of this story.  The pretest provides 
strong evidence that any attitudinal effects found in the experiment are a function not of the 
information being presented but rather how the information was presented, either in political 
comedy or hard news form. 
Also pretested but not included in the final experimental stimuli were story pairs about 
plans for TARP surplus funds and problems with the stimulus website.   These stories were 
rejected based on pretest results, shown in Table 3.6, as well as the author’s subjective 
assessment of quality and substance of these videos.  Though certainly speaking to broader 
conflicts over economic policy and the role of government, these story pairs represented rather 
minor sub-dramas of fleeting political importance.  The TARP surplus stories explore a variety 
                                                 
14
 Prior knowledge was measured using questions about the number of Senators from each state, the process for 
overriding a Presidential veto, the leadership position held by Nancy Pelosi, and the term limits for Supreme Court 
justices.  The complete question wording can be found in Appendix 3A. 
15
Respondents were considered highly sophisticated if they correctly answered at least 3 of the 4 prior knowledge 
questions. Based on this criteria, 29 respondents (57%) were considered highly sophisticated. 
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of suggestions for the use of unspent TARP funds, but focus on abstract goals such as job 
creation, deficit reduction and economic stabilization rather than specific policy proposals.  
Ultimately, this story was rejected because particular proposals and the identities of those 
making suggestions could not be adequately matched across versions.   
Likewise, despite vague connections to weighty issues like government competence and 
the wisdom and efficacy of the economic stimulus package, errors on Recovery.gov were 
isolated issues attributable to human error.   There is comic incongruity built in to this story as 
the gravity of the economic crisis, magnitude of controversial stimulus spending, and urgency of 
efforts to restore confidence and public trust are contrasted with the absurdity of an $18 million, 
“high tech” website designed to promote government accountability and transparency being 
riddled with erroneous information about spending and job creation in non-existent districts. 
Even the news version framed errors as comical given the costs involved and was perceived to be 
more than twice as funny and produced over three times more amusement than any other news 
story.  The news version of the stimulus website story also produced significantly more anger 
than comedic version.  For these reasons, the Recovery.org story was not ultimately included as 
part of the final experimental stimuli. 
In addition to the meticulous editing process, the pretest provides compelling evidence of 
content-equivalence for the banking reform, healthcare reform, and CEO story pairs. Differences 
between the comedy and news videos are statistically and substantively significant only on 
measures of humor.  The final experimental stimuli were created by merging the versions of 
these three stories into one comedy and one news video.  Utilizing an assemblage of stories 
about several important contemporary political controversies helps capture the dynamic interplay 
of political predispositions and prior knowledge with new information, and also reduces concern 
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that findings are specific to any particular issue or story.  The final comedy stimulus runs 14 
minutes, 51 seconds.  The final news stimulus runs 11 minutes, 54 seconds.  Though it seems 
large, the difference in length is a function of including humor and jokes in addition to the 
factual information presented in the news videos, and careful editing as well as the pretest results 
show that the videos differ only in the presence of comedy. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted in the Marsh Lab for Journalistic Performance from 
February 26, 2010 through June 4, 2010.  A total of 184 respondents, recruited from the 
Communication Studies Participant Pool, completed the study. Trained lab assistants greeted 
respondents in the lobby of the Marsh Lab and then escorted them to a private computer 
terminal.  All programs and menu bars on the computers were hidden so that only study 
materials could be accessed while in the lab.  Headphones were provided so that video sound 
could be heard.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: 
comedy, news or control.  The control group did not view a video or receive any new 
information.  A total of 62 respondents were assigned to the comedy condition, and the news and 
control groups each included 61 respondents. 
 The study began with a short pretest questionnaire including basic demographic, media 
use, and party identification questions. The sample was 60% female and had an average age of 
19 years old. The vast majority (71%) were white, with 10% of respondents identifying as black 
and 14% as Asian.  The sample also skews wealthy, with 37% estimating their family household 
income to be greater than $125K, 22% between $100K and $124,999, 17% less than $75K, and 
8% unable to estimate their household income.   
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 A basic measure of party identification was also included as part of the pretest 
questionnaire.  Respondents were asked, Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as 
a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?  Follow-up strength of partisanship and 
party lean questions were asked in the post-test. Overall, the sample skewed slightly democratic, 
with 42% percent of respondents identifying as Democrats, 20% as Republicans, 17% as 
Independents, and 17% did not know. 
 Respondents were also asked about their media use habits, including how many days in a 
typical week they watched, read or listened to news on the Internet; watched national or local 
network news on TV; watched cable news programs on TV; read news in a printed newspaper; 
listened to news on the radio; watched late-night political comedy programs; and talked to 
friends or family about politics.  Respondents reported that the Internet was their primary source 
of news, used 4 days per week on average.  Cable news and network news were used an average 
of 2 days per week.  Respondents were also somewhat familiar with late-night comedy programs, 
reporting that they watched these programs 1.6 days per week on average.  Interpersonal 
discussion about politics was reported an average of 2 days per week. 
Though the sample is not nationally representative, the random assignment procedure 
eliminated all significant differences in the demographic make-up, partisan predispositions and 
media use habits across experimental conditions, ensuring that any observed differences are 
attributable to the experimental manipulation and not pre-existing factors.  Additionally, there 
may be some benefits to having a sample characterized by economic and social privilege, 
Democratic party bias and strong engagement with political media. These characteristics closely 
match those of real world audiences for political comedy (Moy et al., 2005a; Young & Tisinger, 
2006; Morris, 2009).  Using a sample that is representative of typical comedy viewers reduces 
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concern that findings are an artifact of artificial exposure to information that subjects are unlikely 
to encounter outside the experimental setting and, because results reflect how characteristic 
audiences respond to political comedy, may increase the external validity of the study. 
 Further, any bias created by the relatively privilege and sophistication of the sample is 
likely to make estimates of the effects of political comedy relative to news more conservative 
than might be obtained using a more nationally representative sample.  Political knowledge is a 
function of individual differences in opportunity, ability and motivation to acquire political 
information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990).  These factors are strongly associated 
with the variables on which experimental subject differ from the average citizen.  University 
attendance is indicative of pre-adult factors which predict political knowledge and engagement 
(Highton, 2009; Kam & Palmer, 2008).  These elite undergraduate students have the 
demonstrated intellectual ability and cognitive skills necessary to understand and learn complex 
information presented in traditional news formats, and high levels of self-reported news media 
use show that they are practiced in utilizing this type of political information.  Given the 
characteristics of the sample, the extent to which comedy facilitates information acquisition and 
utilization is measured against a relatively high baseline, and differences between the comedy 
and news conditions should be smaller than with a less sophisticated sample that might struggle 
with the information in traditional news. 
After answering demographic, media use and party identification questions, those in the 
comedy and news condition viewed the one of the video stimuli described above. To ensure that 
the videos were watched in their entirety, fast-forward and rewind functions were disabled and 
the last frame of the video clips presented a number which respondents were required to enter 
correctly in order to move to the next part of the study.  Immediately following the experimental 
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stimuli, those in the comedy and news conditions were taken to a stimulus check that measured 
perceptions of and reactions to the videos with items similar to those used in the pretest.
16
 The 
control group did not watch a video or receive any additional information and was taken directly 
to the post-test survey. 
To test predictions about the effects of comedy on political sophistication, the post-test 
questionnaire included measures of political attitudes, orientations toward politics and political 
knowledge.  These measures will be described in detail in the following chapters.  Overall, by 
manipulating humor but holding information constant, the experiment isolates the effect of 
humor from the influence of exposure to information and permits political comedy to be 
evaluated relative to traditional hard news.  Chapters 4 and 5 describe experimental findings 
about the effect of exposure to political comedy on knowledge and attitudes.  
  
                                                 
16
 Information about stimulus check measures can be found in Appendix 4A. 
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Table 3.1  Humor Ratings of Clips Included in the Experimental Stimuli 
  Comedy News Difference 
CEO Meeting    















Health Care Reform    















Banking Reform    















N 26 25  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 




Table 3.2  Perceptions of Information in Clips Included in the Experimental Stimuli 
  Comedy News Difference 
CEO Meeting    
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N 26 25  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 





Table 3.3  Emotional Reactions to Clips Included in the Experimental Stimuli 
  Comedy News Difference 
CEO Meeting    
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N 26 25  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 






Table 3.4  Assessments of Political Perspective by All Respondents 
  Comedy News Difference 
CEO Meeting    
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N 26 25  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 




Table 3.5  Assessments of Political Perspective by High Political Knowledge Respondents 
  Comedy News Difference 
CEO Meeting    
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Banking Reform    




















N 15 14  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 
of the difference is determined with a two-tailed t-test. High knowledge respondents include those who correctly 





Table 3.6  Responses to Videos Not Included in the Experimental Stimuli 
 TARP Surplus  Stimulus Website 
 Comedy News Difference  Comedy News Difference 





















































































































































Political Perspective       





























N 26 25   25 26  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05.  Entries are mean variable score with standard errors in parentheses.  The significance 
of the difference is determined with a two-tailed t-test. Total N=51. 
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Chapter 4. An Experimental Test of the Effect of Political Comedy on Learning 
 It is widely recognized that political comedy contains important information, and many 
previous studies have demonstrated the correlation between exposure to political comedy and 
knowledge (Brewer & Cao, 2008; Cao, 2008; Feldman & Young, 2008; Graber, 2008; 
Hollander, 2005; Parkin, 2010; Xenos & Becker, 2009; Young & Hoffman, 2009).  Regular 
comedy viewers are better informed than audiences of almost any other political media (NAES, 
2004; Pew, 2007, 2012). Previous investigations have identified two pathways by which political 
comedy might promote learning.  Viewers might acquire information as an incidental by-product 
of consuming political comedy for entertainment purposes (Baum, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Brewer 
& Cao, 2008).  Alternatively, political comedy may serve as a gateway to political knowledge by 
promoting awareness and interest so that viewers are more likely to seek out and are better able 
to learn from more traditional sources of information (Baum, 2003b; Cao, 2010; Feldman & 
Young, 2008; Xenos & Becker, 2009). 
 Still, skeptics continue to question whether the relationship between political comedy and 
knowledge is evidence of a learning effect or merely reflects differential patterns of consumption 
among already sophisticated citizens (Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009; Cao, 2008; Prior 2003, 2005, 
2007).  In fact, audience analysis shows that political comedy attracts highly engaged and 
politically aware viewers who tend use comedy as a supplement to rather than replacement for 
other, more traditional sources of information (Feldman & Young, 2008; Hmielowski, Holbert & 
Lee, 2011; Young & Tisinger, 2006).  Because both suggest that learning effects are the result of 
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exposure to political information among otherwise disinterest audiences, neither the incidental 
exposure nor gateway hypotheses are sufficient to explain how political comedy might promote 
learning.   
  Political comedy is more than just a novel delivery system for widely available 
information.  What is important is not the presence of political information in comedy, but the 
unique way that comedy presents political information.  In fact, political comedy is unlike other 
political media, and cognitive requirements associated with this mode of communication are 
fundamentally different than those of more traditional political communication formats.  
Comprehending and appreciating humor is a cognitively complex activity requiring the 
recognition of incongruity between constructs and discovery of a cognitive rule that connects 
seemingly unrelated ideas (Suls, 1972; 1983; Wyer & Collins, 1992).  The model of humor-
triggered cognition presented in Chapter 2 contends that patterns of cognitive processing and 
engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying humor will boost learning.  Further, 
this model predicts that rather than promoting learning among apathetic citizens, the strongest 
learning effect will be among moderately sophisticated citizens who have the prior knowledge 
and understanding necessary to comprehend humor but are generally unmotivated to think 
deeply about politics absent the external incentives provided by political comedy.   In this 
chapter, I explore the link between political comedy and learning by examining the unique 
patterns of information processing associated with humorous messages. 
 
Hypotheses: Learning from Political Comedy 
 The incidental exposure and gateway models share an expectation that learning from 
political comedy is a function of incidental exposure to information that might not otherwise be 
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encountered (e.g. Baum, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Xenos & Becker, 2009).  From this perspective, 
political comedy reduces motivational and resource barriers to learning by presenting 
information in an entertaining and accessible way that appeals to apathetic audiences.  While 
perhaps reasonable in regard to soft news, it is not clear that these expectations are appropriate 
when thinking about the effects of political comedy.  The model of humor-triggered cognition 
suggests that rather than a softer, more accessible variant on widely available political 
information, comedy is a complex form of communication that demands effortful processing and 
thoughtful cognitive engagement to comprehend and appreciate.  Comedy does not decrease the 
motivational or resource barriers to learning but increases motivation to process information and 
elaborate on the meaning and implications of messages.  Relative to traditional hard news, 
comedy creates the intellectual conditions that should encourage learning. 
H1: All else equal, those exposed to political comedy should recall more information than 
those exposed to identical information in a hard news format. 
 Further, the benefits of political humor are not expected to be uniform, but should vary 
based on individual differences in knowledge and abilities.  Most previous research has 
positioned comedy as a supplement to or replacement for traditional hard news and predict that 
exposure to comedy will be most beneficial to those with limited political knowledge and 
experience (Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009; Baum 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Cao, 2010; Feldman et al., 
2011; Feldman & Young, 2008; Xenos & Becker, 2009). However, for information to have an 
impact, one must not only be exposed to information but must also comprehend or receive the 
message (Zaller, 1992).  Those who know and think a lot about politics are better able to 
understand new information, incorporate it with prior knowledge and utilize it when making 
political decisions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Price & Zaller, 1993; Zaller, 1992).   
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 While political comedy may result in some incidental learning of political information 
among relatively apathetic viewers, the features of these programs make them difficult for the 
least sophisticated viewers to comprehend and fully enjoy.    Understanding political humor 
requires at least some prior knowledge about politics.  As Tonight Show host Jay Leno notes, 
“The audience has to know what you’re talking about or else you’ll be sunk…. And we’ve found 
that once you get past the Secretary of State—and even that’s a stretch—no one knows what 
you’re talking about” (in Niven et al., 2003, p. 121). The time and effort expended on humor 
comprehension trades off with elaboration about the implications of humorous messages that 
maximizes enjoyment (Wyer & Collins, 1992).  Sophisticated, not inattentive citizens, should be 
best able comprehend and fully appreciate political comedy. 
  While they have the cognitive resources necessary to understand and enjoy political 
comedy, highly sophisticated citizens also have large stores of pre-existing knowledge which 
allows them to make sense of information presented in more traditional formats.  Thus, 
particularly when information is readily available in the information environment, politically 
sophisticated citizens are unlikely to be influenced by any particular piece of new information 
(Zaller, 1992), no matter the context.  Those with the least prior political knowledge lack the 
skills and resources necessary to make optimal use of comedy, and those with a great deal of 
prior knowledge are familiar enough with politics that comedy should have little net benefit over 
other modes of political communication.  The model of humor-triggered cognition predicts that 
the largest learning effect should be seen among those with sufficient prior knowledge and 
political understanding to comprehend jokes and elaborate on their meaning, but lacking the 
motivation to think deeply or learn about politics absent the emotional gratifications that comedy 
provides for doing so. 
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H2: Comedy will be most powerfully associated with learning among those with 
moderate levels of prior political information.   
 Both the incidental exposure and gateway models of learning suggest that interest drives 
learning effects.  That is, political comedy makes politics more interesting and promotes learning 
among apathetic citizens who might not otherwise be exposed to or have the opportunity to 
acquire political information.  The model of humor-triggered cognition identifies an alternative 
mechanism to explain how political comedy promotes learning.  Rather than an indirect effect of 
altering dispositions toward political information, learning is directly related to the cognitive 
processes associated with humor comprehension and amusement.  Effortful information 
processing and thoughtful elaboration are necessary in order derive gratifications from comedy 
in the form of the emotional experience of amusement.  By facilitating the encoding of 
information in long-term memory, these patterns of cognition also promote learning.  Failure to 
process, comprehend or meaningfully elaborate on the implications of humorous messages will 
decrease amusement and make it unlikely that comedy has a net learning benefit beyond a hard 
news presentation of information.  
H3: Amusement will mediate the effect of political comedy on learning.   
 These predictions are in contrast with previous explanations of the learning effect of 
political comedy which suggest that disinterested audiences learn about politics as an incidental 
by-product of exposure to information presented in a more interesting and accessible form.   The 
model of humor-triggered cognition contends that exposure to information through political 
comedy will enhance learning beyond that associated with exposure to identical information 
presented in traditional hard news form.   Relative to straight news, political comedy will be 
most beneficial for those at moderate levels of political sophistication.  Because it stems from the 
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patterns of cognitive engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying humor, the 
learning effect will be mediate by the emotional experience of amusement and not perceptions 
that information is interesting.  Data from the experiment described in Chapter 3 is used to test 




 Learning was measured using 6 questions, 5 open-ended and 1 multiple-choice, tapping 
recall of information provided in the news and comedy videos comprising the experimental 
conditions.  The open-ended questions create the most conservative possible measurement 
strategy as prior research has shown comedy to be associated with easy, recognition based, 
multiple choice questions rather than more difficult, open ended recall questions (Hollander, 
2005; Kim & Vishak, 2008; Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009). Additionally, by reducing blind 
guessing, these measures produce less measurement error than multiple-choice items (Mondak, 
2001).  Respondents in all three experimental conditions were asked: 1. What state does Senator 
Joe Lieberman represent? (Connecticut); 2. Who were the recipients of TARP money? (Banks/ 
Financial Firms); 3. What type of business is Goldman Sachs? (Investment Bank); 4. Who did 
President Obama recently refer to as “fat cats”? (Wall St. bankers); 5. In their health care bill, 
what government program did Democrats want people to be allowed to buy into? (Medicare); 
and, 6. Which of the following is NOT included in the President’s plan to regulate banks? 
(Limiting the interest rates that banks can charge (correct); Increasing the amount of cash banks 
must maintain; Banning banks from speculating on stocks with deposits; Capping the total size 
of banks). Responses to open-ended items were coded for correctness.  Answers were coded as 
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‘don’t know’ as opposed to incorrect when no response was given or “don’t know” was entered 
into the response box.  Fifty percent of responses were double coded by a trained undergraduate 
research assistant for reliability analysis, and all questions were reliable at the 95% level or 
greater.  An additive index of the 6 information recall questions was used to measure learning.   
 To test whether the strength of the learning effect differs across levels of prior 
knowledge, 6 general political knowledge questions were also included in the post-test 
knowledge inventory.  Information about the items used to measure prior political knowledge is 
available in Appendix 4A
1
.  Measuring prior knowledge in the post-test reduces the risk that 
respondents would be primed for a test of political knowledge as they viewed the experimental 
stimulus.  The introduction of information acquisition goals would be particularly problematic 
because they might alter the cognitive processes that are hypothesized to drive effects.  That is, 
respondents might watch the comedy video with the goal of remembering as much information 
as possible as opposed to comprehending and enjoying the jokes and humor.  The post-test 
placement of prior knowledge items avoids this bias but creates endogeneity in the prior 
knowledge measure because scores are somewhat affected by experimental condition.  
 Though none of the answers to prior knowledge questions were mentioned in the news or 
comedy stimuli, respondents the control group answered significantly fewer of these questions 
correctly than those in either the comedy or news condition, and respondents in the comedy 
                                                 
1
 Questions were similar to those typically utilized in public opinion surveys and produced results comparable to 
those obtained from a nationally representative sample in the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES).  
The largest difference was found in a question about the political party controlling Congress, which was correctly 
answered by 75% of experimental respondents versus 63% of NAES respondents.  Experimental respondents were 
only slightly more successful than those from the NAES in indentifying the procedure for overriding a presidential 
veto, with 43% answering correctly versus 38% in the NAES. The nationally representative sample was slightly 
more successful on a question about the branch of government responsible for determining the constitutionality of 
laws, with 71% answering correctly versus 66% if experimental respondents. Overall, the distribution of prior 
political knowledge in the experimental sample does not appear to be dissimilar to that obtained in the nationally 
representative survey.  This reduces concern that findings are an artificial by-product of the sophisticated 
experimental sample and suggests that the division of respondents into knowledge groups was appropriate to 
produce valid tests of non-linear predictions. 
78 
 
condition scored slightly higher than those in the news condition.  Because there are no other 
variables where respondents significantly differ across conditions, this imbalance is likely the 
result of differences in how respondents answered questions.  Any measure of political 
knowledge captures both information and irrelevant factors such as individual differences in 
motivation to search memory for answers and the propensity to guess (Mondak, 2001).  Further, 
variance in motivation can significantly affect the likelihood of correctly answering questions 
(Prior & Lupia, 2008). Exposure to information, particularly political comedy, may inflate prior 
knowledge scores by increasing cognitive engagement, activating stored political knowledge or 
motivating more thoughtful responses.   
 Following the logic of Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT), prior political knowledge 
scores were corrected by weighting items by difficulty.  Because they were not exposed to any 
new political information, scores in the control group are a relatively unbiased reflection of 
information stored in memory, and the probability that control group respondents correctly 
answered a question was taken as an indicator of item difficulty.  Items were assigned a point 
value equivalent to the percentage of the control group answering a question incorrectly so that 
difficult items were given greater weight than easier items that control group answered more 
successfully.  The total score from the 6 weighted items was then converted into a 3-category 
index of prior political knowledge, with the bottom 1/3 of scores rated as low in prior 
knowledge, the middle 1/3 placed in the medium knowledge category, and the those with the 
highest 1/3 of scores ranked high in prior political knowledge.  The resulting prior knowledge 
variable is balanced across experimental conditions.  That is, there is no significant difference in 




 The mediating variable—amusement—was measured using 3, comedy related, stimulus 
check questions: entertaining, funny and amused.  Entertaining was included to reduce concern 
that the amusement measure is simply a proxy for the comedy condition, and that the reduction 
in the coefficient on comedy when this variable is included in learning models is the result of 
multicollinearity rather than evidence of mediation by the experience of amusement.  The 
entertaining measure is highly correlated with both funny (r=.78) and amused (r=.77).  Though 
the mean score was higher in the comedy condition (M=4.75), many respondents found news 
entertaining (M=2.02).  Including these 3 measures—entertaining, funny and amused—in the 
mediating amusement variable insures that this is a valid indicator of the experience of 
amusement stemming from comedy exposure, and that results of the mediation analysis reflect 
the impact of that emotional experience.   
 This mediating variable was measured in non-linear form.  The amusement initially 
experienced by comprehending jokes is enhanced through cognitive elaboration about the 
meaning and implications of a humorous reinterpretation (Wyer & Collins, 1992).  Subsequent 
elaboration is likely to result in only a small increase in learning beyond that stemming from the 
cognitive processes associated with humor comprehension.  To account for the non-linear 
relationship between amusement and learning, the amusement variable was created by taking the 
square root of the mean of entertaining, funny and amused.
2
   The square root of amusement is 
used because the marginal effect of additional amusement is expected to be smaller than the 
initial boost in learning that results from the amusement initially experienced when a joke is 
understood.  This non-linear transformation results in an amusement variable that ranges from 0 
to 2.45.  
                                                 
2
 The models were also tested using only funny and amused and with the amusement variable specified in linear 
form.  The results are substantively the same. 
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 Finally, the alternative mediating variable—interest—was measured using the stimulus 
check question gauging how interesting respondents found the video that they just saw.  This 
variable runs from 0, meaning not interesting at all, to 6, meaning the video was extremely 
interesting.
3
  To mirror the analysis of amusement, the square root of this variable was taken.
4
   
 
Results 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that information will be better recalled when presented in comedic 
form than when presented as hard news.  Table 4.1 shows models predicting the total number of 
correct answers, the total number of incorrect answers and the number of don’t know responses.  
Taken together, these 3 models show that while both conditions increase overall opinionation, 
i.e. the number of questions attempted, comedy maximizes the number of questions answered 
correctly.   
 Column 1 of Table 4.1 shows the number of correctly answered questions regressed on 
dummy variables for the experimental conditions.  Following exposure to the experimental 
stimuli, those in both the comedy and news conditions are able to answer more questions 
correctly.  However, this effect is larger in the comedy condition than in the news condition.  
Those in the comedy condition answer on average 2.74 questions correctly as compared to 1.97 
in the news condition.  A t-test shows the .77 difference between the coefficient on comedy and 
the coefficient on news is statistically significant (t=2.04, p<.05).  Additionally, restricting the 
model so that the coefficients on these conditions are equal significantly reduces model fit 
(F=10.43, p<.01). 
                                                 
3
 Mediation was also tested using a more global measure of political interest, “Generally speaking, how interested 
are you in information about what's going on in / government and politics?  Extremely interested, moderately 
interested, slightly interested, or not interested at all?” Results were the same.  These models can be found in 
Appendix 4B. 
4
 The models were also tested using a linear form of the interest variable.  The results were substantively the same. 
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 It is possible, however, that respondents are more motivated to answer questions 
following exposure to information, and that the observed relationship between comedy and 
learning is attributable to greater overall opinionation rather than information recall.  To test this 
alternative explanation, Column 2 of Table 4.1 shows the model predicting non-response, 
including questions answered “don’t know” or left blank.  Indeed, rates of non-response are 
lower in both the comedy and news conditions.  However, the non-response rate in the comedy 
condition is only a statistically insignificant .19 points less than in the news condition.  Thus, the 
comedic learning effect is not merely a by-product of differential rates of response. 
 Increased guessing could also produce the observed relationship between comedy and 
learning.  If this is the case, then comedy should be associated with a larger number of both 
correct and incorrect responses.  Column 3 of Table 4.1 shows the model for valid but incorrect 
responses, excluding questions answered “don’t know” or left blank.  Exposure to news, but not 
comedy, increases the number of incorrect responses.  On average, those in the news condition 
answer 2.07 questions incorrectly, a statistically significant increase relative to both the control 
group and comedy condition.  While the relationship between news and learning may be 
attributable to increased guessing, comedy increases only the number of correct responses.  In 
line with Hypothesis 1, this overall pattern of results suggests that political comedy does not 
simply promote greater overall opinionation or guessing, but enhances information acquisition.  
 The model of humor-triggered cognition also predicts that the amount of information 
retained in response to news versus comedy will depend on levels of prior political knowledge.  
Neither news nor comedy is expected to promote learning among those low in prior political 
knowledge.  Highly sophisticated subjects should demonstrate good recall in both the news and 
comedy conditions.  For those with moderate levels of political knowledge, learning should be 
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maximized by comedic presentation of political information.  Table 4.2 contains models of 
learning run separately for high, medium and low prior political knowledge groups.
5
  Only at 
moderate levels of political knowledge is there a significant difference in learning between the 
comedy and news conditions.  At low levels of prior knowledge, political comedy produces only 
a marginally significant .54 point increase in learning relative to news.  For those with high 
levels of political knowledge, exposure to political comedy results in only .25 more correct 
answers than exposure to news.  At moderate levels of prior knowledge, those in the comedy 
condition answer 1.36 more questions correctly than those in the news condition.  A t-test of the 
difference between the coefficients on comedy and news coefficients shows that this is a 
statistically significant increase in learning (t=2.78, p<.01).  These results strongly support 
Hypothesis 2, indicating that comedy promotes learning primarily among those with moderate 
prior political knowledge.  
 Figure 4.1 shows how experimental condition affects the gap in knowledge across levels 
of prior political knowledge.   In the control condition, where no new political information is 
given, those with moderate prior political knowledge behave much like those low in prior 
knowledge, with both groups answering about .3 questions correctly.  In the control condition, 
those with high prior knowledge answer about .8 more questions correctly than those with low 
and medium levels of prior political knowledge.  The learning gap between the medium and high 
knowledge groups is maximized in the news condition.  After exposure to news, the medium 
knowledge group answers 1.38 fewer questions correctly than the high knowledge group and 
only .45 more than the low knowledge group.  Political comedy has the opposite effect, shrinking 
the gap in learning so that those with medium prior knowledge perform almost as well as those 
                                                 
5
 A fully interacted model can be found in Appendix 4B.  The results are consistent with those obtained when the 
models are run separately for each prior knowledge group. 
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with high prior knowledge in the test of information recall.  In the comedy condition, the gap 
between the high and medium prior knowledge group falls to .27, but grows to 1.24 between the 
medium and low knowledge groups.  Exposure to political comedy equalizes knowledge 
between those with moderate and high prior political knowledge. 
 Others have suggested that learning from political comedy is a result of attention or 
interest; however, the model of humor-triggered cognition explains that it is the way comedy is 
cognitively processed that catalyzes learning.  Comedy has high cognitive processing 
requirements, and motivation to expend cognitive energy processing comedic political 
information is provided by the emotional payoff that comes from ‘getting’ a joke and elaborating 
on the meaning of humorous reinterpretations.  The learning effect of political comedy is 
attributable to the cognitive processes associated with comprehending humor and experiencing 
amusement.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that amusement mediates the relationship between comedy 
and learning.  The models in Table 4.3 test this prediction.   Because amusement was only 
measured in the news and comedy conditions as part of the manipulation check, this analysis 
excludes the control group, and in these models, the constant represents learning in the news 
condition.  So that the dependent variable reflects information acquisition as opposed to 
knowledge, baseline knowledge observed in the control group was removed from scores by 
taking the residual values from the overall learning model.   
 To show mediation, four criteria must be met: 1. the independent variable must affect the 
mediator; 2. the independent variable must affect the dependent variable in the absence of the 
mediator; 3. the mediator must have a significant independent effect on the dependent variable; 
and, 4. the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must shrink when the 
mediator is included in the model.  The models in Table 4.3 show that amusement meets all the 
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criteria for mediating the relationship between comedy and learning.  Comedy increases the net 
knowledge gain from information (Column 1) by .77 above that resulting from exposure to news.   
Comedy is also strongly associated with the experience of amusement (Column 2).  The level of 
amusement reported increases from .93 in the news condition to 2.08 in the comedy condition, 
near the top of the amusement scale.  The final column shows learning regressed on comedy and 
the mediating variable—amusement.  The square root of amusement has a strong, statistically 
significant effect on learning.  However, when amusement is included in the model, the 
coefficient on comedy becomes negative, dropping from .77 to -.53, a statistically significant 
1.30 point decrease (t=2.55, p<.01).  Additionally, the statistical significance of the mediation by 
amusement is established by a Sobel test (3.63, p<.01).
 6
   Substantively, these results show that 
moving from no amusement to maximum amusement results in a 2.77 point increase in the 
number of questions answered correctly; conversely, a respondent in the comedy condition who 
reports no amusement performs no better on the test of information recall than does a respondent 
in the control group who received no information intervention.  These results support Hypothesis 
3, that the effect of comedy on learning is mediated by amusement. 
 The alternative hypothesis suggested by the incidental exposure and gateway models is 
that comedy promotes learning by making information more interesting.  Experimental findings 
do not support this alternative explanation.  Table 4.4 shows a test of mediation by how 
interesting the video presentation was perceived to be.  While both news and comedy are 
associated with increased levels of interest, the inclusion of interest in the learning model does 
not significantly reduce the effect of comedy.  When interest is included in the learning model 
the coefficient on comedy drops from .77 to .39, a statistically insignificant .38 point reduction in 
the relationship between comedy and learning.  Finding the presentation interesting does not 
                                                 
6
 Interactive mediation test http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm 
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seem to have a differential effect on the news and comedy conditions.  Instead, when interest is 
included in the learning model the constant drops 1.82 points (t=3.34, p<.01), indicating that 
finding receiving information interesting boosts learning, regardless of presentation format.  
While comedy was slightly more interesting than news, this increase in interest does not mediate 
learning. 
 Additionally, if comedy encouraged learning by stimulating interest, than those who 
benefit most from comedy should also show the greatest boost in interest following exposure to 
political comedy.   Table 4.5 shows the relationship between rating information as interesting 
divided by levels of prior political knowledge.  Comedy increases interest primarily among those 
who are least likely to learn about politics.  Among those with the lowest levels of prior 
knowledge, the comedic presentation of information boosts interest ratings by 1.72 points, more 
than double the increase seen among those at moderate or high levels of political knowledge.  
However, as previous models show, this increase in interest does not translate into greater 
knowledge gain.  Among the moderately knowledgeable, who have been shown to benefit the 
most from comedy relative to news, the increase in interest is only .62 in the comedy condition, a 
marginally significant boost relative to the news condition.  There is no evidence, then, that 
interest mediates the relationship between comedy and political learning.  
 
Conclusion 
 Previous studies investigating the relationship between political comedy and knowledge 
suggest that learning is a happy accident that occurs when disinterested citizens are exposed to 
information as they pursue other goals. The model of humor-triggered cognition offers a very 
different explanation of how political comedy promotes learning.  Comedy presents an 
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intellectual puzzle requiring effortful processing and thoughtful engagement to discover how 
seemingly unrelated pieces of information are connected.  For those with the skills and resources 
necessary to engage in this exercise, political comedy enhances learning.   
 Using a controlled experiment that manipulated humor while holding information 
constant, this study demonstrates the learning effect of political comedy.  Because audiences are 
pursuing the rewarding experience of amusement, comedy encourages active and effortful 
information processing and thoughtful cognitive elaboration.  Exposure to information was more 
strongly associated with recall in the comedy condition than the news condition, suggesting that 
learning was not the result of simple incidental exposure to information but was related to 
differences in how information was presented.  Information was acquired not in spite of the 
pursuit of entertainment but because of the patterns of cognitive processing and engagement 
associated with comprehending and enjoying humor. 
 Rather than benefiting the least informed group, comedy lifted up the middle so that 
moderately sophisticated citizens behaved more like those with advanced political knowledge.  
Previous research has focused on the effects of political comedy on apathetic citizens who were 
expected to benefit most from the entertaining presentation of political information.  Though 
they may be exposed to some information that might not otherwise be encountered, those with 
the lowest levels of prior political knowledge are the least capable of comprehending political 
comedy.  Some pre-requisite knowledge and skills are required to identify and make sense of 
humorous incongruity and elaborate about the meaning of humorous messages.  Findings 
demonstrate that, relative to traditional news, comedy is most beneficial to those with moderate 
levels of political sophistication. 
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 Further, learning effects come not from increasing attention and interest but are mediated 
by the complex cognitive processes associated with humor comprehension and the experience of 
amusement.  Exposure, by itself, is not enough.  Understanding and enjoying comedy requires 
effortful processing and cognitive elaboration.  The mediation analysis shows that comedy is 
associated with learning only when a subject ‘gets’ the joke and experiences amusement.  
Findings did not support the alternative hypothesis that political comedy promotes learning by 
stimulating interest.  Consistent with the model of humor-triggered cognition, amusement 
mediated learning from political comedy. 
 To understand the effects of political comedy it is necessary to recognize that comedy is 
not simply an alternative source of news and information but a unique form of political 
communication that enhances learning by promoting effortful information processing and 
thoughtful engagement so that information is incorporated into memory and available for use 
when making decisions.  The next chapter looks more directly at how the cognitive processes 
associated with humor comprehension and amusement impact the structure of information in 




Table 4.1  Effects of Comedy and News on Learning and Patterns of Response to 
Information Recall Questions 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15  Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4.2  Learning Effect across Levels of Prior Political Knowledge 
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Table 4.3  Mediation of Comedic Learning Effect by Amusement 
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Table 4.4  Mediation of Comedic Learning Effect by Interesting Ratings 
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Table 4.5  Interesting Ratings for Comedy vs. News across Levels of Prior Political 
Knowledge 
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Chapter 5. An Experimental Test of the Effect of Political Comedy on Ideological 
Constraint 
 The patterns of cognition associated with enjoying political comedy facilitate learning.  
Comedy encourages attention to and elaboration about political messages such that information 
is more likely to be encoded in memory and is more easily recalled later.  But political comedy 
may do more to enhance understanding of politics than simply provide information.  The comic 
format, involving incongruity and violation of expectations, encourages viewers to think about 
the interrelationships among seemingly disparate political issues and helps them put information 
together to build a stronger understanding of how policy discourse is organized and ‘what goes 
with what’ in party platforms.  Because of this, exposure to political comedy should not just 
improve accurate recall of factually correct information but should also boost ideological 
constraint. 
 
Political Sophistication and Ideological Constraint 
 The political knowledge gap is concerning not because factual knowledge is inherently 
important, but because of the relationship between information and citizens’ ability to understand 
politics, effectively recognize and promote personal interests, and hold leaders accountable for 
their actions.  Beyond low levels of factual knowledge, there has long been concern among 
public opinion scholars that citizens are unable to form and articulate coherent political attitudes, 
that they have a limited grasp of the important political debates, and that most fail to achieve a 
basic level of attitude consistency (Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1922; Schumpeter, 1942).  That 
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the average citizen lacks ideological sophistication is troubling from the perspective of 
democratic theory because it implies that a large portion of the public is unable to form 
meaningful opinions; instead expressing relatively meaningless, unstable, top-of-the-head 
positions about important issues and policies (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992).  Though citizens 
can use a variety of cognitive heuristics to compensate for their lack of specific information, 
these shortcuts are more meaningful and reliable decision-making guides when they are closely 
connected to a large volume of highly structured political information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Zaller, 1992). If citizens are unable to understand and structure 
preferences using the ideological framework that organizes elite policy debate and activity, then 
their capacity to resist manipulation and effectively represent themselves in democratic politics is 
greatly compromised. 
 Concern about ideological naiveté led to an interest in factors that might increase attitude 
consistency and promote ideological thinking.  While the average citizen makes little use of 
abstract ideological principles, a small subset of the population, those with high levels of 
political sophistication, hold stable, ideologically-structured attitudes and have a well developed 
ideological framework through which they evaluate the political world (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Luskin, 1987; Zaller, 1992).  Across many indices—factual 
political knowledge, interest in politics, involvement in political affairs, cognitive ability, etc.—
political sophistication is associated with a tendency to think about politics in ideological terms 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Federico, 2007; Luskin, 1990), greater attitude consistency and stability 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jacoby, 1991; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Zaller, 1992), and stronger 
inter-correlations among issue attitudes, ideological self-placement, and partisanship 
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(Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Federico, 
2007; Federico & Hunt, 2013).    
 The close relationship between political knowledge and ideological constraint stems from 
the way information is cognitively processed.  Luskin (1987, 1990) contends that sophistication 
is a function of the number, diversity, and organization of political cognitions in memory; that is, 
a political belief system is characterized by its size—how much is known—range—the amount 
of the universe covered—and constraint—the extent of interconnectivity among discrete 
considerations and ideas.  These dimensions are related because systems with large amounts of 
diverse information necessitate an organization system that makes retention and recall of 
information easier.   
 The most effective and efficient way to organize information is through hierarchical 
categorization with increasing levels of abstraction.  As such, sophistication and abstraction are 
irrevocably connected.  As noted in The American Voter, “any cognitive structure that subsumes 
content of wide scope and high diversity must be capped by concepts of a higher order of 
abstractness” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 163).  Converse (1964) echoes this idea when he 
describes the “companion concepts” of economy and constraint (p. 214).  Ideological constraint 
implies centrality of abstract ideological constructs within a belief system such that ideology is a 
frequently used consideration that is closely connected with numerous elements (Luskin, 1987).  
Perhaps now more than ever, ideology structures elite discourse and, thus, is the organizing 
principle most useful in thinking about the political world. 
 Sophisticated citizens hold ideologically constrained attitudes because they possess an 
understanding of the abstract principles that structure contemporary democratic politics and have 
the ability to apply them when evaluating information and making political judgments.   Zaller 
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(1992) explains that the relationship between sophistication and constraint is a function of the 
distribution of considerations available when an evaluation is made.  Attitude instability stems 
from conflicting considerations used to form an opinion.  To the extent that responses to survey 
questions are based on the considerations most immediately accessible in memory, the 
directional thrust of those considerations determines response.  In a balanced information 
environment, response instability stems from variance in the accessibility of considerations.   So, 
for example, the attitude expressed about immigration reform may depend on whether one most 
recently heard about a violent crime committed by an illegal immigrant or a sympathetic story 
about the plight of undocumented young people brought to the country when they were very 
young.  Were a representative sample of considerations available, conflicting considerations 
would offset each other to produce ambivalent or neutral responses.  Sophisticated citizens are 
better able to recognize the ideological implications of new information and reject messages 
inconsistent with values.  As a result, sophistication increases the homogeneity of considerations 
used to form opinions and increases attitude constraint. 
 Ideological understanding can be developed through sustained attention to and thought 
about politics and the structure of political controversies (Bennett, 2006; Converse, 2000, 2006; 
Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit & Rich, 2001; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia, McCubbins & Popkin, 
2000).  Encoding factual information into memory is only one element of learning.  Learning 
also involves the development of categories and organizational models necessary to make sense 
of new information, and the refinement and expansion of categories with new details and 
information about how prior knowledge and organizational models apply in new situations 
(Denzau & North, 2000). New experiences and information provide, “feedback that may 
strengthen and confirm our initial categories and models or that may lead to modifications” (p. 
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33).  For example, learning about Ron Paul’s seemingly contradictory positions may lead one to 
reevaluate their mental model of the Republican party to incorporate a more sophisticated and 
nuanced understanding of the economic, social and foreign policy dimensions of ideology. Thus, 
ideological constraint can be developed through sustained attention to politics and continued 
development and refinement of increasingly abstract categories to organize thinking about the 
political world. 
 Politically sophisticated citizens rely on organizational models that are more abstract and 
universally applicable than those utilized by citizens who are less politically engaged.  Hamil, 
Lodge and Blake (1985) found that ideology and partisanship structured sophisticated citizens’ 
beliefs about spend-save type issues, while those less interested, attentive and involved relied on 
more limited “rich-poor” categories when thinking about these issues.  Similarly, utilizing a 
thought experiment, Judd and Downing (1990) found that repeated evaluation of policy issues 
triggered broadly applicable, abstract ideological constructs among political experts, but only 
situation specific rules among those low in political expertise.  Experimental respondents were 
given information about a hypothetical person’s position on an issue and were then asked to 
identify that person’s position on a different, unrelated issue.  This process was repeated 120 
times.  With repeated exposure to the same pairs of issues, all respondents improved the speed 
and reliability of their ratings, indicating that those at all levels of expertise developed rules 
defining the relationships among issues.  However, when respondents were later asked to 
evaluate the positions of candidates on those same issues, the practice of rating the issue pairs 
only improved the reliability of candidate issue placement among those high in political 
expertise.  While less sophisticated respondents were able to develop rules governing issue 
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evaluations, those rules were not universal and did not improve performance when the evaluative 
task was changed.   
 Though an understanding of ideological relationships can be learned, this knowledge is 
necessary but insufficient to produce ideological constraint.  Ideological thinking requires both 
the ability to use abstract ideological concepts and the motivation to apply those concepts when 
making political judgments (Federico & Hunt, 2013).  Motivation comes from the gratifications 
associated with paying attention to, thinking seriously about, and evaluating politics (Claassen & 
Highton, 2009; Federico, 2007; Federico & Hunt, 2013).  Ideological constraint is most strongly 
associated with political sophistication among those with a high trait need to evaluate (Federico, 
2007), a strong sense of personal involvement in politics, extreme partisan attachments (Federico 
& Hunt, 2013) and intense political interest (Claassen & Highton, 2009). 
 Citizens motivated to receive, process and utilize information about the ideological 
implications of issues are those highly engaged, sophisticated citizens possessing relatively well-
developed ideological understanding that can be utilized when evaluating new information 
(Hamill et al., 1985; Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1992). The well-documented increase in elite 
polarization (Fiorina, Samuel & Pope, 2005, 2008; Jacobson, 2000; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997) 
has increased the availability and clarity of elite cues about policy issues.  Rather than diminish 
the importance of political awareness in linking abstract ideological or partisan constructs to 
specific policy issues, Claassen and Highton (2009) find that the polarized choice context 
exacerbates political differences because motivational factors condition responsiveness to more 
readily available ideological cues.  “People who are less aware about politics derive few intrinsic 
and expressive benefits from following, knowing, and talking about politics.  As a result, they 
have little incentive to attend to the signals emanating from political elites” (Claassen & 
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Highton, 2009, p. 540). Elite polarization has made ideological cues more easily available but 
has not increased the motivation to pay attention.  Ideological constraint necessitates both 
awareness of ideology and motivation to apply abstract ideological constructs when making 
political judgments. 
 
Hypotheses: Political Comedy and Ideological Constraint 
 Given a basic understanding of ideological principles and the motivation to utilize those 
principles when making political judgments, attitudes about specific political issues will be 
constrained by ideology such that positions are more consistently located on the ideological 
spectrum and attitudes toward any given issue more strongly predict attitudes about other issues.  
Certainly, much of the ability and motivation to utilize abstract ideological concepts when 
evaluating information is determined by the individual characteristics and predispositions 
associated with general political engagement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992).  
However, the ability to recognize ideological relationships and motivation to do so might also be 
affected by the context in which information is presented.  In particular, political comedy is not 
just an alternative source of information but a communicative form with features that highlight 
political relationships and motivate elaboration about how the political environment is structured. 
 As previously discussed in detail, humor stems from the simultaneous elicitation of 
contradictory schema.  The setup of a joke prompts a listener to search memory for a relevant 
schema that provides context and creates expectations about future information and how it 
should be interpreted (Suls, 1983; Wyer & Collins, 1992).  In comedy, subsequent information 
violates expectations and requires a situation to be reinterpreted using an alternative set of 
concepts in order to resolve incongruity and understand the seemingly contradictory information 
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as a whole.  Motivation to engage in this process of complex cognitive elaboration is generated 
by a desire for the emotional gratification that comes in the form of amusement experienced 
when a joke is understood. 
 The cognitive processes underlying the appreciation of political comedy necessitate broad 
thinking about politics and how political information fits together.  The surprise generated when 
expectations are violated shifts focus from the concrete to more abstract political concepts 
applicable to new situations.  For example, Jon Stewart’s coupling of a story about the Iraq war 
with the headline “Mess-o-potamia” shifts attention from the particular event being discussed to 
broader foreign policy concerns and how new information should be understood in the context of 
previous knowledge about U.S. involvement in the Middle East.  Political comedy is an 
intellectual game which encourages audiences to play with political ideas and recognize 
connections between what previously seemed unrelated.  It is exactly this type of thought that 
fosters ideological constraint. 
H4: All else equal, exposure to political comedy will trigger ideologically constrained 
issue positions, even compared to exposure to traditional news. 
 Of course, the effects of political humor will vary as a function of the individual 
characteristics of audiences.  First, in order to understand a joke one must have the cognitive 
resources necessary to recognize and resolve incongruity.  While those with large amounts of 
political information have the knowledge necessary to understand jokes, they are also motivated 
and practiced at utilizing abstract ideological concepts to interpret information even when 
presented in traditional news contexts.  Because of this, it is unlikely that new information, 
regardless of comic format, will enhance ideological constraint among those with the highest 
levels of pre-existing knowledge.  Those with low political knowledge are also unlikely to 
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benefit from political comedy.  Even if these unsophisticated viewers are able to recognize and 
resolve incongruity, the time and energy expended on humor comprehension trades off with 
subsequent elaboration about the implications of a humorous reinterpretation (Wyer & Collins, 
1992), and the rule identified to resolve incongruity is likely to be context dependent rather than 
abstract and of limited utility in understanding politics more broadly.  Political comedy should 
boost ideological constraint most strongly among those with adequate political knowledge to 
understand jokes and a basic understanding of abstract ideological principles, but who lack the 
intrinsic motivation necessary for ideological thinking and effortful cognitive elaboration absent 
the expected gratifications derived from the comic context. 
H5: Comedy will be most strongly associated with ideological constraint among those at 
moderate levels of prior political knowledge. 
 Comprehending and appreciating comedy requires effortful processing and cognitive 
engagement.  As viewers work to resolve humorous incongruity, they discover new connections 
among seemingly unrelated pieces of information and develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of political relationships.  The model of humor-triggered cognition predicts that 
exposure to political comedy will increase ideological constraint, particularly among those with 
moderate levels of political sophistication.  These predictions are tested using data from the 
experiment described in Chapter 3.  The relationship between exposure to information and the 
consistency of political attitudes is examined with several alternative measures of ideological 
constraint. 




 To measure ideological constraint, respondents were asked in the post-test to rate their 
level of support or opposition to 10 policy issues representing a range of policy domains.  
Respondents in all conditions were asked to indicate how much they support or oppose: 1. 
Government funding for the development of green products and technology; 2. Using the death 
penalty in cases of murder; 3. Regulations on the number and types of guns that people can 
purchase; 4. Removing criminal penalties associated with being caught with illegal drugs; 5. 
Comprehensive sex education that covers topics like safe sex and birth control; 6. Regulating the 
types of investments banks are allowed to make; 7. Funding medical care for those who do not 
have or cannot afford health insurance; 8. Placing strict limits on the amount of pollution that 
companies are allowed to emit; 9. Giving minority applicants some preference in university 
admissions; and, 10. Raising taxes on those who make more than $250K a year.
1
  Respondents 
were asked whether they strongly oppose, oppose, somewhat oppose, neither support nor oppose, 
somewhat support, support, or strongly support each policy.  If they were not sure of their 
position or had not thought much about the issue they could also select a ‘not sure’ option.  On 
average, less than 3 percent of respondents selected ‘not sure’ on any given question.  Eighty 
percent answered all 10 questions, 94% answered at least 9, 99% answered at least 8, and only 2 
respondents answered ‘not sure’ on 3 of the 10 policy issue questions. When possible, rather than 
excluding those who selected ‘not sure’, constraint measures were based on all available 
information from questions that were answered by a respondent.   
                                                 
1
 Respondents were also asked two additional issue items: Allowing security personnel to select people of Middle 
Eastern descent for additional screening at airports; and, Taking welfare benefits away from those who do not seek 
employment or education.  However, an examination of the reliability of the issues scale showed small, negative 
item-test and item-rest (corrected item-total) correlations for both these items, indicating that they did not capture 
the same underlying construct as the other 10 items.  Because they lacked clear ideological implications, these items 
were not included in measures of ideological constraint.  
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 Each policy issue question was recoded to run from -3 to 3, with -3 indicating a strong 
liberal response and 3 indicating a strong conservative response.  For the green technology, gun 
control, drugs, sex education, bank regulation, health care, taxation, pollution and affirmative 
action questions, opposition was considered conservative and support liberal.  For the death 
penalty question, opposition was considered liberal and support conservative.  The alpha 
reliability is .74 for the overall 10 issue item scale. 
 Using the 10 policy issue items, several measures of ideological constraint were built.  
Measuring ideological constraint in multiple yet complimentary ways reduces concern that 
measurement error is driving the result in any particular case.  First, Chronbach’s alpha was 
calculated as an internal consistency estimate of the reliability of the policy issue scale.  A higher 
Chronbach’s alpha indicates greater intercorrelation among policy items and, thus, greater 
ideological constraint.  Because alpha is not robust against missing data, ‘not sure’ responses are 
excluded from this analysis. 
 Scale reliability estimates of ideological constraint can produce misleading conclusions 
because results are reliant on the correlational structure of the aggregate population or 
subpopulation that forms the unit of analysis (Barton & Parsons, 1977).  Attitude homogeneity 
will result in low reliability coefficient estimates even if individuals hold highly consistent 
attitudes.  Similarly, groups including individuals with extremist tendencies will artificially 
appear more consistent than groups with attitudes that are equally consistent but more moderate.   
In response to these limitations, Barton and Parsons (1977) suggest an alternative approach 
allowing attitude consistency to be analyzed at the individual level rather than relying on 
relationships within aggregate populations or subpopulations.  Here, ideological constraint is 
measured using the variance in attitudes expressed by an individual.  For each respondent, the 
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standard deviation of all answered issue items was calculated. Ideologically constrained 
respondents should place themselves at similar left-right locations across issues and, thus, scores 
on this measure should be lower; unconstrained attitudes have greater variability and will have a 
higher standard deviation. 
 The third measure of ideological constraint is the average inter-item issue distance for 
each of the 10 policy items (Levendusky, 2009).  While this measure is quite similar to the 
standard deviation measure described above, it does not rely on the mean issue position and is 
therefore less susceptible to the biasing influence outlying attitudes.  Here, the absolute value of 
the difference between each of the possible 36 pairs of items was calculated, and then the 
average issue distance was taken.  Because the large number of possible pairs creates a robust 
measure even where information is missing on individual issue items, respondents who answered 
‘not sure’ on any policy issue were still included, and scores were based on all the item pairs 
with valid responses.  Policy opinions that are more closely located on the 7-point scales are 
more ideologically consistent; so lower average inter-item distance indicates greater ideological 
constraint.  
 An additional measure of constraint examines the bi-polarity of issue positions using a 
measure of consistency of left-right placement (Frederico & Hunt, 2012; Jacoby, 1991). The 
standard deviation and average inter-item issue distance measures depend on the strength of 
issue positions.  Because the consistency measure disregards attitude strength and looks only at 
the direction of attitudes, it is less of a concern that attitude moderation is creating the illusion of 
consistency in this measure.  To create this bi-polarity measure of ideological consistency, the 
percentage of issues where respondents placed themselves on the conservative side and the 
percentage on the liberal side of the scale, regardless of strength, were calculated.  Then the 
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absolute value of the difference between the percent conservative and percent liberal placement 
was taken.  Constrained attitudes should be more consistently located on a single side of the 
scale; thus, higher scores indicate greater ideological constraint. 
 The previous measures tap what might be thought of as horizontal constraint, that is, 
consistency among discrete issue positions.  Vertical constraint is the relationship between these 
issue positions and general ideological identification.  Ideologically constrained policy opinions 
should be more correlated with ideological self-placement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Fredrico & Hunt, 2012).  To test this, the average of all answered issue position questions was 
taken.  The average issue position measure was then regressed on ideological self-placement, and 
constraint is indicated by the coefficient on the self-placement variable.  Among more 
ideologically constrained citizens, the measure of ideological self-placement should be a strong 
predictor of average placement of issue items. 
 Ideological self-placement was measured using three, branching, post-test questions.  
First, respondents were asked whether they considered themselves liberal, conservative, 
moderate or they were not sure.  Those answering liberal or conservative were then asked 
whether, generally speaking, they were extremely, somewhat or only slightly 
liberal/conservative.  Moderates were asked whether they leaned liberal, conservative or not 
more toward one side or the other.  From these questions a 9 point ideological scale was 
constructed.  The ideology measure runs from -4, meaning extremely liberal, to 4, meaning 
extremely conservative.  Those answering don’t know, 27 respondents total, were excluded from 
analysis.  Of the 27 excluded respondents, 19 were from the control group, 3 were from the 
comedy condition, and 5 were from the news condition.  Over half of those excluded were at the 
lowest level of prior political knowledge.  This creates a more conservative estimate of the 
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impact of comedy and news because those conditions are being compared against a relatively 
sophisticated subset of the control group. 
 Prior knowledge was calculated as described in the previous chapter.  Again, based on 
correct responses to prior knowledge items of varying difficulty, respondents are divided into 
three groups: low, moderate and high prior political knowledge.  These categories are balanced 
across experimental conditions. 
 
Results 
 It is predicted that exposure to political comedy should be associated with greater 
ideological constraint (Hypothesis 4), and that this relationship should be strongest among those 
at moderate levels of prior political knowledge (Hypothesis 5).  The first test of these hypotheses 
examines the reliability of policy positions.  Table 5.1 shows the Chronbach’s alpha reliability 
coefficients for the 10 policy issue items, divided by condition and levels of prior political 
knowledge.  Overall, exposure to both news and comedy increases the reliability of the issue 
scale relative to the control group. However, in contrast to Hypothesis 4, there is only a small 
difference in reliability between the news and comedy conditions; reliability in the comedy 
condition is .80, versus .76 in the news condition.  While there is no available test of the 
significance of the difference between Chronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients, the .04 
difference between comedy and news appears substantively quite small.   
 Nonetheless, when the sample is divided by levels of prior political knowledge, patterns 
of reliability fall in line with expectations.  Hypothesis 5 predicts that the relationship between 
comedy and ideological constraint should be most evident among the moderately political 
knowledgeable who possess a base level political awareness necessary to make sense of comedy, 
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but are less practiced at using ideological constructs than those with higher levels of knowledge.  
Among those low in prior knowledge, both news and comedy are associated with a small boost 
in reliability relative to the control group, but there is little difference between the two 
conditions, with reliability in the comedy condition .03 less than in the news condition.  Among 
those high in prior knowledge, comedy and news do little to boost the already high reliability of 
the issue scale.  Here, Chronbach’s alpha is .85 in the control group as well as the comedy 
condition, and increases by only .04 in the news condition.  Comedy has a dramatic effect on the 
issue scale reliability of those with moderate political knowledge.  Among those at the moderate 
level of prior knowledge, reliability is a low .39 in the control group.  Exposure to traditional 
news has no substantive effect on ideological constraint, decreasing the reliability of the issue 
scale by .02 relative to the control group. However, comedy is strongly associated with 
constraint among those with moderate prior knowledge.  The reliability coefficient for the 
moderately knowledgeable in the comedy condition is .76, fully .37 points greater than the 
control group and .39 points greater than those in the news condition.  This provides strong 
support for Hypothesis 5, that the relationship between comedy and constraint will be greatest 
for those at moderate levels of prior knowledge.  Indeed, it is only among the moderately 
knowledgeable that exposure to comedy seems to trigger the expression of highly reliable 
attitudes. 
 The second test of the effect of comedy on ideological constraint allows for a test of the 
statistical significance of this relationship.  Table 5.2 shows models where ideological constraint 
is measured as the standard deviation of the 10 policy issue items.  Overall, information 
condition has no impact on the standard deviation of policy attitudes.  However, when the 
sample is divided by levels of prior political knowledge, results support the prediction that 
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comedy is associated with constraint for those with moderate levels of prior knowledge.  For 
those with low or high prior knowledge, there is no relationship between exposure to information 
and the standard deviation of issue positions, and neither news nor comedy significantly 
increases constraint.  However, among the moderately knowledgeable, exposure to political 
comedy is associated with a statistically significant .24 point drop in the standard deviation of 
issue positions, indicating greater constraint among this group.  Additionally, this is a statistically 
significant decline of .40 points relative to the news condition.  Substantively, moderately 
knowledgeable respondents in the comedy condition show a level of ideological constraint 
greater than that estimated for highly knowledgeable respondents, while the moderately 
knowledgeable control group is roughly equivalent to the low knowledge control.  The estimated 
standard deviation for those in the comedy condition with moderate knowledge is 1.31, the same 
as the highly knowledgeable control group.  Conversely, the estimated standard deviation of the 
moderately knowledgeable control group is 1.55, a mere .01 points less than the low knowledge 
control.  Again, while no main effect of information format is identified, comedy is associated 
with greater ideological constraint for those at moderate levels of political knowledge. 
 Table 5.3 shows models of the average inter-item issue distance overall and across levels 
of prior knowledge.  Because more constrained attitudes should be placed in more consistent 
positions across policy issues, negative coefficients indicate greater constraint.  In the pooled 
model there is little evidence that exposure to information, regardless of format, has any impact 
on constraint.  Neither comedy nor news emerges as a significant predictor of average inter-item 
distance.  However, in line with predictions, comedy does improve constraint among those at 
moderate levels but not those at low or high levels of prior knowledge.  Information condition 
has no effect on the average inter-item distance for those at low levels of prior knowledge.  
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Surprisingly, in the high knowledge group, comedy actually hinders constraint, increasing 
average inter-item distance by a marginally significant .28 points relative to the control group; 
however, this coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from that on news.  In the moderate 
knowledge model, the coefficient on comedy is a marginally significant -.22, a significant .38 
points smaller than the effect of news.  Constraint among the moderately knowledgeable exposed 
to political comedy is roughly equivalent to that of the highly knowledgeable in the control 
group; the average inter-item issue distance for the highly knowledgeable control group is 1.43, 
versus 1.5 among the moderately knowledgeable in the comedy condition.  Generally speaking, 
the analysis of the average inter-item distance measure of ideological constraint fails to support 
Hypothesis 4, but provides some support for Hypothesis 5.  Political comedy promotes 
ideological constraint, but only among those at moderate levels of political knowledge. 
 This pattern is replicated again when the consistency of left-right placement is used as the 
indicator of ideological constraint.  The dependent variable in Table 5.4 is the absolute value of 
the difference between the percentage conservative and percentage liberal policy placements.  
Higher values indicate more consistent placement of policy attitudes on either the liberal or 
conservative side of the scale and, thus, greater attitude constraint.  Again, comedy is associated 
with attitude consistency, but only among those with moderate prior knowledge.  The results of 
the pooled model show no main effect for condition.  In the moderate knowledge model, comedy 
is associated with a .14 point increase in consistency. A t-test fails to distinguish this coefficient 
from that on news, but a Wald test restricting the coefficients to be equivalent is marginally 
significant.  Surprisingly, among those high in prior knowledge, both the comedy and news 
conditions are associated with decreased consistency, but only the coefficient on comedy is 
significant and the effect is indistinguishable across conditions.  There is no effect for 
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information condition among those low in prior knowledge.  Again, comedy is associated with 
ideological consistency only among those with moderate prior political knowledge. 
 Rather than the relationship among issue items, the final piece of analysis is concerned 
with the connection between ideological self-placement and issue attitudes.  More constrained 
attitudes should be more highly correlated with ideological identification, with strong liberals 
placing themselves farther to the left and strong conservatives farther to the right on policy issue 
items.  If comedy increases ideological constraint among moderately sophisticated viewers, then 
the correlation between ideology and average issue position should be stronger for those in the 
comedy condition, particularly among those at moderate levels of political knowledge, than the 
correlation for those in the news condition or control group.  In Table 5.5, the average issue 
position on the 10 policy issue items is regressed on dummy variables for condition, self-
placement on the 9-point ideology scale, and the interactions between condition and ideological 
self-placement.  In the model for all respondents, shown in Column 1, ideology has a strong 
positive relationship with average issue position.  Overall, a one-point shift on the ideology scale 
is associated with a .20 point change in average issue position in the same direction.  More 
importantly, the interaction between comedy and ideology is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that exposure to political comedy strengthens the relationship between ideological 
self-placement and average issue position.  In the comedy condition, a one-point change in self-
placement is associated with a .33 point shift in average issue position, a substantial 65% 
increase in the relationship between ideology and average issue placement.  There is no such 
increase in the impact of ideology in the news condition. 
  Broken down by level of prior political knowledge, the effect of comedy is again located 
primarily among those with moderate prior knowledge.  For those low in prior knowledge, there 
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is no relationship between ideological self-placement and issue positions, no matter the 
experimental condition.  Among the highly knowledgeable, the coefficient on ideology is a 
statistically significant .33, but this relationship does not significantly vary as a function of 
condition.  In the moderate knowledge model, a one-point shift in ideology is associated with a 
.16 point change in average issue position in the direction of that shift.  This change is half the 
size of that seen among those at high levels of prior knowledge. However, the magnitude of the 
shift increases by .17 points in the comedy condition so that a one-point shift in ideology is 
associated with a .33 point shift in average issue position, a change identical to that estimated for 
those high in prior-knowledge.   
 Substantively, exposure to political comedy strengthens the relationship between 
ideology and average issue placement such that those at moderate levels of prior knowledge are 
indistinguishable from those at the highest levels of political knowledge. Figure 5.1 graphically 
demonstrates the impact of experimental condition on the relationship between ideological self-
placement and average issue position for those with low, moderate and high prior knowledge.  
The bars show the size of the shift in average issue position attributable to a one-point change in 
ideology.  In the control and news groups, the impact of ideology is much stronger for those high 
in knowledge than those at lower levels.  In the comedy condition, the moderate and high 
knowledge groups converge such that the influence of ideology among the moderately 
knowledgeable is quite similar to that among the high knowledge group. 
 In addition to its effect on the magnitude of the relationship between ideology and 
attitudes, exposure to political comedy leads those with moderate levels of political knowledge to 
express attitudes similar to those held by the most knowledgeable respondents. Based on the 
models in Table 5.5, Figure 5.2 shows estimates of average issue position by condition for self-
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reported strong liberals and strong conservatives at various levels of political knowledge.  
Holding ideological self-placement constant, while experimental condition has little influence on 
the average issue position held by those at high or low levels of knowledge, there is a substantial 
difference in the attitudes expressed by those with moderate knowledge across experimental 
conditions. In the news condition, there is a large gap between the estimated average issue 
position of those high in prior knowledge and those with lower levels of knowledge.  In the 
comedy condition, the high and moderate knowledge groups converge, and the attitudes 
expressed are roughly equivalent for those with moderate and high levels of prior political 
knowledge who place themselves at the same position on the ideology scale 
 
Conclusion 
 To date, the effect of political comedy on attitudes is not well understood.  Some 
evidence suggests that the negative portrayal of the political system, leaders and media can lead 
to cynicism and mistrust (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Guggenheim et al., 2011; Morris & 
Baumgartner, 2008), but empirical studies have found only limited effects on more specific 
attitudes (Morris, 2009; Xenos et al., 2011; Young, 2004, 2006), leading researchers to conclude 
that political comedy has limited persuasive power (Holbert et al., 2011; Polk et al., 2009; Nabi 
et al., 2007).  The findings from this study suggest that comedy may have a much stronger effect 
on political attitudes than previously recognized.  Not only does political comedy provide 
important political information, it does so in a manner that helps viewers contextualize and 
understand information, resulting in the expression of more consistent, ideologically constrained 
attitudes.  In fact, the humorous presentation of information influences attitudes more powerfully 
than exposure to information in more traditional news form. 
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 Consistent with expectations from the model of humor-triggered cognition, the 
experiment demonstrates that exposure to political comedy encourages those with adequate prior 
political knowledge to utilize abstract ideological principles when thinking about political issues, 
resulting in greater consistency in attitudes toward concrete policy issues across various political 
domains.  Across several measures of ideological constraint, political comedy was associated 
with greater attitude consistency, but only for those at moderate levels of prior political 
knowledge.  The attitudes of moderately knowledgeable respondents exposed to political comedy 
were more reliable, less variable, closer together, more consistently located on one side of the 
ideological scale and more strongly related to ideological self-placement.   
 One unexpected finding was a decrease in ideological constraint observed among 
moderately knowledgeable respondents in the news condition.  A speculative explanation 
consistent with the model of humor-triggered cognition is that these largely left-leaning 
respondents reacted automatically to messages critical of the Obama administration and, unlike 
similar participants in the comedy condition, did not invest much cognitive effort evaluating 
information or incorporating it into political belief systems.  Though it is observed in all four of 
the alternative constraint models, the magnitude of the effect is rather small and never reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Additionally, these tests are based on the same set 
of attitude measures, so this unexpected result does not indicate a pattern but only a small, one-
time decrease in attitude consistency among moderately knowledgeable participants in the news 
condition.  Most importantly, this anomalous finding does not affect conclusions about the effect 
of political comedy on ideological constraint.  All moderate prior knowledge models show a 
significant increase in ideological constraint in the comedy condition relative to the control 
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group, so claims about the effect of comedy are not contingent on the behavior of those in the 
news condition.     
 Despite this minor deviation from predictions, results are generally consistent with the 
model of humor-triggered cognition.  The overall pattern of results is particularly remarkable 
given that respondents were only exposed to 15 minutes of political comedy covering a select 
few political topics, and only 2 of the 10 issue items included in the measures of ideological 
constraint were discussed in the experimental stimuli.  Certainly, it is difficult to argue that this 
brief exposure was sufficient to produce real, lasting changes in the structure of political belief 
systems.  Still, results indicate that political comedy promotes the expression of more 
thoughtfully considered, ideological consistent political attitudes.  Exposure to political comedy 
encourages effortful information processing and motivates the use of abstract ideological 
principles to organize thinking.  Over time, these patterns of cognitive engagement should boost 
ideological constraint, even if experimental results merely reflect more thoughtful responses 
rather than fundamental, long-term changes in underlying structure of political knowledge and 
attitudes.  To examine the relationship between real-world patterns of exposure to political 
comedy and ideological constraint, the next chapter replicates experimental analysis of the effect 
of political comedy on attitudes using secondary survey data from the 2008 National Annenberg 





Table 5.1  Chronbach’s Alpha Reliability of 10-Item Issue Scale by Condition and across 
Levels of Prior Political Knowledge 
 Overall Low  Medium  High  N 
Comedy .80 .65 .76 .85 62 
News .76 .68 .37 .89 61 
Control .65 .59 .39 .85 61 







Table 5.2  Effect on The Standard Deviation of Policy Issue Positions across Levels of Prior 
Political Knowledge 



























.01 .02 .11 .04 
N 184 54 61 67 
βc-βn .00 .17 .40 .16 
t .00 .73 2.06** .74 
F .00 .94 7.50*** 1.57 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
#
p<.20. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 











Table 5.3  Effect on The Average Inter-Item Issue Distance across Levels of Prior Political 
Knowledge 




























.01 .01 .08 .05 
N 184 54 61 67 
βc-βn .04 .16 .38 .24 
t .23 .55 1.66** .91 
F .11 .55 4.83** 2.27^ 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
#
p<.20. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 










Table 5.4  Effect on The Ideological Bi-Polarity of Policy Issue Position across Levels of 
Prior Political Knowledge 



























.01 .02 .05 .05 
N 184 54 61 67 
βc-βn .03 .12 .12 .06 
t .40 .84 1.00 .48 
F .24 1.25 1.75
#
 .63 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
#
p<.20. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 










Table 5.5  Effect on Vertical Constraint, The Relationship between Self-Reported Ideology 
and Average Issue Position across Levels of Prior Political Knowledge 





















































.52 .35 .34 .76 
N 157 38 55 63 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
#
p<.20. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 










Figure 5.1  The Relationship between Ideology and Average Issue Position by Condition 

































Figure 5.2  Average Issue Position for Strong Liberals and Strong Conservatives across 
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Chapter 6. Leaving the Lab for the Living Room: A Survey-Based Demonstration of the 
Effect of Political Comedy on Ideological Constraint 
 According to the model of humor-triggered cognition, the patterns of cognitive 
processing and engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying humor affect the way 
information is encoded and structured in memory by encouraging the discovery of new and novel 
relationships between seemingly inconsistent ideas.  As a result, exposure to political comedy 
should enhance ideological constraint (Hypothesis 4), and do so most strongly for those with 
moderate levels of prior political knowledge (Hypothesis 5).  The experimental findings reported 
in the previous chapter strongly support both of these predictions.   
 The experiment demonstrates that exposure to political comedy boosts ideological 
constraint beyond exposure to identical information presented in traditional hard news.  
Participants were randomly assigned to view stimuli that varied on humor but were otherwise 
identical in factual content.  This combination of rigorous control and random assignment 
provides confidence that observed differences in ideological constraint are attributable to the 
experimental manipulation and not irrelevant story content features or patterns of selective 
exposure.  In short, the experiment provides strong evidence of the causal relationship between 
exposure to political comedy and ideological constraint.  
 However, there are several important limitations to the experimental design that make it 
difficult to generalize effects to the real-world.  First, the experiment relies on a convenience 
sample drawn from the Communication Studies Participant Pool.  This unrepresentative sample 
of mostly college sophomores may or may not be comparable to “real people” (Hovland, 1959).  
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In addition to their high cognitive skill, undergraduates are characterized by deference to 
authority, unstable peer relationships, and relatively weak, uncrystallized political and social 
attitudes that are not firmly based in personal experience or a strong sense of self, all of which 
make this population particularly susceptible to influence (Sears, 1986).  While their 
characteristics closely mirror those of typical comedy viewers, the unrepresentative sample 
utilized in the experiment is insufficient to produce population effect estimates. 
 Second, these differences may be exacerbated by features of the artificial laboratory 
environment.  While the intentions of the study were disguised, participants were aware of being 
monitored and may have behaved quite differently than they would have under more typical 
exposure conditions.  Further, the experiment was conducted in an academic setting, and 
respondents received college credit for participation.  This context may have introduced a 
cognitive set that encouraged greater attention and more thoughtful engagement (Sears, 1986).  
Given the peculiarities of the experimental setting, it is possible that findings are not an accurate 
reflection of how political comedy affects the general population in its natural habitat. 
 Finally, there is an inevitable trade-off between rigorous control and realism.  The 
experiment assess effects based on brief exposure to a few messages strategically selected to 
represent the broader communication phenomenon of interest.  To minimize the risk that results 
are specific to particular issues or stories, and to capture the dynamic interplay of prior 
knowledge and predispositions with new information, the experiment included an assemblage of 
stories pertaining to three important contemporary political issues.  Stimuli were highly realistic, 
with actual political comedy and news coverage unobtrusively edited to achieve content 
equivalence.  This design is a significant improvement over previous research where information 
content was less tightly controlled and fewer stories were included in experimental stimuli.  Still, 
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real-world exposure to political comedy does not occur in isolation and effects are likely to be 
cumulative.  No experiment can fully capture what Walter Lippmann (1922) called the 
“blooming, buzzing confusion” of the political communication environment (p. 54), and only 
tentative conclusions can be drawn from one-shot exposure to a potentially idiosyncratic set of 
political messages. 
 While the experimental design makes it possible to test causal relationships and 
demonstrate media effects, this methodology lacks external validity.  It is difficult to make 
generalizations about real-world political communication effects based on the behavior of an 
unrepresentative, captive audience briefly exposed to a small set of strategically crafted 
messages in an artificial laboratory setting.  Supplementing the experiment with data from a 
nationally representative survey strengthens confidence in conclusions and makes it possible to 
estimate the cumulative, population effects of exposure to a full range of humorous political 
messages 
 Certainly, survey research is not without shortcomings.  This methodology can identify 
correlations that are suggestive of media effects but cannot establish causal relationships between 
variables of interest.  Additionally, self-reported measures are notoriously unreliable proxies for 
media exposure, and measurement error tends to attenuate effects (Iyengar & Simon, 2000).  
Further, those who report exposure to particular political media tend to differ systematically from 
those who do not.  To the extent that similar underlying factors influence both patterns of media 
exposure and outcome variables of interest, survey data analysis cannot disentangle the 
reciprocal effects of political messages and audience predispositions.  For example, because it is 
difficult to distinguish between newly acquired and pre-existing political information, 
researchers disagree about whether the correlation between exposure to political comedy and 
121 
 
knowledge should be interpreted as evidence of learning or merely reflects high levels of 
sophistication among those who choose to consume this type of media.  For all of these reasons, 
relative to rigorously controlled experiments, correlational survey studies tend to produce 
conservative estimates of mass media effects. 
 Methodological pluralism, employing multiple, complementary strategies to investigate 
political communication phenomenon, helps overcome the limitations inherent in any given 
approach (Hovland, 1959).  In this chapter, secondary survey data is used to replicate 
experimental analysis and investigate the relationship between real-world patterns of exposure to 
political comedy and ideological constraint in a nationally representative sample.   The 
advantage of the survey approach is the ability to capture the cumulative effects of exposure to 
multifaceted political messages which interact with information from multiple media sources and 
with citizens’ prior knowledge and political predispositions.  Combining both experimental and 
survey methodologies provides a more complete and nuanced understanding of how political 
comedy shapes citizens’ political attitudes. 
  
Data and Measures 
 Experimental analysis of the effects of political comedy on ideological constraint is 
replicated using secondary survey data from the telephone edition of the 2008 National 
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) collected by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the 
University of Pennsylvania.  The large-scale telephone survey was designed to track the 
dynamics of public opinion during the 2008 Presidential election.  Because the survey was 
designed to capture campaign dynamics, questions varied across the field period, with items 
added, removed or changed in response to unfolding campaign events.  In total, 57,967 
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respondents participated in the survey between December 17, 2007 and November 3, 2008, with 
3,737 post-election re-interviews conducted immediately following the November 4, 2008 
general election.  The NAES telephone survey was conducted as a rolling cross-section, with up 
to 300 interviews conducted on each day throughout the sampling period.   For this analysis, data 
was aggregated across all time periods and treated like a single cross-section. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 Several measures of ideological constraint were developed based on a variety of pre-
election policy issue items.  Because the 2008 NAES was a rolling cross-sectional survey and 
relevant policy questions varied across time periods, traditional correlational, scale reliability 
estimates of constraint are not feasible due to missing data.  Several alternative measures of 
ideological constraint similar to those used in the experimental chapter were utilized.  These 
include variance in issue positions, average inter-item issue distance, consistency of left-right 
placement, and vertical constraint, or the relationship between issue attitudes and ideological 
self-placement. 
 To measure ideological constraint, policy issue items with response options reflecting 
clear differences in ideological position were identified.  Several issue items asked respondents 
to rate whether they were strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed, 
somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed to a given policy.  Of the issue attitudes measured in this 
way, 7 items had response options with clear ideological implications.  The items included in this 
analysis measured attitudes about school vouchers, negotiating with enemy nations, a U.S.-
Mexico border fence, drivers licenses for illegal immigrants, funding stem cell research, a 
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Constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, and lifting the ban on off shore drilling.
1
 
Information about specific question wording can be found in Appendix 6A.  Each question was 
coded to run from -2, indicating a strong liberal response, to 2, indicating a strong conservative 
response.  Neutral and ‘don’t know’ responses were coded as 0.   
 The first indicator of ideological constraint is the standard deviation of responses given to 
the 7 policy issue questions (Barton & Parsons, 1977; Wyckoff, 1980; Hamill et al., 1985).  A 
more constrained respondent should offer more consistent opinions and, therefore, their 
responses to the 7 policy questions should have a smaller standard deviation.   The individual-
level standard deviation of the issues scales was developed using the technique described by 
Barton and Parsons (1977) and refined by Wyckoff (1980) and Hamill et al. (1985).  First, 
responses to the 7 issue items were standardized for the sample so that respondent attitude scores 
are expressed in terms of socially defined liberal and conservative positions.  Next, the mean 
standardized scores and standard deviations from the mean were computed for each individual.  
Because the items included in the survey varied over time, the maximum number of questions 
asked of any respondent was 4 out of the 7 possible issue items.  Due to concern that consistency 
is more likely when a smaller number of items are being compared, two strategies were 
employed to correct for the number of items on which an individual offers an opinion. First, 
                                                 
1
 Not included in analysis were items measuring strength of support or opposition to 3 additional issues where 
ideological implications were not readily apparent.  The first item asked, Do you favor or oppose the federal 
government in Washington negotiating for more free trade agreements like NAFTA?  This item was excluded 
because the debate about free trade agreements, and NAFTA in particular, is not structured by traditional ideological 
divisions.  Opposition comes from unions, environmentalists, and others on the left, while conservatives express 
concern about immigration, loss of comparative advantage in agriculture and industry and government interference 
in markets.  Also excluded were a set of items from a question wording experiment examining support or opposition 
for a path to citizenship for ‘illegal aliens’, ‘illegal immigrants’, or ‘undocumented immigrants’.  Response 
instability attributable to wording changes makes these items unsuitable to examine ideological constraint.  
Additionally, these items were double barreled, conditioning amnesty on return to home countries and substantial 
fines.  Opposition could indicate a conservative position against a path to citizenship or a liberal position opposing 
onerous conditions on amnesty.  Finally, a small subset of respondents was asked about support or opposition to 
suspending the federal gas tax for the summer months.  Because the Democratic Presidential candidates, Clinton and 
Obama, were divided on this issue, support or opposition reflects divisions in the highly contested primary campaign 
rather than ideological principles. 
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those answering fewer than 2 of the 7 issue items were excluded from analysis.  Then, a 
weighting factor was created by dividing the maximum number of items by the number of items 
on which a valid response was available.  This weight is closer to one the more items a 
respondent answered and becomes larger than 1 as fewer items are available.  The final score is 
equal to the standard deviation of each individual’s responses to the standardized issue items, 
multiplied by the calculated weight.
2
 
 A second measure of attitude constraint is the average inter-item issue distance for each 
of the 7 policy position questions described above (Levendusky, 2009).  Because it does not rely 
on the mean issue position, this measure is less likely to be biased by outlying attitudes than the 
standard deviation measure of constraint.  The average inter-item distance was calculated by 
taking the absolute value of the difference between self-placement on each possible pair of items.  
Then, the average of these values was computed for each individual.  Because the highest 
number of items available was 4, there were 6 potential item pairs available.  Those answering 
fewer than 2 of the 4 questions were excluded from analysis.
3
  Attitudes are constrained insofar 
as positions are located at similar points on the scale across issues; thus, lower inter-item issue 
distance indicates greater ideological constraint. 
 Vertical constraint, the relationship between issue positions and the higher-order 
construct of ideology itself, was examined using the 7 issue items described above as well as an 
ideological self-placement measure.  Ideology and strength of ideology were derived from a pre-
election measure asking: Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very 
                                                 
2
 Models using simplified versions of this measure were also tested with results substantively identical to the 
measure described.  Alternative measures examined included the unweighted standard deviation of unstandardized 
and standardized issue items, and the weighted standard deviation of unstandardized issue items.  The pattern of 
results is identical across these alternative measures of variance. 
3
 Because average inter-item issue distance may also be biased by the number of items answered, a version of this 
variable weighted using the same method as the standard deviation measure was also tested.  The pattern of results 
was substantively identical to that obtained using the unweighted version of this variable. 
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conservative, somewhat conservative, moderate, somewhat liberal or very liberal?  Just as the 
policy issue items, the ideology measure was coded to run from -2 to 2, with moderates centered 
at 0 and smaller values indicating more liberal self-identification.  Twenty-six percent of 
respondents self-identified as liberal, 39% as conservative, and 35% considered themselves to be 
moderate.  The absolute value of the ideology scale was taken to create a strength of ideology 
measure.   Overall, 22% of respondents were strong ideologues and 43% identified themselves as 
only somewhat ideological.  When included in the models, ideology and strength of ideology 
measures were rescaled to run from 0 to 1 to make comparisons across variables easier. 
 The vertical constraint measure was constructed using a method described by Federico 
and Schneider (2007).  The 7 issue items and self-reported ideology were all scaled to run from -
2 to 2, with lower values indicating more liberal responses.  The mean absolute value of the 
difference between ideological self-placement and each issue item was taken.  Because it is 
dependent on ideological self-placement, there is risk that basic political predispositions will 
confound the relationship between this measure and other variables.  To eliminate variance 
attributable to individual differences in predispositions, the raw score was regressed on strength 
of ideology, and the residual was taken as the final measure of vertical constraint.
4
  Lower scores 
indicate greater correspondence between self-reported ideology and policy issue positions. 
 An additional test of the relationship between political comedy and vertical constraint 
involved an examination of how well self-reported ideology predicted issue positions.  The 
average issue position was calculated for all items for which a valid response was available.  
This measure runs from -2 to 2, with lower values indicating more liberal responses.  Vertical 
                                                 
4
 Results for models using unpurged vertical constraint scores as well as scores purged by regressing the raw scores 
on ideology and partisanship yielded the same pattern of results. 
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ideological constraint was examined by regressing the average issue position measure on self-
reported ideology.   
 Finally, ideological constraint was indicated by the consistency with which respondents 
placed themselves on a single side of the issue scales.  This measure gauges tendency toward bi-
polar thinking about the political world (Federico, 2007).  In addition to the 7 policy placement 
questions described above, several additional policy items were included in this measure of 
ideological consistency.  The 6 additional issue items measured attitudes toward were taxes 
(increase, decrease, keep the same), abortion (available to anyone, stricter limits, only 
rape/incest/life of mother exceptions, never permitted), gay marriage (allow marriage, domestic 
partnerships, no legal recognition), the environment versus jobs (environment priority, economy 
priority), as well as two health care items (single government program, current private insurance 
system; increase regulation, increase market competition). See the variables Appendix 6A for 
information about specific question wording.  Because these items did not conform to the five-
point, strongly support to strongly oppose scale, they could not be included in the previously 
described measures of constraint.  However, response options reflected clear liberal or 
conservative positions, and because it is concerned with the direction of opinion rather than the 
strength or relative placement of positions across issues, these additional questions were suitable 
for inclusion in the ideological consistency measure.  
 For each of the 13 policy questions, responses were classified as either liberal or 
conservative.  Because not all respondents were asked about all issues, the percentage of issues 
where a respondent placed themselves on the conservative side or on the liberal side, regardless 
of strength, was calculated.  Then, the absolute value of the difference between the conservative 
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 Comedy was measured as a binary variable indicating self-reported use of several 
comedy programs based on 4 survey items.  Respondents in the pre-election survey were asked 2 
open-ended questions about political television consumption: 1. During the past week, from what 
television program did you get most of your information about the 2008 Presidential campaign? 
and, 2. In the past week, did you watch any other television programs that contained information 
about the 2008 Presidential Campaign? If so, which ones?  Two trained coders, including the 
researcher and a trained undergraduate research assistant, identified mentions of Comedy Central 
and the programs The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, or their hosts Jon Stewart and Steven 
Colbert; Late-night Comedy programs such as The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Late Show 
with David Letterman, etc.; Saturday Night Live; or Real Time with Bill Maher.  Inter-coder 
agreement was .98 and the coded comedy measure was reliable at the .95 alpha level.  Excluding 
those with insufficient information to be included in analysis, 2.27% of respondents mentioned at 
least one comedy program, and 1.66% mentioned The Daily Show or Colbert Report, 
specifically.   
 The post-election survey included 2 general measures of self-reported exposure to 
political comedy that were not focused on sources of campaign information.  Post-election 
respondents were asked: 1. Which of the following shows do you regularly watch—The Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart, Saturday Night Live, both or neither? and, 2. In the past week, how many 
days did you watch late-night comedy programs like The Late Show with David Letterman, The 
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Tonight Show with Jay Leno, or Late Night with Conan O’Brien?   Excluding those with 
insufficient information to be included in analysis, 14.3% of post-election survey respondents 
reported regularly watching The Daily Show, about 20% regularly watched SNL, and 
approximately 25% reported watching late-night comedy at least once in the past week. 
 The 4 items were combined into an overall comedy exposure measure and a separate 
variable indicating exposure to The Daily Show or Colbert Report.  The overall comedy measure 
has a value of 1 if a respondent mentioned any comedy program in either of the open-ended, pre-
election items or, in the post-election survey items, reported watching any political comedy 
program at least once in the previous week.  In the combined measure, 3.75% of respondents 
were counted as political comedy consumers.  A separate measure of comedy exposure includes 
only The Daily Show and Colbert Report viewership.  This measure has a value of 1 if a 
respondent mentioned these programs, specifically, in the open-ended items or reported regularly 
watching The Daily Show in the post-test item.  Overall, 2.12% of respondents reported using 
The Daily Show or Colbert Report in at least 1 of the 3 self-reported exposure measures.  
Information about patterns of exposure across demographic and political groups can be found in 
Appendix 6B.  Overall, these measures reflect rates and patterns of exposure to political comedy 




 To rule out the possibility that the comedy exposure variables are simply picking up the 
influence of overall exposure to media rather than variance attributable to political comedy, 
several additional media consumption measures were also included as control variables.  The 
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pre-election survey included 4 items gauging use of television news, talk radio, print and 
electronic newspapers, and the Internet for information about the 2008 Presidential election.  
Respondents were asked how many days in the past week they saw information about the 
campaign on broadcast or cable television; heard information on radio shows that invite speakers 
to call in and discuss current events, public issues, or politics; read information in a newspaper, 
including a paper copy, online copy, or on an application downloaded to a mobile device; and 
saw or heard information on the Internet, including on a computer or a mobile device.  So that 
measures of television, radio, newspaper and Internet use were comparable to the comedy 
measures, items were recoded into binary variables with a value of 1 indicating that a particular 
media source was used at least once in the past week.
5
  Overall, 89% of respondents reported 
watching television news, 40% reported listening to talk radio, 60% read a print or electronic 
newspaper, and 57% reported using the Internet for information about the 2008 Presidential 
Election in the past week.  
Orientation toward Politics 
 Measures of political engagement were included as control variables in models to rule out 
the possibility that those who watch political comedy are simply more knowledgeable and 
engaged to begin with, and this is what leads to greater ideological constraint.  General political 
interest was measured using the pre-election item: How closely are you following the 2008 
Presidential campaign—very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not closely at all.  
The interest measure was recoded to run from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning not closely at all and 1 
meaning very closely.  Overall, 43% of respondents reported following the campaign very 
closely, 42% somewhat closely, 11% not too closely, and only 4% not closely at all. 
                                                 
5
 Models were also run with alternative media measures including the full 0-7 range, binary measures cut at the 
mean, and 3 point measures cut at the 25 and 75 percentile marks.  There was no substantive difference in results 
when these alternative media consumption measures were used. 
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 Political knowledge was measured using 3 pre-election general political knowledge 
questions: 1. Who has the final responsibility to determine if a law is constitutional or not? Is it 
the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?  2. How much of a majority is required for 
the US Senate and House to override a presidential veto? and, 3. Do you happen to know which 
party has the most members in the United States House of Representatives?
6
  The general 
political knowledge measure was constructed from a simple additive index indicating the total 
number of questions answered correctly.  Overall, 27% of respondents answered all 3 questions 
correctly, 33% answered 2 correctly, 25% answered 1 correctly, and 14% were unable to 
correctly answer any question.  To facilitate comparison of citizens at low, moderate and high 
levels of political knowledge, the additive index was cut at the 25 and 75 percentiles to create a 3 
point index of general political knowledge.  Those answering no questions correctly were ranked 
at 0 and formed the low knowledge group.  The high knowledge group was scored at 2 and 
included those answering all 3 questions correctly.  The moderate knowledge group was ranked 
at 1 and included the 72% of respondents who answered 1 or 2 questions correctly.  The 3 point 
knowledge measure was then rescaled to run from 0 to 1 for ease of comparison. 
  Party identification was measured using a standard 7 point scale based on 3 branching 
pre-election questions: 1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, an Independent, or something else? 2. Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very 
strong [Democrat/Republican]? 3.  Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or 
Democratic Party?  Party Identification was coded to run from 0, indicating Strong Democrat, to 
                                                 
6
 A fourth item was asked to less than half of respondents: To the best of your knowledge, do you happen to know 
how Supreme Court justices are chosen?  Are they nominated by a nonpartisan congressional committee, elected by 
the American people, nominated by the President and the confirmed by the Senate, or appointed if they receive a 
two-thirds majority vote of the justices already on the court? This item was excluded from the general knowledge 
measure because relative political knowledge could be better gauged using a scale constructed only from questions 
asked of all respondents. 
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1, indicating Strong Republican, with true independents centered at the midpoint.  In the initial 
PID question, 36% of respondents identified as Democrats, 30% as Republicans, and 34% as 
Independents or third-party identifiers.  The PID scale was then collapsed into a measure of 
strength of partisanship, running from 0 for true Independents to 1 for strong partisans.  Overall, 
true independents comprised 12% of the sample, 27% were party leaners, 22% were weak 
partisans, and 39% strongly identified with one of major political parties. 
Demographic Controls  
 To remove variance in ideological constraint attributable to ‘the usual suspects’ and 
ensure that any relationship found between political comedy and ideological constraint is 
indicative of the effect of viewership rather than a function of audience characteristics, a number 
of standard demographic measures were also included as control variables.  These included 
gender, age, education, income, employment status, race/ethnicity, and religiosity.  Gender is a 
binary variable with 1 meaning male. The sample was 43% male.  Age ranges from 18 to 97, 
with a median age of 53 years old.  Education is a categorical variable with 5 values indicating 
the highest level of education completed. About 40% of the sample reported having a 4-year 
college degree or greater, and about 6% reported less than a high school education.  The income 
measure includes 9 categories of self-reported, total pre-tax household income.  About 40% 
reported a household income of greater than $75K, about 20% reported an income between $50K 
and $75K, and about 40% reported less than $50K annual household income.  An indicator of 
employment has a value of 1 if a respondent is employed full or part-time.  Sixty-one percent of 
respondents were considered employed based on this measure.  Race and ethnicity are included 
in the models using indicators for self-reported Hispanic or Latino origin and white racial 
identification.  The sample was about 6% Hispanic and 85% white.  A religiosity variable was 
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based on a 5-point, categorical measure of self-reported frequency of church attendance.  All 
demographic variables were rescaled to run from 0 to 1 for ease of comparison.  Details about 
the specific questions utilized in demographic and other measures can be found in Appendix 6A. 
 
Results 
 To test whether or not political comedy use is associated with greater ideological 
constraint, the several measures of constraint described above were regressed on comedy 
viewership as well as demographic controls, political engagement variables and media use 
measures.  All variables have been scaled to run from 0 to 1 for ease of comparison.  The models 
discussed here are estimated using OLS regression.  Models estimated using hierarchical 
regression, with variables entered as blocks, can be found in Appendix 6C.  The hierarchical 
models show the same pattern of results as those obtained using OLS, but also show that the 
addition of media use and comedy exposure variables makes a significant contribution to the 
variance explained. 
 Table 6.1 shows models of ideological constraint measured by the standard deviation of 
issue positions.  Constrained attitudes should exhibit lower variance in issue positions; thus, 
negative coefficients indicate greater ideological constraint.  The first column shows the model 
for all comedy exposure.  As expected, the coefficient on comedy is negative.  According to this 
model, exposure to comedy is associated with a .09 point decrease in the weighted standard 
deviation of issue positions.  This decrease is statistically significant at the .10 level and 
issubstantively large compared to other variables in the model.  Among media use variables, 
comedy is the most strongly associated with ideological constraint.  Television news and 
newspaper are associated with greater variance in issue positions.  Though the coefficient on talk 
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radio is significant and negative, it is less than half the size of that on comedy.  The third column 
of Table 6.1 shows the model of the standard deviation of issue positions with the comedy 
variable including Daily Show/Colbert Report viewership only.  Here, the coefficient on comedy 
is a statistically significant -.13, much larger than any other media use variable.  Viewing The 
Daily Show or Colbert Report is associated with a decrease in issue attitude variance slightly 
greater than the .11 point decrease associated with the highest level of general political 
knowledge.  Similarly, strong partisanship is associated with an estimated .09 point decrease in 
attitude variance, .04 points less than the decrease associated with Daily Show/Colbert exposure.  
In line with the prediction made in Hypothesis 4, these models show that viewing political 
comedy is statistically and substantively related to greater ideological constraint. 
 To test the non-linear prediction that the effect of political comedy will be greatest among 
moderately sophisticated viewers, models were also estimated using indicator variables for low 
and moderate general political knowledge and the interactions between these indicators and self-
reported comedy exposure.
7
  In these models, the coefficient on comedy represents the 
relationship between comedy and constraint among those high in political knowledge, and the 
interactions between comedy and the low and moderate knowledge indicators allow a 
comparison of the impact of comedy across knowledge levels.  In the overall comedy model 
shown in the second column of Table 6.1, and the Daily Show/Colbert model in Column 4, only 
the low knowledge interaction is statistically significant.  For those low in political knowledge, 
viewing comedy actually decreases ideological constraint, increasing the standard deviation of 
issue positions by .26 points in the overall comedy model and .31 points in the Daily 
                                                 
7
 To test the non-linear relationship between comedy and prior knowledge, models were also run using the square 
root of the prior knowledge variable.  For all models, the coefficient on the interaction between comedy and the 
square root of prior knowledge is significant and in the appropriate direction.  For ease of interpretation, I discuss 
the models including binary indicators prior knowledge level instead of the non-linear specification. 
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Show/Colbert model.  The interactions between comedy and moderate political knowledge are 
positive, but statistically indistinguishable from 0, indicating that those at moderate levels of 
political knowledge see a boost in constraint resulting from political comedy exposure equivalent 
to that seen among high political knowledge viewers.  These results provide some support for 
Hypothesis 5.  Though there is no statistically identifiable boost at moderate levels of political 
knowledge, the interactive models do show that comedy improves ideological constraint only for 
those with a baseline level of knowledge necessary to get the jokes. 
 A second test of the hypothesis that comedy increases ideological constraint comes from 
examining the relative distance of attitude placements across the several policy issue items.  
Table 6.2 shows the models of average inter-item issue distance regressed on demographic 
controls, political engagement variables, media use and comedy exposure.  Both the overall 
comedy and Daily Show/Colbert models provide support for Hypothesis 4.  The first column of 
Table 6.2 shows the model for overall comedy exposure.  Here, political comedy is associated 
with a statistically significant .12 point decrease in average inter-item issue distance.  
Substantively, this decrease is larger than that associated with any other form of media use, and 
roughly equivalent to the shift expected among strong partisans and those with the highest levels 
of political knowledge.  The model of Daily Show/Colbert viewership, shown in the third column 
of Table 6.2, provides even stronger evidence that political comedy is associated with ideological 
constraint.  Viewing The Daily Show or Colbert Report is associated with a .16 point reduction in 
the average distance between issue items.  This is roughly equivalent to the reduction of inter-
item distance associated with strong campaign interest and greater than the .12 point decrease 
estimated for those at the highest levels of knowledge as well as the .13 point reduction in 
average inter-item issue distance among strong partisans. 
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 Models were also estimated with indicators for low and moderate knowledge and the 
interactions between knowledge level and comedy.  Again, these models provide some support 
for Hypothesis 5.  Though there is no statistically identifiable increase in constraint among 
moderately knowledgeable viewers relative to those high in political knowledge, results do show 
that comedy only boosts constraint among those with prior knowledge sufficient to understand 
humor.  The significant negative coefficient on comedy shows that comedy improves constraint 
among the highly knowledgeable.  For those with low political knowledge, the net effect of 
comedy is a decrease in ideological constraint.   Average inter-item issue distance increases by 
.26 points for all comedy and .42 points for Daily Show/Colbert viewers low in political 
knowledge.  The coefficients on the interactions between comedy and moderate political 
knowledge are positive, but statistically insignificant.  These models show that the boost in 
constraint resulting from comedy among moderately knowledgeable viewers is statistically 
equivalent to that among highly knowledgeable viewers.   
 An ideological understanding of politics is associated with a more bi-polar view of the 
political world, and attitudes constrained by ideology should be more consistently located on one 
side of the ideological spectrum of the other (Federico, 2007).  The relationship between political 
comedy consumption and the tendency toward ideological bi-polarity is examined in Table 6.3, 
which shows models of consistency as measured by the absolute difference between the 
percentage of issues on which one holds a conservative position and the percentage where the 
position is liberal.  In both the overall comedy and Daily Show/Colbert models, political comedy 
is more strongly associated with ideological consistency than any other media use variable.  The 
statistically significant .10 point increase in consistency associated with overall comedy, shown 
in the first column of Table 6.3, is 5 times larger than the boost from talk radio, the second 
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strongest media predictor of consistency, and double that associated with maximum political 
interest.  Use of The Daily Show and Colbert Report shows an even stronger relationship with 
ideological consistency.  The statistically significant .12 point increase in consistency associated 
with viewing these programs is twice as large as the increase associated with strong partisanship.   
Additionally, the difference in consistency between those with the highest and lowest levels of 
general political knowledge is .06, half the magnitude of the boost associated with comedy 
viewership.   Much of this benefit is a function of a greater percentage of liberal issue attitudes 
among comedy viewers.  Models estimating the percentage liberal and percentage conservative 
positions can be found in Appendix 6D. The models of ideological consistency show that 
comedy viewership is associated with a more bi-polar, ideological view of the political world, 
providing additional support for Hypothesis 4. 
 The models utilizing indicators for low and moderate knowledge and the interactions 
with comedy do not show the pattern of results predicted in Hypothesis 5.  The significant 
positive coefficients on comedy show that ideological consistency increases among highly 
knowledgeable comedy viewers.  The significant negative coefficients on the interactions 
between knowledge level and comedy show that the boost in consistency resulting from comedy 
is smaller for those with low or moderate knowledge.  The net effect of comedy for low 
knowledge viewers approaches 0 in both the overall comedy and Daily Show/Colbert models.  
For moderately knowledgeable viewers, attitude consistency improves by .07 points from overall 
comedy, and .09 points from exposure Daily Show/Colbert.  Though the shift is in the correct 
direction, the magnitude is smaller than the .15 point increase in consistency predicted for high 
knowledge viewers.   Rather than lifting up the middle, these models show that comedy most 
strongly benefits those at high levels of political knowledge.   
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 An additional indicator of ideological constraint is the extent to which the abstract 
construct of ideology is related to positions held on concrete political issues.  For those who rely 
on ideology to organize their political thinking, self-placement on the scale of ideology should be 
strongly related to positions on specific policy issues.  Table 6.4 shows the models with the 
average distance between ideological self-placement and placement on each issue item regressed 
on the demographic controls, engagement variables, media use and comedy exposure.   Column 
1 of Table 6.4 shows that overall comedy use is associated with a statistically significant .11 
point decrease in the average distance between ideology and specific issue attitudes.  This 
decrease is larger than that associated with any other media use measure and equivalent to the 
effect of strong partisanship.  The impact of Daily Show/Colbert use is shown in the second 
column of Table 6.4.  These programs are associated with an estimated .15 point reduction in 
average ideology-issue distance.  This decrease is both statistically and substantively significant, 
greater than the .12 point reduction associated with graduate level education and the .10 point 
decrease in average distance found for strong partisans.  These models show that for viewers of 
political comedy, the abstract construct of ideology constrains attitudes about specific policy 
issues. 
 The interactive models show that this effect does not vary significantly across levels of 
political knowledge.  The negative coefficients on comedy show that viewership increases 
constraint among those high in political knowledge.  The insignificant, positive coefficients on 
the interactions between comedy and low knowledge show no net benefit to comedy for those at 
low levels of political knowledge.   For those low in political knowledge, the average distance 
between issue positions and ideological self-placement decreases by only .02 points as a result of 
overall comedy or Daily Show/Colbert viewership.  The coefficients on the interactions between 
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comedy and moderate political knowledge are in the expected direction, but statistically 
indistinguishable from 0.  For moderately knowledgeable viewers, vertical constraint scores 
improve by .12 points as a result any comedy exposure.  In the Daily Show/Colbert model, the 
net effect of comedy among those with moderate prior political knowledge is a .18 point 
reduction in the average distance between ideology and issue positions.  While larger than the 
.13 point decrease among highly knowledgeable viewers, the difference is not statistically 
significant.  These models provide some support for Hypothesis 4.  Comedy viewership is 
associated with greater ideological constraint only among those with adequate prior political 
knowledge to comprehend and appreciate humor. 
 Table 6.5 examines how general political knowledge and comedy viewership condition 
the relationship between ideology and average issue position.  Of interest is whether or not 
comedy encourages viewers to make more sophisticated connections between abstract 
ideological principles and concrete political attitudes.  More specifically, it is expected that 
comedy improves the ability of those with moderate levels of political knowledge to make use of 
abstract ideological constructs in a manner similar to more sophisticated citizens.  In this 
analysis, the average issue position, coded from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, is 
regressed on comedy use, general political knowledge, ideology, and the interactions of these 
three variables. For ease of interpretation, ideology is coded using the same -2 to 2 scale as the 
dependent variable—average issue position.  Models were run using the full 0 to 2 range of 
general political knowledge.   In order to test the non-linear prediction that comedy improves 
constraint most strongly among those at moderate levels of political knowledge, separate models 
were run using indicator variables for low and moderate political knowledge. 
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 Looking first at the models estimated using the full, 3-point general knowledge scale, 
shown in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6.5, the significant positive coefficients on the interactions 
between comedy viewership and ideology show that the relationship between self-reported 
ideology and average issue position is stronger for comedy viewers than for those not exposed to 
comedy.  All else equal, a one-point change ideology is associated with a .51 point shift in 
average issue among all comedy viewers, and a .53 point shift for Daily Show/Colbert viewers, 
as compared to a change in average issue position of only .15 points among those who do not 
consume any political comedy.  Moreover, the significant negative coefficients on the three-way 
interaction between ideology, knowledge and comedy viewership show that comedy diminishes 
the importance of knowledge in conditioning the relationship between ideology and average 
issue position.   To show this, the difference in predicted average issue position resulting from a 
one-point change in ideology was calculated for comedy viewers and non-viewers at low and 
high levels of political knowledge.  For non-viewers, the change in average issue position 
associated with a one-point shift in ideology is .54 points greater among those at the highest level 
of political knowledge than that predicted for those low in political knowledge.  For all comedy 
viewers, the difference in the magnitude of the shift is only .20 points greater for those at high 
levels of knowledge.  Among Daily Show/Colbert viewers, there is virtually no difference in the 
impact of ideology for those at low and high levels of knowledge.  A one-point shift in ideology 
changes the average issue position of those at low knowledge by .51 points, versus .56 points at 
high levels of knowledge.   
 To test whether or not the effects are strongest for comedy viewers at moderate levels of 
political knowledge, models were also estimated with dummy variables indicating low and 
moderate political knowledge.  These models are shown in the second and fourth columns of 
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Table 6.5.  Again, in line with predictions in Hypothesis 4, comedy strengthens the relationship 
between ideology and issue positions.   Among non-viewers, a one-point shift in ideological self-
placement changes average issue position by .43 points, versus .55 points for all comedy viewers 
and .59 points for those who watch The Daily Show/Colbert Report.  More importantly, these 
models show that comedy improves constraint most among those at moderate levels of political 
knowledge.  For those at low levels of political knowledge, the relationship between ideology 
and average issue position is not strengthened much by political comedy.   The change in issue 
positions associated with a one-point shift in ideology is only .06 points more for all low-
knowledge comedy viewers and .04 points more for low-knowledge Daily Show/Colbert viewers 
than for low-knowledge non-viewers.  Among those high in political knowledge, the relationship 
between ideology and issue positions is actually weaker among comedy viewers than among 
non-viewers.  Exposure to political comedy decreases the change in issue positions associated 
with a one-point shift in ideology by .12 points for all high-knowledge comedy viewers and by 
.16 points for high-knowledge Daily Show/Colbert viewers.  For those at moderate levels of 
political knowledge, comedy dramatically improves the connection between ideology and issue 
positions.  For these viewers, exposure to political comedy increases the change in issue 
positions associated with a one-point shift in ideology by .12 points for all comedy and by .16 
points for Daily Show/Colbert relative to the change observed among moderately knowledgeable 
non-viewers.     
 Figure 6.1 shows how political knowledge conditions the relationship between ideology 
and average issue position for comedy viewers versus non-viewers.  Bars show the shift in 
average issue position expected from a one-point change ideological self-placement for viewers 
and non-viewers at low, medium and high levels of political knowledge.  Among those who do 
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not watch political comedy programs, a one-point change ideological self placement has almost 
no impact on the positions of those at low levels of political knowledge, a modest impact at 
moderate knowledge levels, and a strong impact on the positions of those high in political 
knowledge.  For comedy viewers with low knowledge, there is still little change in average issue 
position associated with shifting ideology.  However, the moderate and high knowledge groups 
converge with exposure to political comedy.  In fact, the magnitude of the shift in average issue 
position associated with a one-point change in ideology is slightly greater for Daily 
Show/Colbert Report viewers with moderate knowledge than viewers with high knowledge.  Not 
only does comedy improve ideological constraint, the benefit is most pronounced for those with 
moderate political knowledge. 
 This analysis shows that exposure to political comedy is associated with opinions that 
more closely resemble the constrained opinions expressed by sophisticated citizens.  Figure 6.2 
shows estimates of the average issue position for a strong liberal comedy viewer or non-viewer 
across levels of general political knowledge.  For non-viewers, there is a linear relationship 
between political knowledge and average issue position.  As political knowledge increases, the 
average issue position of a self-reported strong liberal becomes more liberal.  Exposure to 
political comedy, however, changes the relationship between knowledge and ideology.  Among 
comedy viewers, attitudes of those at moderate and high levels of political knowledge converge, 
and the gap in attitudes expressed by these groups decreases dramatically.  Moderately 
knowledgeable comedy viewers hold attitudes that closely resemble those of highly 
knowledgeable citizens with the same ideological predispositions.  In effect, political comedy 
viewers hold more sophisticated attitudes, with higher level abstractions like ideology 
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constraining their attitudes to a greater extent than among non-viewers.  This effect is 
particularly pronounced for moderately knowledgeable comedy viewers. 
 
Conclusion 
 Analysis of the 2008 NAES presented in this chapter is generally consistent with 
predictions from the model of humor-triggered cognition.  Despite the relatively weak self-
reported exposure measure, political comedy emerged as a strong predictor of ideological 
constraint.  Comedy viewers expressed political attitudes that were more consistent and 
ideologically coherent in structure.  In fact, political comedy was more strongly associated with 
ideological constraint than any other form of media consumption.   This relationship holds across 
several alternative measures of attitude consistency and even with extensive controls for 
individual characteristics and predispositions associated with motivation and ability for 
ideological thinking. 
 The non-linear prediction that comedy boosts constraint most strongly for those with 
moderate prior political knowledge received only limited support.  As expected, among those 
with the lowest levels of political knowledge, self-reported exposure to political comedy was not 
associated with ideological constraint.   However, alternative models produced mixed results 
about the strength of the relationship between exposure to comedy and attitude consistency 
among more sophisticated viewers.  In one model, those with moderate prior political knowledge 
appeared to benefit most from political comedy—exposure strengthened the connection between 
ideological identification and concrete policy issue positions so that the attitudes expressed by 
moderately knowledgeable viewers were quite similar to those of more sophisticated viewers 
with similar ideological identifications.  However, two models showed the relationship between 
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comedy and ideological constraint to be roughly equivalent at moderate and high levels of prior 
political knowledge, and one model showed the strongest relationship for highly knowledgeable 
viewers. 
 Some of this inconsistency is likely a function of endogeneity in the measures of self-
reported political comedy use and political knowledge.  Survey data captures the cumulative 
effects of long-term exposure to political comedy, which should, over time, enhance political 
knowledge by promoting learning and activating stored political information and concepts, 
particularly for those with moderate pre-existing levels of political sophistication.  Among 
frequent comedy viewers, this knowledge equalizing effect will produce a distribution of 
political knowledge with a higher mean and lesser variance, making it difficult to detect 
differences in effects across levels of prior knowledge or political sophistication. Though non-
linear predictions could not be adequately tested, the findings in this chapter are still generally 
consistent with the model of humor-triggered cognition.  A relationship between exposure to 
political comedy and ideological constraint is found only for those with sufficient pre-existing 
political knowledge to comprehend and enjoy political humor and jokes.   
 Coupled with findings from the experiment, the results presented in this chapter provide 
strong evidence that the patterns of cognitive processing and engagement associated with 
comprehending and enjoying political comedy affect the way information is encoded and 
structured in memory and promote ideological constraint. Even if experimental findings reflect 
the expression of more thoughtfully considered attitudes rather than fundamental changes in the 
structure of political belief systems, survey replications supports the argument that, over time, 
exposure to political comedy enhances ideological constraint. Whether forced in an artificial 
laboratory setting or freely chosen in the real-world, those exposed to political comedy were 
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better able to connect abstract ideological principles to discrete policy issues and expressed more 
ideologically coherent political attitudes.  In short, political comedy promotes the development 
of a more sophisticated understanding of politics and may, thereby, enhance citizens’ capacity 




Table 6.1  The Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and The 
Standard Deviation of Policy Issue Positions 
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  (%) 1.96 1.98 1.97 1.99 
N 23138 23138 23138 23138 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
#
p<.20 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 




Table 6.2  The Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and 
Average Inter-Item Issue Distance 
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p<.20 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 




Table 6.3  The Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and The 
Ideological Bi-Polarity of Policy Issue Position 
 All Comedy Daily Show/Colbert Report 








General Knowledge     








Interactions     








Engagement     































Media Use     
































Demographics     








































   Hispanic -.04*** -.04*** -.04*** -.04*** 
150 
 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 


























  (%) 10.74 10.80 10.76 10.80 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
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p<.20 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 





Table 6.4  The Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and 
Vertical Constraint, Self-Reported Ideology and Average Issue Position 
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p<.20 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 





Table 6.5  The Relationship between Ideology and Average Issue Position by Self-Reported 
Exposure to Political Comedy across Levels of General Political Knowledge 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15, 
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p<.20 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
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Figure 6.2  Average Issue Position for Strong Liberals by Self-Reported Exposure to 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 This dissertation investigates the effects of political comedy on knowledge and attitudes.  
Information is a valuable resource which facilitates effective political engagement, and citizens 
with higher levels of political knowledge hold attitudes that are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively different than those expressed by less informed citizens.  The social distribution of 
political knowledge is shaped by three broad factors—opportunity, motivation and ability.  Mass 
media play an important role in determining the opportunities for learning and the mix of 
information about politics and public affairs available to citizens.  However, because chronic 
differences in motivation and ability determine how much attention is paid to political messages, 
what is learned and how information is ultimately interpreted and utilized, it is often argued that 
media have “minimal effects” on patterns of knowledge, attitudes and engagement.  Nonetheless, 
changes in the information environment, especially the availability of entertaining alternatives to 
traditional hard news, may have a profound effect on democratic citizenship by altering the 
opportunities available for learning and the relative importance of chronic differences in 
motivation and ability.  The central claim in this dissertation, one which some evidence supports, 
is that the context in which information is presented—humor versus hard news—shapes the way 
it is processed, encoded in memory, recalled and applied in political judgment. 
 This dissertation concentrates on one particular non-traditional form of political media—
political comedy—which has emerged as an increasingly popular and important source of 
political information, especially for young citizens.  Questions linger about whether comedy is a 
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democratically healthy alternative to traditional news that enhances knowledge and competence 
and, if so, what type of citizen is most likely to benefit.  Previous research on this topic has been 
guided by competing perspectives.  One argument is that political comedy is an entertaining and 
accessible alternative source of political information that can promote knowledge, awareness and 
interest among otherwise apathetic audiences (Baum, 2003b; Rottinghaus et al., 2008; Xenos & 
Becker, 2009).  Others are less optimistic, arguing that political comedy has limited potential to 
enhance knowledge and sophistication because it reaches only relatively engaged citizens who 
maintain an extensive political media diet to begin with (Moy et al., 2005b; Prior, 2007; Cao, 
2008; Young, 2008; Landreville et al., 2010).  More pessimistically, the comedic portrayal of 
politics may cause cynicism and decreased political trust (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Morris 
& Baumgartner, 1008; Guggenheim et al., 2011), or prime negative considerations that lead to 
less favorable evaluations of political leaders (Young, 2004; 2006; Esralew & Young, 2012).  
However, empirical research to date has been unable to make sense of these contradictory 
predictions and has revealed small or mixed effects. As a result, the impact of political comedy 
on attitudes and knowledge remains unclear. 
  To better understand the democratic consequences of political comedy, the current study 
shifts attention from political content to the comedic format itself.  Drawing on socio-
psychological theories of humor, Chapter 2 outlined a model of humor-triggered cognition. This 
model produced expectations about how the patterns of cognitive processing and engagement 
associated with comprehending and enjoying comedy promote learning and attitude constraint.  
Political comedy is not merely a source of new information but a complex communication form.  
Comedy presents an intellectual puzzle requiring the identification and resolution of incongruity 
to comprehend and enjoy.  The desire for amusement motivates attention and encourages 
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thoughtful cognitive engagement, the integration of ideas, elaboration about how seemingly 
disparate pieces of information relate and consideration of the implications of humorous 
reinterpretations across domains of knowledge.  The patterns of cognitive processing and 
engagement associated with comprehending and enjoying political comedy promote learning and 
shape how information is encoded and organized memory, enhancing and deepening 
understanding and encouraging ideological constraint. 
 Additionally, the model of humor-triggered cognition offers an alternative account of 
who should be most affected by exposure to political comedy.  As a puzzle-solving exercise, 
sufficient prior knowledge and understanding is necessary to comprehend jokes, meaningfully 
elaborate about humorous reinterpretations and derive pleasure from humor.  Rather than the 
least knowledgeable citizens, who might not be motivated or able to comprehend and learn from 
comedy, or highly sophisticated audiences, who already know and think a lot about politics and 
are highly motivated and able to understand and interpret information from traditional news 
sources, the model of humor-triggered cognition predicts that political comedy will have the 
strongest effect on those with moderate prior political knowledge.   Among these moderately 
sophisticated viewers, political comedy should promote learning and ideological constraint 
beyond exposure to information presented in traditional news form. 
 Because the effects on knowledge and attitudes are thought to stem not from exposure to 
information but from the patterns of cognitive processing and engagement associated with humor 
comprehension and the experience of amusement, the influence of political comedy must be 
evaluated relative to exposure to identical information presented in a non-humorous context.   
Chapter 3 describes the development of experimental stimuli manipulating the presence of 
humor but holding information constant, thereby allowing a direct comparison of the effects of 
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political comedy versus traditional hard news.  Analysis of pretest respondents’ perceptions of 
the informational content and emotional reactions to the videos suggest the news and comedy 
stimuli are quite comparable, reducing concern that confounding factors may be driving results.  
Three pairs of stories discussing economic recovery, healthcare reform and banking regulations 
were included as part of the final stimuli for an experiment evaluating the effects of political 
comedy on knowledge and attitudes. 
 Chapter 4 describes experimental findings about the effect of political comedy on 
information acquisition.  Results show that learning is not an incidental by-product of exposure 
to information but that political comedy enhances recall beyond that resulting from exposure to 
identical information in a traditional hard news format.  Further, learning does not stem from a 
simplification of politics because those with the lowest levels of political awareness do not 
acquire much information regardless of its source.  Rather, the greatest benefit is seen among 
moderately knowledgeable viewers with adequate pre-existing information to comprehend 
humor but generally lacking motivation to think deeply about politics absent the emotional 
rewards that political comedy provides for doing so.  Further, political comedy boosts learning 
not by making politics more interesting, as the gateway hypothesis would suggest, but by 
encouraging effortful processing and thoughtful cognitive engagement to achieve the emotional 
gratification of amusement.  Amusement, not interest, mediates learning effects.   The pattern of 
results observed is inconsistent with the incidental exposure or gateway hypotheses and can best 
be explained by the model of humor-triggered cognition. 
 By promoting cognitive engagement and elaboration about political relationships and the 
meaning of information across domains of knowledge, political comedy not only promotes 
learning but also encourages the expression of thoughtfully considered, consistent attitudes.  In 
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Chapter 5, data from the experiment is used to investigate the effect of political comedy on 
ideological constraint.  Results show that exposure to political comedy produced greater attitude 
consistency than exposure to identical information in traditional hard news form.  Once again, 
effects are strongest for those with moderate levels of prior political knowledge.  Comedy 
enhances ideological thinking primarily among moderately sophisticated viewers who possess a 
basic understanding of ideological principles but are not generally motivated to apply such 
abstract thinking when forming and expressing political opinions.  
 Chapter 6 replicates analysis of the effects of political comedy on ideological constraint 
using data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey.  Here again, political comedy 
was strongly associated with ideological constraint in political attitudes.  Across several 
measures, attitude consistency was greater among those reporting exposure to political comedy.  
This relationship is both substantively and statistically significant—greater than that associated 
with any other form of media exposure and on par with the influence of general political 
knowledge, partisanship, and political interest.  The survey replication shows that the effect of 
political comedy on ideological constraint is not an artifact of artificial experimental exposure 
but is evidence of the real world influence of comedy on political understanding and attitude 
consistency.   
 Overall, results suggest that the impact of political information depends on both chronic 
differences in motivation and ability as well as the context in which information is presented.  
Rather than an alternative source for widely available political information, political comedy is a 
unique communicative form which presents information in a way that promotes attention, 
effortful processing and thoughtful engagement.  These patterns of cognition not only boost 
learning, but also affect how information is encoded and organized in memory, thereby 
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enhancing political understanding and facilitating the expression of more sophisticated, 
ideologically consistent attitudes. 
 
Limitations 
 Certainly, there are several important limitations to the current study.  First, while factual 
information is an important indicator of “good citizenship,” it is always a challenge to develop 
measures of political knowledge that are reliable and valid indicators of citizen competence.  
Both the content and format of questions used to measure knowledge affect the ability of scales 
to discriminate between those with more or less information and predict theoretically related 
abilities, predispositions and behaviors.  It is difficult to determine precisely what citizens should 
know in order to understand and effectively engage in contemporary democratic politics.  
Measures of political knowledge can tap only a selective sample of pertinent factual information 
from relevant domains of knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993).  In this study, learning was 
measured with 6 factual questions reflecting the information available in experimental stimuli.  
Items tested recall of key facts from multiple knowledge domains, including the individuals, 
institutions and policies involved in the stories.  Still, these specific facts may or may not 
represent the type of information that can help improve political decision-making, and it is 
possible that respondents acquired other important political information and that different 
questions might produce different results.    
 Further, question format choices, including the use of multiple-choice versus open-ended 
items and the availability of ‘don’t know’ options, affect the reliability and validity of measures 
and the extent to which scores reflect political knowledge versus the propensity to guess or other 
irrelevant factors (Mondak, 2001).  Five of the 6 knowledge items used to gauge learning were 
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open-ended.  This choice was made, in part, because open-ended questions could more 
adequately address criticism that comedy promotes awareness and recognition of political 
information rather than learning and recall.  Further, multiple-choice questions facilitate blind 
guessing, resulting in greater measurement error and making the detection of small differences in 
learning difficult.  However, open-ended questions are more susceptible to contamination by 
differential propensity to guess (Mondak, 2001), and the knowledge measure might reflect 
different underlying constructs for experimental and control groups.  Because they were not 
given any new political information, control group respondents could only answer questions 
using information stored in long-term memory, and scores may reflect both pre-existing 
knowledge as well as individual differences in motivation to search memory and the propensity 
to guess.  For those in the news and comedy conditions, experimental exposure to information 
provides the opportunity to learn but might also make pre-existing knowledge more accessible 
by activating stored information or motivating a more exhaustive search of long-term memory.  
Consequently, results may reflect not only learning effects but also differences in how 
respondents answered questions. 
 There are also several important limitations to measures of attitude consistency.  Some 
may be skeptical that ideological constraint could be significantly influenced by brief exposure 
to a small number of comedy stories.  Even if brief exposure was insufficient to produce 
permanent change in underlying belief systems, the pattern of results obtained at least reflects an 
increase in motivation and ability to utilize abstract ideological principles and the expression of 
more thoughtfully considered attitudes among those exposed to political comedy.  The 
cumulative impact of exposure to political comedy may be real, long-term changes in the 
structure of political knowledge.  Survey replication shows that self-reported exposure to 
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political comedy is associated with more ideologically consistent political attitudes, suggesting 
that prolonged, repeated exposure to humorous political messages does indeed promote 
ideological constraint.  Whether greater attitude consistency indicates a more ideologically 
coherent structure of knowledge in memory or merely more thoughtful attitude expression, both 
experimental and survey findings demonstrate that political comedy enhances viewers’ capacity 
to recognize and understand the ideological relationships that organize democratic discourse. 
 However, it cannot be taken for granted that ideological constraint is indicative of “good 
citizenship,” and greater attitude consistency among those exposed to comedy may or may not be 
a democratically desirable outcome.  Converse’s (1964) notion of ideological constraint has been 
the standard yardstick against which citizens are judged.  Critics note that an individual may be 
quite well informed and politically sophisticated even without faithful adherence to liberal or 
conservative beliefs, and, as Kam (2006) astutely points out, there is conflict between constraint 
and open-mindedness.  That is, from the perspective of ideological constraint, enlightened views 
are internally consistent in their ideological perspective; but enlightenment could, and perhaps 
should, include a willingness to recognize alternative perspectives and integrate and multiple, 
competing relevant considerations.   If political comedy boosts ideological constraint by 
promoting ideological extremism and rigidity rather than open-minded, thoughtful engagement, 
then it might contribute to general patterns of ideological and partisan polarization in politics.  
Ideological constraint is only one of many politically relevant outcome variables that should be 
considered in order to more fully assess the democratic consequences of political comedy. 
 On face, the observed increase in ideological constraint might seem to contradict 
previous research showing that some forms of political comedy, particularly candidate 
appearances on late-night comedy programs, can lead to more favorable evaluations of out-party 
164 
 
leaders (Moy et al., 2005b; Xenos et al., 2009) and increase switch party voting (Baum, 2005; 
Taniguchi, 2011).  However, measures of ideological constraint do not capture the same 
underlying constructs as favorability ratings or vote choice, and results of the current study are 
not necessarily incompatible with previous research.  Reliance on cognitive heuristics like party 
identification can often lead to judgment errors (Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Lau & Redlawsk, 2001), and it is certainly possible that out-party candidate evaluations and 
switch party votes are more consistent with political attitudes and beliefs than decisions made 
based on partisanship alone.  Additionally, given the strength and stability of the relationship 
between partisan identification and vote choice (Campbell et al., 1960), the small number of 
switch party voters identified in these studies likely comes from the least politically aware 
segment of the audience.  For such viewers, the model of humor-triggered cognition does not 
predict and experimental findings do not show that political comedy increases ideological 
constraint. Nonetheless, future research should investigate the effects of other forms of political 
humor, such as candidate appearances on-late night comedy programs, and consider the 
implications of enhanced cognitive processing and engagement for variables like candidate 
favorability ratings and vote choice. 
 There are also limitations to the measurement strategy used to evaluate the theorized 
causal mechanism driving effects.  According to the model of humor-triggered cognition, 
learning and ideological constraint are consequences of the processes of cognitive engagement 
associated with comprehending and enjoying humor.  While mediation analysis strongly supports 
predictions, the amusement measure provides only an indirect test of this causal explanation.  
Previous studies have included self-reported cognitive effort scales to examine humorous 
message processing (e.g. Feldman, 2013; Matthes, 2013; Nabi et al., 2007).  However, these self-
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reported measures make unrealistic assumptions about conscious awareness of cognitive 
processes and are potentially biased by unrelated factors.  For example, the tendency to discount 
humorous messages (LaMarre & Walther, 2013; Nabi et al., 2007; Young, 2008) might also lead 
viewers to underestimate the amount of cognitive effort invested processing information.  
Conversely, those who struggle to comprehend jokes may report high levels of cognitive effort 
even if they are not ultimately able to interpret messages and are, therefore, unlikely to benefit 
much from comedy relative to more traditional hard news. Still, there is a strong correlation 
between self-reported cognitive processing effort and the level of amusement experienced (Nabi 
et al., 2007), and combining these measures might provide additional leverage on the role played 
by cognitive engagement in shaping the effects of political comedy.     
 Because the model of humor-triggered cognition implies that effects will be stronger 
when more cognitive effort is invested in humor comprehension, manipulating the complexity of 
humor might provide an alternative way to test causal explanations.  Previous research indicates 
that patterns of cognitive processing depend on the complexity of humorous messages.  Studies 
examining this moderating factor find that complexity and audience ability have an interactive 
effect on enjoyment, perceived argument strength and argument scrutiny, but are inconsistently 
related to learning, persuasion and other outcome variable of interest (Holbert et al., 2011, 2013; 
Polk et al., 2009). Modeling the relationship between audience ability and effects in non-linear 
form would likely produce more a more consistent pattern of results.  A two-by-two 
experimental design, with stimuli varying on both humor and message complexity, could be used 
to test whether, as predicted, patterns of cognitive processing and engagement mediate the 
effects of political comedy on learning and ideological constraint.  If effects are strongest in the 
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high complexity humor condition than this would provide further evidence supporting the 
theoretical account offered by the model of humor-triggered cognition. 
 A third alternative strategy that might be employed to test causal predictions involves 
disrupting cognitive processing with a distraction task.  For example, respondents could be asked 
to complete simple math problems that popped up on the screen periodically while they viewed 
the video stimuli.  If the causal explanation is correct, and comedy enhances sophistication by 
encouraging effortful processing and thoughtful engagement, then disrupting these cognitive 
processes should attenuate effects.   
 In addition to these measurement issues, there are also several important limitations to the 
experimental methodology used to examine effects and test causal predictions.  In designing the 
experiment, precautions were taken to ensure that results would not be biased by irrelevant 
aspects of the experimental setting.  The stimuli were designed to isolate the effects of comedy 
from the influence of exposure to information by presenting otherwise identical content in 
comedic and hard news form.  Careful editing and pretesting establish the content equivalence of 
the experimental stimuli and help rule out potentially confounding factors.  However, it is 
impossible to completely eliminate potential biases.   
 The experimental stimuli included only a small subset of stories discussing political 
controversies important during the period of time the study was conducted.  However, some 
issues and political contexts may be more or less suitable for political humor.  For example, 
some predicted that the serious public mood following the 911 terrorist attacks would make 
political comedy unappealing.  Indeed, some political comedy programs, such as Politically 
Incorrect and the animated series My Lil’ Bush, offended sensitive audiences and were quickly 
canceled.  Nonetheless, political comedy thrived during the Bush administration.  With the 
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election of Barack Obama, some wondered whether or not the hip, young, left-leaning, black 
President would inspire the type of critical commentary from humorists that had made political 
comedy so popular.  It is certainly possible that effects are an artifact of the particular issues 
selected or the political context in which the experiment was conducted. 
 Further, while the model of humor-triggered cognition makes general predictions about 
the effects of humorous presentations of political information, the experiment focuses 
exclusively on comedy from The Daily Show and Colbert Report.  This complex, politically 
oriented satire may influence knowledge and attitudes more powerfully than traditional late-night 
or sketch comedy, which some correlational studies show to be only weakly associated with 
politically relevant outcome variables (Feldman & Young, 2008; Guggenheim et al., 2011; 
Hoffman & Young, 2011; Morris & Baumgartner, 2008; Young & Tisinger, 2006). It is 
important to recognize that political comedy is not monolithic, and predictions should be tested 
with a different set of stories, in a different political context and with different forms of comedy 
varying in complexity and treatment of politics.   
  The experimental stimuli were realistic representations of the treatment of key political 
issues in news and comedy during the experimental period; and results demonstrate the potential 
power of political comedy to enhance knowledge and sophistication.  However, the possibility 
that content manipulations resulted in stimuli unrepresentative of the actual information available 
in political comedy programs represents a significant threat to external validity.  To establish the 
validity of the experimental stimuli, it is necessary to more carefully assess the informational 
content found in various forms of political comedy versus traditional hard news.  This would 
require a multi-level content analysis examining both the types of political issues receiving 
attention and the treatment of particular stories in various political comedy and hard news 
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platforms. Such analysis should evaluate not only The Daily Show and Colbert Report, but also 
the political content available in traditional late-night comedy such as The Tonight Show, sketch 
comedy programs like SNL, and possibly Internet humor sites such as The Onion or user-
generated political comedy on Buzzfeed and Youtube.  The content of political comedy should 
be compared to more traditional information sources, including network news, cable news and 
key newspapers, as well as opinion based programs such as The O’Reilly Factor and Rachel 
Maddow Show.   
 Comparison of these various sources should begin with an assessment the amount of 
attention paid to broad categories of politically relevant information, for example the economy, 
foreign policy, social issues and election campaigns.  Next, the nature of political coverage and 
specific information available should be evaluated.  This would involve measurement of the 
precise factual and contextual content included in stories about a select subset of political topics.  
For example, all discussion of the healthcare reform bill might be coded for the specific facts and 
statistics reported, political leaders or groups mentioned and story frames utilized.  Alternatively, 
coverage of the Presidential primary campaign could be compared in terms of the amount of 
information related to policy positions, campaign events, candidate biographies, poll numbers, 
endorsements, party affiliation, and campaign strategy.  This type of in-depth content analysis 
would help establish the validity of experimental manipulations and provide context necessary to 
better understand how political comedy fits in to the broader political media landscape. 
 In addition to external validity issues stemming from the artificial manipulation of 
information, the experiment relies on a biased sample of respondents drawn from the 
Communication Studies Participant Pool.  Undergraduates tend to have relatively weak and 
inconsistent political and social attitudes that are particularly unstable and susceptible to 
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influence (Sears, 1986).  As a result, the observed effects may be stronger than those that would 
be obtained with an older, more politically diverse sample.  Still, there are several potential 
advantages to the experimental sample utilized in this study.   Though not nationally 
representative, the relative youth, Democratic party leanings, political sophistication and 
cognitive abilities of participants reflect the characteristics observed in real-world audiences for 
political comedy.   Using a sample representative of comedy viewers rather than the general 
population might actually enhance external validity to the extent that results may be more 
indicative of the actual influence of political comedy on characteristic audiences.   Also, because 
it creates a relatively sophisticated baseline with advanced abilities to learn and comprehend 
information, sampling bias may produce conservative estimates of effects. Though results 
demonstrate that political comedy boosts knowledge and attitude constraint among typical 
viewers, it is nonetheless difficult to determine how a more representative sample of diverse 
citizens might be affected. 
 Findings indicate that exposure to political comedy has the greatest potential to enhance 
knowledge and understanding among moderately sophisticated viewers, but it is unclear how 
generalizable this effect is outside the experimental setting.  Given the peculiarities of the 
experimental sample, some might be concerned that the subset of respondents considered 
moderately knowledgeable is actually highly knowledgeable by population standards.  However, 
comparison of the experimental prior knowledge measures with those from the nationally 
representative 2008 NAES shows that the distribution of knowledge in the experimental sample 
is quite similar to that found in the general population.  While the experiment demonstrates that 
moderately knowledgeable viewers are the most likely to be affected, it is nonetheless necessary 
to consider real-world patterns of consumption to determine the ultimate impact of political 
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comedy.  After all, political comedy may be used by moderately sophisticated former hard news 
consumers who find their preferred mix of entertainment and information, by sophisticated and 
engaged audiences who utilize it as yet another source of political information, or by 
disinterested citizens who are incidentally exposed to information as they pursue entertainment.   
 Though suggestive, survey replication using self-reported measures of exposure to 
comedy cannot completely address these concerns.   Political comedy promotes information 
acquisition, and endogeneity in measures of exposure and political knowledge makes it difficult 
to detect differences in the effects of political comedy across knowledge groups using large-
scale, cross-sectional survey data.   Further, self-reported measures of media exposure are 
notoriously unreliable.  Rather than reflect real world viewership, these indicators may simply 
measure awareness, partisan predispositions or other factors.  To the extent that these factors 
influence both the tendency to report exposure to political comedy the consistency of attitudes 
expressed, the relationship between comedy and ideological constraint observed in survey 
analysis may be spurious.  Alternative strategies for measuring exposure and prior knowledge are 
necessary to more fully evaluate the effects of political comedy on knowledge and attitudes.   
   Replication of results in a field-experimental setting with natural stimuli would be 
beneficial.  Such an approach might involve randomly assigning a representative sample of 
participants to view political comedy and tracking knowledge and attitudes over time.  If greater 
changes in knowledge and attitudes are observed among those assigned to view political comedy 
than others, then this would provide compelling evidence of the effect of exposure.  
Additionally, comparing those who independently chose to view comedy to those randomly 
assigned to do so would allow selection effects to be distinguished from media effects.   Such a 
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natural, time-series design would help overcome issues with self-reported exposure and 
endogeneity in measures of prior political knowledge and produce more generalizable findings.   
 Additionally, the small number of self-reported comedy viewers in the survey sample 
makes detection of subtle differences is attitudes difficult.   Instead of randomly selecting a 
nationally representative sample, future survey work investigating the effects of niche media 
such as political comedy might be improved by oversampling audiences of interest.  Strategies to 
oversample comedy viewers might include using social-network data about user media 
preferences and habits to recruit participants with an expressed interest in political comedy 
programs.  Including a larger number of actual political comedy viewers would create greater 
statistical leverage when assessing the relationship between media use habits and attitudes or 
other variables of interest.  The utility of this recruitment method in media effects surveys should 
be evaluated.     
 Despite methodological limitations, results strongly support the conclusion that political 
comedy promotes learning and enhances ideological constraint by encouraging effortful 
processing and thoughtful engagement with political information.  Further, the model of humor-
triggered cognition provides a theoretical framework that can be used to assess the effects of 
political comedy on other politically important variables of interest.  Future research should build 
on findings from the current study to further advance our understanding of the consequences of 
political comedy and its role in contemporary democratic discourse.   
 
Future research  
 Findings presented in this dissertation demonstrate the short-term influence of comedy on 
knowledge and attitudes, but real-world effects are likely to be cumulative.  The current study 
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cannot speak to these cumulative effects of comedy nor how increased knowledge and 
ideological thinking translate into real-world judgments and behavior.  Political comedy attracts 
young audiences and may play a role the political socialization process, promoting the 
development of skills, predispositions and habits of thought that shape lifetime political 
engagement.  Future work should investigate the long-term, cumulative effects of exposure to 
political comedy and include measures of political engagement and participation in addition to 
the knowledge and attitude measures used here. 
 By many accounts, comedy tends to have liberal leanings, and results of the current study 
indicate a persuasive effect, with increased ideological constraint stemming from more liberal 
tendencies among comedy viewers. Previous persuasion research has focused almost exclusively 
on discrete policy issue attitudes and assessed effects on the basis of researchers’ own, possibly 
incorrect, interpretations of humorous messages and assumptions about how specific attitudes 
should be affected (e.g. Holbert et al., 2011, 2013; Nabi et al., 2007; Polk et al., 2009).  
However, pre-existing attitudes about the high profile political issues examined in these studies 
(e.g. healthcare reform, the Iraq war and gun control) are likely to be relatively strong and 
resistant to change.  Further, the reliability of measures, upper and lower bounds of scales and 
regression toward the mean all tend to attenuate effects, making it difficult to detect small 
changes between pre- and post-test measures of individual issue attitudes.  The current findings 
suggest that, failing to identify changes in specific policy issue attitudes, researches may have 
been too quick to discount the persuasive power of political comedy.  While attitudes toward 
particular political issues may be unaffected, political comedy powerfully influences viewers’ 
general political world view and shapes how political information is understood and interpreted.  
Future research should conceptualize persuasion more broadly and consider the effects of 
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political comedy not only on individual policy attitudes but also on the categories that viewers 
use to understand the political environment and their attitudes toward interrelated packages of 
issues from various policy domains.  
 Further, political comedy is typically incorporated into one’s broader media diet, used in 
conjunction with other, more traditional sources of information.  How the patterns of cognitive 
engagement and thought that give rise to learning and attitude effects might influence the 
processing and interpretation of subsequent information remains to be seen.  Current findings 
show that political comedy affects the way information is encoded and structured in memory and 
promotes more sophisticated, ideological coherent thought.  As a result, comedy may enhance 
viewers’ ability to comprehend and respond appropriately to new political information 
encountered in more traditional sources.  Similarly, previous research has shown that comedy 
decreases argument scrutiny (Nabi et al., 2007; Young, 2008; Polk et al., 2009), but how this 
might affect perceptions of subsequent messages has not been investigated.  Though humorous 
messages, themselves, may receive decreased scrutiny, comedy may actually enhance scrutiny 
and critical thought about subsequent information.  Rather than uncritical acceptance, decreased 
argument scrutiny may lead to uncritical application of humorous interpretations when 
evaluating new information involving related situations, controversies and political actors.  By 
enhancing cognitive elaboration but decreasing argument scrutiny, political comedy may 
promote both sophistication and cynicism.  Further research is needed to more fully evaluate the 
implications of political comedy on information processing and judgment in the context of the 
broader political information environment.  
 In the polarized landscape of political media, political comedy may be a liberal 
counterpart to conservative punditry on cable news and talk radio.   The lack of conservative 
174 
 
humor is intriguing.  Psychologists recognize that political orientations are strongly associated 
with many non-political preferences.  In part, social and psychological dispositions and cognitive 
styles may make liberals more receptive to comedy as a mode of political communication.  
Conservatives value tradition, conformity and order and tend to prefer simple solutions and 
straight-forward, unambiguous messages that serve their needs for certainty and closure (for 
review of psychological perspectives on ideology see Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009).  Political 
comedy may be more appealing to liberals, whose characteristic sensation-seeking tendencies, 
openness to novelty and new experiences, and tolerance for uncertainty and complexity make 
them less averse to incongruity and ambiguity in humorous messages.  Off-color humor is also 
more likely to offend conservatives who exhibit a heightened sensitivity to disgust.  Further, it 
may be socially acceptable for liberal comedians to “speak truth to power” and mock authority to 
promote progress and social change.  Conversely, conservative comedy reflecting anxiety and 
hostility toward low-status and stigmatized groups perceived to threaten the established order is 
likely to be interpreted as mean-spirited bullying.  Indeed, conservative Rush Limbaugh faced 
significant public backlash for broadcasting a “humorous” jingle entitled “Barack the Magic 
Negro” and for ridiculing women seeking insurance coverage for birth control, whom he 
“jokingly” referred to as sluts.  Greater consideration should be given to the psychological and 
ideological orientations associated with the consumption and enjoyment of comedy as a mode of 
political communication.    
    In addition to shaping how individuals understand politics, political comedy may have far 
reaching consequences for democratic discourse.  In many ways, political comedians have 
become part of the media elite and taken on a journalistic role as information gate-keepers.  
Beyond simply providing a humorous take on widely available information, political comedy 
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may help set the public and news agenda by drawing attention to issues ignored by mainstream 
media and policy makers.  Further, “fake” journalists like Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert, 
unconstrained by norms of objectivity and balance in reporting, enjoy greater leeway to engage 
in critical analysis of contemporary politics and are well positioned to serve as opinion leaders.     
 There are several instances where “advocacy satire” on The Daily Show and Colbert 
Report has successfully brought attention to issues and influenced public opinion and policy.  By 
highlighting the hypocrisy of Republican opposition and criticizing the lack of coverage in 
network news, Jon Stewart is widely credited with ensuring the passage of a 911 first responders 
healthcare bill that had stalled in Congress.  With his Colbert Super PAC, a brilliant piece of 
performance art illustrating complex and technical FEC rules, Steven Colbert drew widespread 
attention to issues in the campaign finance system.  More recently, Jon Stewart has taken up a 
new crusade to reform the VA benefits system.  Such anecdotes highlight the need to more fully 
explore the agenda setting function of political comedy and the strategic utility of humor in 
political advocacy.  
 The current study focuses primarily on highly visible, professional political comedy; 
however, new media is characterized by opportunities for user-generated content.   While vitriol 
and incivility in online political discourse have received much attention, the popularity of 
humorous political memes suggests that greater consideration should be given to the discursive 
role of comedy in online communication.  The Internet and social media seem to promote the use 
of wit and humor to convey sophistication and articulate opinions about controversial issues.  
While direct attempts at persuasion may be ineffective because heavy-handed political messages 
are easily ignored, humor may draw attention to concerns, promote thoughtful consideration of 
political perspectives and, by encouraging viral dissemination, increase the reach of messages.  
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Additionally, because they are easily discounted as “just a joke,” intended to amuse rather than 
inform or persuade (Nabi et al., 2007), funny messages may be perceived as less offensive and 
avoid unwanted hostility or debate.  While comedy may increase the visibility and appeal of 
political messages, it might also have the unintended consequence of making arguments seem 
less serious or significant.  If they are given less weight by citizens and political leaders, then the 
impact of humorous messages may be limited in spite of their increased reach.   The 
effectiveness of humor in political communication and the role of comedy in democratic 
discourse should be more fully evaluated. 
  
Final Thoughts  
 Mass media play an important role in democratic society.  News and other political media 
are responsible for providing citizens with the information necessary for effective political 
engagement.  However, media not only affect what citizens know but also how they understand 
and interpret political information.  Models should not assume passive audiences responding 
simply and automatically to messages, nor that media effects can be fully explained by chronic 
differences in motivation and ability associated with the usual, socio-economic suspects; rather, 
it is important to recognize that the way information is presented affects the patterns of 
processing and engagement that ultimately determine the influence of political messages.  As 
results of the current study show, citizens are best served when media is both informative and 
engaging.   
 Political comedy not only conveys importation political information, it does so in a 
manner which enhances competence and helps prepare audiences to make sense of the 
abundance of information available in the broader media environment.  Humor encourages 
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attention and thoughtful elaboration, which boost learning, enhance sophistication and promote 
ideological constraint.  These factors, the total volume of information in memory and the 
organizational structure of political belief systems, are critical components of good democratic 
citizenship.  Further, because the strongest effects are observed among moderately sophisticated 
viewers who, in the new, high choice media context, are generally at greatest risk for dropping 
out of the political information environment, comedy may help attenuate the expansion of gaps 
in political knowledge and engagement. 
  From the earliest days of Democracy in ancient Greece, humor has been used to convey 
political messages.  Until recently, this important mode of political communication has been 
largely overlooked.  Though empirical research has significantly advanced our understanding, 
there is still much about political comedy and its democratic consequences that remains 
unknown.  As the findings presented in this dissertation show, the effects of political comedy and 






 Appendix 3A:  Pretest Variables   
Stimulus Check Measures 
General Perceptions:  
How well does each of the following words describe the video that you just saw? Please rate the 
video on the following scale where 0 means that a word describes the video NOT AT ALL and 6 
means that it describes the video VERY WELL.  Entertaining, Informative, Boring, Funny, 
Interesting, Confusing 
Emotional Reactions:  
Now I would like to know how the video made you feel.  I am going to give you a list of 
emotions and would like you to tell me how much of each emotion you felt while you were 
watching the video.  For each emotion, please place yourself on the following scale where 0 
means that you felt the emotion NOT AT ALL and 6 means that you felt the emotion A LOT. 
Angry, Sad, Afraid, Amused, Excited, Happy 
Informational Content:  
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree.  
 The video I just watched contained a lot of important political information.   
 The video contained facts and statistics about the issue.   
 I know more about the issue discussed in the video now than I did before I watched.   
 All the claims in the video were backed up by evidence.   
179 
 
 The video contained information about what both sides of the issue think. 
Political Perspective: 
How liberal or conservative do you think the video was? Place the video on the following 7 point 
ideology scale where 1 means conservative, 7 means liberal and 4 means that the video is not 
closer to one side or the other. 
Please indicate the percentage of the video that you think contained the following: Democratic 
side, Republican side. 
 
Media Use 
During a typical week, how many days per week do you do each of the following: 
Internet:  Watch, read or listen to news on the Internet?  
Network News: Watch national or local network news on TV?  
Cable News: Watch cable news programs on TV?  
Newspaper: Read news in a printed newspaper? 
Political Comedy: Watch late-night political comedy programs?  
Interpersonal Discussion: Talk to friends or family about politics? 
 
Political Orientations 
Political Interest:  Generally speaking, how interested are you in information about what is 
going on in government and politics? Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interest, 
slightly interest, or not interest at all 
Party Identification:  Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a 





Perceived Knowledge:  Generally speaking, how much do you know about government and 
politics? Place your knowledge of the following scale where 0 means that you are not very 
knowledgeable about government and politics, 3 means you are moderately knowledgeable, and 
6 means you are extremely knowledgeable about government and politics. 
General Civics Knowledge: Now I am going to ask you a few more questions about politics.  
Please type your answer to the following questions in the space provided. Many people do not 
know the answer to all of these questions and it is OK is you do not.  If you are not sure of the 
answer you can type Don’t Know or just leave the space blank.   
 How many United States Senators are there from each state?  (2) 
 Which best describes the procedure for overriding a presidential veto? 3/4 of the US 
House of Representatives must vote to override the veto; The Supreme Court must decide 
that it is unconstitutional; 2/3 of the House of Representatives and Senate must vote to 
override the veto; 3/4 of State Houses of Representatives must vote to override the veto; 
2/3 of the US Senate must vote to override the veto (correct); None of the Above.  
 What leadership position does Nancy Pelosi hold? (Speaker of the House) 
 What is the maximum number of years that a Supreme Court Justice can serve on the 
court? (lifetime appointment/unlimited)  
 
Demographics 
Age:  What is your age in years? 
Gender:  What is your gender? Male, Female 
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Race:  What race would you classify yourself as belonging to? White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
Other, I’d rather not say 
Income: If you had to guess, what would you say is the combined annual household income of 
your family? Less than $25K, $25K-$49,999; $50K-$74,999, $75K-$99,999; $100K-$124,999; 






 Appendix 4A: Experimental Learning Variables 
Stimulus Check Measures 
General Perceptions:  
How well does each of the following words describe the video that you just saw? Please rate the 
video on the following scale where 0 means that a word describes the video NOT AT ALL and 6 
means that it describes the video VERY WELL.  Entertaining, Informative, Boring, Funny, 
Interesting, Confusing 
Emotional Reactions:  
Now I would like to know how the video made you feel.  I am going to give you a list of 
emotions and would like you to tell me how much of each emotion you felt while you were 
watching the video.  For each emotion, please place yourself on the following scale where 0 
means that you felt the emotion NOT AT ALL and 6 means that you felt the emotion A LOT. 
Angry, Sad, Afraid, Amused, Excited, Happy 
Informational Content:  
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree.  
 The video I just watched contained a lot of important political information.   
 The video contained facts and statistics about the issue.   
 I know more about the issue discussed in the video now than I did before I watched.   




General Political Interest 
Generally speaking, how interested are you in information about what is going on in government 
and politics? Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interest, slightly interest, or not 
interest at all 
 
Political Knowledge 
Now I am going to ask you a few more questions about politics. Please type your answer to the 
following questions in the space provided. Many people do not know the answer to all of these 
questions and it is OK if you do not.  Please do not use any outside sources to find the answers to 
the questions. If you are not sure of the answer you can type Don’t Know or just leave the space 
blank. 
Learning: 
 What state does Senator Joe Lieberman represent? (Connecticut)  
 Who were the recipients of TARP money? (Banks/ Financial Firms)  
 What type of business is Goldman Sachs? (Investment Bank)  
 Who did President Obama recently refer to as “fat cats”? (Wall St. bankers)  
 In their health care bill, what government program did Democrats want people to be 
allowed to buy into? (Medicare)  
 Which of the following is NOT included in the President’s plan to regulate banks? 
Limiting the interest rates that banks can charge (correct); Increasing the amount of cash 
banks must maintain; Banning banks from speculating on stocks with deposits; Capping 
the total size of banks). 
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Prior Political Knowledge: 
 How many United States Senators are there from each state?  (2) 
 Which best describes the procedure for overriding a presidential veto? 3/4 of the US 
House of Representatives must vote to override the veto; The Supreme Court must decide 
that it is unconstitutional; 2/3 of the House of Representatives and Senate must vote to 
override the veto; 3/4 of State Houses of Representatives must vote to override the veto; 
2/3 of the US Senate must vote to override the veto (correct); None of the Above.  
 What leadership position does Nancy Pelosi hold? (Speaker of the House) 
 What is the maximum number of years that a Supreme Court Justice can serve on the 
court? (lifetime appointment/unlimited)  
 Which branch of government decides whether or not a law is constitutional? 
(Judicial/Supreme Court) 







 Appendix 4B: Alternative Learning Models  
Table 4.4b: Mediation of Comedic Learning Effect by General Interest in Politics 
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15  Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   








Table 4.5b: Effect of Comedy vs. News on General Interest in Politics across Levels of Prior 
Political Knowledge 
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News .83**  
(.38) 
Prior Political Knowledge  
Moderate .05  
(.35) 
High .85**  
(.40) 
Condition x Prior Knowledge 
Interactions 
 
Comedy x Moderate 1.20**  
(.55) 
Comedy x High .41 
(.52) 
News x Moderate .67 
 (.54) 













An Interactive Model of The Moderation of The Learning Effect by Party Identification 
 Learning 
Comedy 2.20***  
(.42) 
News 1.77***  
(.43) 
Party Identification  
Democrat .39  
(.39) 
Republican -.16  
(.54) 
Condition x Party 
Identification Interactions 
 
Comedy x Democrat -.26  
(.56) 
Comedy x Republican .40  
(.72) 
News x Democrat 1.07* 
(.56) 
News x Republican .58  
(.72) 











Learning Models Controlling for Late-Night Usage (Average Number of Days per Week) 
across Levels of Prior Political Knowledge 
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F 10.71*** 2.87* 3.66* 14.39*** .56 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ^p<.15 Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  The 















 Appendix 6A: NAES 2008 Telephone Edition Variables 
Comedy Exposure 
Open-Ended Pre-Election Items:  Open-ended television exposure items coded for mentions of 
Comedy Central, The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, Jon Stewart, or Steven Colbert; Late-
Night talk including the Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Late Show with David Letterman, 
Late Night with Conan O’Brien, etc.; Saturday Night Live; Real Time with Bill Maher (Inter-
coder agreement .99; Alpha reliability >.95). 
 [EB03] During the past week, from what television program did you get most of your 
information about the 2008 presidential campaign?  (Open Ended) 
 [EB06] In the past week, did you watch any other television programs that contained 
information about the 2008 presidential campaign? [If yes:] Which ones? (Open Ended) 
Post-Election Items: 
 [EB07] Which of the following shows do you regularly watch: The Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart, Saturday Night Live, both, or neither? 
 [EE08] In the past week, how many days did you watch late night comedy programs like 
the Late Show with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, or Late Night 
with Conan O’Brien? [0-7] 
Policy Issue Attitudes 
School Vouchers  [CCc01] Do you favor or oppose vouchers which would help parents pay the 
cost of charter or private elementary or secondary schools for their children? [If favor:] Do you 
190 
 
strongly favor or somewhat favor this? (Conservative) [If oppose:] Do you strongly oppose or 
somewhat oppose this? (Liberal) 
Negotiate with enemies [CDa05] Do you favor or oppose the president of the United States 
negotiating with nations the United States considers as enemies? [If favor:] Do you strongly 
favor or somewhat favor this?(liberal) [If oppose:] Do you strongly oppose or somewhat oppose 
this? (conservative) 
Border Fence [CDd04]  I'm going to read you a proposal some have made regarding 
immigration. Please tell me whether you strongly favor, somewhat favor (conservative), 
somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose it (liberal): increase border security by building a fence 
along part of the US border with Mexico. 
Drivers License for Illegal Immigrants [CDd09]  Do you favor or oppose allowing driver's 
licenses to undocumented or illegal immigrants? [If favor:] Do you strongly favor or somewhat 
favor this? (liberal) [If oppose:] Do you strongly oppose or somewhat oppose this? 
(conservative) 
Stem Cell Research [CEb01]  Do you favor or oppose federal funding of embryonic stem cell 
research? [If favor:] Do you strongly favor or somewhat favor this?(liberal) [If oppose:] Do you 
strongly oppose or somewhat oppose this? (conservative) 
Gay Marriage [CEc02]  Would you favor or oppose an amendment to the US Constitution that 
would allow marriage only between a man and a woman? [If favor:] Would you strongly favor or 
somewhat favor the amendment? (conservative) [If oppose:] Would you strongly oppose or 
somewhat oppose the amendment? (liberal) 
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Off Shore Drilling [CFa09]  Do you favor or oppose lifting the federal ban on oil drilling in 
waters off the coast of the United States? [If favor:] Do you strongly favor or somewhat favor 
this?(conservative) [If oppose:] Do you strongly oppose or somewhat oppose this? (liberal) 
Additional Items for Liberal/Conservative Placement Measure: 
Taxes [CBb01]  I'm going to read you some options about federal income taxes. Please tell me 
which one comes closest to your view on what we should be doing about federal income taxes: 
Taxes should be cut (Conservative), Taxes should be kept pretty much as they are, Taxes should 
be raised if necessary in order to maintain current federal programs and services (Liberal). 
Health Care [CCa01]  Which do you think would be better for the country: having one health 
insurance program covering all Americans that would be administered by the government and 
paid for by taxpayers (Liberal), or keeping the current system where many people get their 
insurance from private employers and some have no insurance (Conservative)? 
Health Care [CCa02]  Which comes closer to your view when it comes to increasing access to 
affordable health care in the United States: the country should increase competition in the health 
insurance market (Conservative) or increase regulation of the insurance industry (Liberal)? 
Abortion [CEa01]  Please tell me which of the following statements about abortion comes closest 
to your own view: Abortion should be available to anyone who wants it. (Liberal) Abortion 
should be available, but with stricter limits than it is now. (Conservative) Abortion should not be 
permitted except in cases of rape, incest, or when the life of the woman is at risk. (Conservative) 
Abortion should not be permitted under any circumstances. (Conservative) 
Gay Marriage [CEc01]  There has been much talk recently about whether gays and lesbians 
should have the legal right to marry someone of the same sex. Which of the following options 
comes closest to your position on this issue? I support full marriage rights for gay and lesbian 
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couples. (Liberal) I support civil unions or domestic partnerships, but not gay marriage (liberal). 
I do not support any form of legal recognition of the relationships of gay and lesbian couples. 
(Conservative) 
Environment vs. Jobs [CFb01]  I am going to read you a pair of statements. Please tell me which 
of the two statements comes closest to your opinion: Protecting the environment should be a top 
priority, even if that means higher consumer prices (liberal). Protecting the environment is 
important, but it is more important to keep the economy growing (conservative). 
 
Engagement & Orientation toward Politics 
Interest: [KA01]  How closely  are you following the 2008 presidential campaign: very closely, 
somewhat closely, not too closely, or not closely at all? 
Party ID & Party ID Strength:  
 [MA01]  Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, an Independent, or something else? 
 [MA02]  Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong ([party named in MA01:] 
Republican / Democrat / Independent)? 
 [MA03]  Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?  
Ideology & Ideology Strength: [MA04]  Generally speaking, would you describe your political 
views as very conservative, somewhat conservative, moderate, somewhat liberal, or very liberal?  
General Knowledge:  
 [MC01]  Who has the final responsibility to determine if a law is constitutional or not? Is 
it the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?  
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 [MC02]  How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
 [MC03]  Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the United States 
House of Representatives?  
 
Other Media Use 
TV News: [EB02]  Thinking about the past week, how many days did you see information on 
broadcast or cable television about the 2008 presidential campaign? 0-7 
Talk Radio: [EC01]  Thinking about the past week, how many days did you hear information 
about the 2008 presidential campaign on radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss 
current events, public issues, or politics? 0-7 
Newspaper: [ED01]  Thinking about the past week, how many days did you read a newspaper 
for information about the 2008 presidential campaign? 0-7 
Internet News: [EE02]  How many days in the past week did you see or hear information about 
the 2008 presidential campaign on the Internet? 0-7 
 
Demographics 
Gender: [WA01]  male 
Age: [WA02]  Age in years, 18-97. 
Education:  [WA03]  What is the last grade or class you completed in school? Less than HS 
diploma, HS diploma or equivalent, Some College or post-HS training but less than 4-year 
degree, 4-year College Degree, Some Graduate School or More 
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Income:  [WA04, WA05]  Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people 
living in your house or apartment? Just stop me when I get to the right category:  Less than 
$10K, $10K to less than $15K, $15K to less than $25K, $25K to less than $35K, $35K to less 
than $50K, $50K to less than $75K, $75K to less than $100K, $100K to less than $150K, $150K 
or more 
Employment:  [WB01]  Are you working full time or part time? 
Hispanic:  [WC01]  Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent? 
White:  [WC03]  What is your race? Are you white, black or African American, Asian, 
American Indian, or some other race? [If Hispanic:] Are you white Hispanic, black Hispanic, or 
some other race? 
Church Attendance: [WD01]  How often do you attend religious services, apart from special 
events like weddings and funerals: more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, 




 Appendix 6B: Patterns of Self-Reported Exposure to Comedy across Demographic and 
Political Groups 
 All Comedy Daily Show/Colbert 
Report 
Men 3.91 2.52 
Women 3.61 1.79 
Under 30 6.88 4.92 
Over 30 3.47 1.86 
College Graduates 4.58 2.86 
High School or Less 2.43 1.09 
Democrats 5.19 3.16 
Republicans 1.88 .63 
Independents 3.15 1.98 
Liberals 6.61 4.37 
Conservatives 1.93 .71 
Moderates 3.43 1.84 
High Political Interest 4.96 2.82 
Low Political Interest 1.49 .66 
High TV News 4.26 2.31 
Low TV News 1.22 .71 
High Newspaper 4.53 2.72 
Low Newspaper 2.99 1.53 
Entries show the percentage of respondents in each group that report exposure to political comedy on any of the 3 
self-reported measures.  Respondents not included in models due to insufficient information are excluded in this 





 Appendix 6C: Hierarchical Regression Models 
Each model has been re-estimated using hierarchical regression.  Instead of entering all variables 
simultaneously, logically related blocks of variables are entered in an iterative process.  The 
coefficients on variables in each block control only for the variables entered in previous blocks.  
The improvement of the model resulting from the entry of new blocks can be determined by 
examining the incremental R
2
 value and F-change.  For each model, the first block includes only 
demographic variables.  The second block entered consists of variables related to political 
engagement, including interest, strength of partisanship, strength of ideology, and general 
political knowledge.  The third block entered includes the media use variables for television 
news, talk radio, newspaper, and Internet.  Comedy variables are entered in the final block.  
Models using all comedy viewership and Daily Show/Colbert Report viewership were estimated 
separately; however, because these variables were entered in the final block, the coefficients on 
all previously entered variables are identical for each model.  For ease of presentation, 
coefficients on the first 3 blocks are only presented once.  Though they are presented together, 
the coefficients on all comedy and Daily Show/Colbert were obtained in separate models that 





Table 6.1b Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and The 
Standard Deviation of Policy Issue Positions 
  Incremental R
2
 (%) F Change 
Block 1: Demographics   





















Church Attendance -.01 
(.01) 
.74  




PID Strength -.03*** 
(.01) 
  
Ideology Strength -.12*** 
(.01) 
  
General Knowledge -.04*** 
(.01) 
1.85*** 65.38 
Block 3: Media Use    
TV News .07*** 
(.02) 
  






Internet News -.02 
(.01) 
1.95*** 5.77 
Block 4: Comedy    








N 23138   
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 Entries are OLS regression coefficients prior to previous block entry with standard 
errors in parentheses.  Observations with a missing value for any variable in the models are excluded from analysis.  
The All Comedy and Daily Show/Colbert Report coefficients are based on separate models, one entering all comedy 




Table 6.2b: Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and 
Average Inter-Item Issue Distance 
  Incremental R
2
 (%) F Change 
Block 1: Demographics   





















Church Attendance -.01 
(.01) 
.60  




PID Strength -.04*** 
(.01) 
  
Ideology Strength -.20*** 
(.01) 
  
General Knowledge -.04*** 
(.01) 
2.28*** 99.18 
Block 3: Media Use    
TV News .09*** 
(.03) 
  






Internet News -.03* 
(.02) 
2.43*** 8.66 
Block 4: Comedy    








N 23138   
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 Entries are OLS regression coefficients prior to previous block entry with standard 
errors in parentheses.  Observations with a missing value for any variable in the models are excluded from analysis.  
The All Comedy and Daily Show/Colbert Report coefficients are based on separate models, one entering all comedy 




Table 6.3b: Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and The 
Ideological Bi-Polarity of Policy Issue Position 
  Incremental R
2
 (%) F Change 
Block 1: Demographics   





















Church Attendance .01** 
(.01) 
2.26  




PID Strength .02*** 
(.01) 
  
Ideology Strength .09*** 
(.01) 
  
General Knowledge .03*** 
(.01) 
10.20*** 838.49 
Block 3: Media Use    
TV News -.02*** 
(.01) 
  






Internet News .01* 
(.01) 
10.41*** 22.56 
Block 4: Comedy    








N 37965   
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 Entries are OLS regression coefficients prior to previous block entry with standard 
errors in parentheses.  Observations with a missing value for any variable in the models are excluded from analysis.  
The All Comedy and Daily Show/Colbert Report coefficients are based on separate models, one entering all comedy 





Table 6.4b: Relationship between Self-Reported Exposure to Political Comedy and Vertical 
Constraint, The Relationship between Self-Reported Ideology and Average Issue Position 
  Incremental R
2
 (%) F Change 
Block 1: Demographics   





















Church Attendance -.02*** 
(.01) 
2.33  




PID Strength .03*** 
(.01) 
  
Ideology Strength -.05*** 
(.06) 
  
General Knowledge -.08*** 
(.01) 
3.97*** 98.81 
Block 3: Media Use    
TV News .05*** 
(.02) 
  






Internet News -.03*** 
(.01) 
4.22*** 15.38 
Block 4: Comedy    








N 23255   
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***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 Entries are OLS regression coefficients prior to previous block entry with standard 
errors in parentheses.  Observations with a missing value for any variable in the models are excluded from analysis.  
The All Comedy and Daily Show/Colbert Report coefficients are based on separate models, one entering all comedy 




Table 6.5b: The Relationship between Ideology and Average Issue Position by Self-
Reported Exposure to Political Comedy across Levels of General Political Knowledge 
 All Comedy Daily Show/Colbert 












Block 1: Ideology & Knowledge     
Ideology (5-pt) .12*** 
(.01) 
  .12*** 
(.01) 
  
General Knowledge -.17*** 
(.01) 
  -.17*** 
(.01) 
  
Ideology x Knowledge .20*** 
(.01) 
16.22  .20*** 
(.01) 
16.22  
Block 2: Comedy       
Comedy -.74*** 
(.03) 
16.98*** 506.32 -.71*** 
(.05) 
16.58*** 239.17 
Block 3: Comedy Interactions      
Ideology x Comedy .24*** 
(.07) 
  .33*** 
(.12) 
  
Knowledge x Comedy .07* 
(.04) 
  .01 
(.06) 
  









  .40*** 
(.01) 
  
N 55045      
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 Entries are OLS regression coefficients prior to previous block entry with standard 














 Appendix 6D: Percentage Liberal and Conservative Policy Issue Positions 
   
 All Comedy Daily Show/Colbert 
 Liberal (%) Conservative (%) Liberal (%) Conservative (%) 








Engagement     




































Media Use     



















































































































  (%) 45.19 42.98 45.20 42.98 
N 23261 23261 23261 23261 




Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. (2008). Is Polarization a Myth? Journal of Politics, 70(2), 
542-555. 
Abramowitz, A. I. (2010). The Disappearing Center. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Alexander, R. D. (1986). Ostracism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Reproductive Significance of 
Humor. Ethology and Sociobiology, 7(3), 253-270. 
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Althus, S. L. (1998). Information Effects in Collective Preferences. American Political Science 
Review, 92(3), 545-558. 
Althaus, S. L. (2003). Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Anderson, J. R. (1983). The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Apte, M. L. (1985). Humor and Laughter: An Anthropological Approach. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Apter, M. J. (1982). The Experience of Motivation: The Theory of Psychological Reversals. San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 




Baek, Y. M., & Wojcieszak, M. E. (2009). Don’t Expect Too Much! Learning from Late-Night 
Comedy and Knowledge Item Difficulty. Communication Research. 36(6), 783-809. 
Bartels, L. M. (1993). Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure. American 
Political Science Review, 87(2), 267-285. 
Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections. 
American Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 194-230. 
Bartolo, A., Benuzzi, F., Nocetti, L., Baraldi, P., & Nichelli, P. (2006). Humor Comprehension 
and Appreciation: An fMRI Study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(11), 1789-
1798. 
Barton, A. H., & Parsons, R. W. (1977). Measuring Belief System Structure. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 41(2), 159-180. 
Baum, M. A.  (2002). Sex, Lies and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the 
Inattentive Public. American Political Science Review, 96(1), 91-109 
Baum, M. A. (2003a). Soft News and Political Knowledge: Evidence of Absence or Absence of 
Evidence. Political Communication, 20(2), 173-190. 
Baum, M. A. (2003b). Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American foreign Policy in 
the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baum, M. A. (2005). Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit. 
American Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 213-234. 
Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J. S. (2006). The Daily Show Effect, Candidate Evaluations, 
Efficacy, and American Youth. American Politics Research, 34(3), 341-367. 
210 
 
Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J. S. (2008). One ‘Nation,’ Under Stephen? The Effects of The 
Colbert Report on American Youth. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 52(4), 
622-643. 
Baumgartner, J., Morris, J. S., & Walth, N. L. (2012). The Fey Effect: Young Adults, Political 
Humor and Perceptions of Sarah Palin in the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign. 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(1), 95-104. 
Becker, A. B. (2011). Political Humor as Democratic Relief? The Effects of Exposure to 
Comedy and Straight News on Trust and Efficacy. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 
19(5), 235-250. 
Becker, A. B. (2012). Comedy Types and Political Campaigns: The Differential Influence of 
Other-Directed Hostile Humor and Self-Ridicule on Candidate Evaluations. Mass 
Communication and Society 15(6), 791-812. 
Becker, A.B., Xenos, M.A., & Waisanen, D.J. (2010). Sizing Up The Daily Show: Audience 
Perceptions of Political Comedy Programming. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 
18(3), 144-157. 
Bennett, S. E. (1988). Know-Nothings’ Revisited: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today. 
Political Science Quarterly 69(2), 476-490. 
Bennett, S. E. (1989). Trends in Americans’ Political Information, 1967-1987. American Politics 
Research, 17(4), 422-435. 
Bennett, S. E. (1996). Know Nothings Revisited Again.  Political Behavior, 18(3), 219-233. 




Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. (1954). Voting: A Study of Opinion 
Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Brader, T. (2005). Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade 
Voters by Appealing to Emotions. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 388-405. 
Brader, T. (2006). Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads 
Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Brady, H. E., & Sniderman, P. M. (1985). Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political 
Reasoning.  American Political Science Review, 79(4), 1061-1078. 
Brewer, P. R., & Cao, X. (2006). Candidate Appearances on Soft News Shows and Public 
Knowledge about Primary Campaigns. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 
50(1), 18-35. 
Brewer, P. R., & Marquardt, E. (2007). Mock News and Democracy: Analyzing The Daily 
Show. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 15(4), 249-267. 
Brewer, P. R., & Cao, X. X.  (2008). Late Night Comedy Television Shows as News Sources: 
What the Polls Say. In J. C. Baumgartner, & J. S. Morris (Eds.), Laughing Matters: 
Humor and American Politics in the Media Age (pp. 263-278). New York, NY: 
Routledge.  
Brinkman, D. (1968). Do Editorial Cartoons and Editorials Change Opinions? Journalism 
Quarterly, 45(4), 724-726. 
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960).  The American Voter. New 
York, NY: John Wiley. 
212 
 
Cao, X. (2008). Political Comedy Shows and Knowledge about Primary Campaigns: The 
Moderating Effects of Age and Education. Mass Communication and Society, 11(1), 43-
61. 
Cao, X., & Brewer, P. R. (2008). Political Comedy Shows and Public Participation in Politics. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(1), 90-99. 
Cao, X., & Brewer, P. R. (2009, September). The Daily Show and Perceptions of Government. 
Paper presented at The Annual Conference of The American Political Science 
Association, Toronto, ON. 
Cao, X. (2010). Hearing it From Jon Stewart: The Impact of The Daily Show on Public 
Attentiveness to Politics. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22(1), 26-46. 
Carl, L. M. (1968). Editorial Cartoons Fail to Reach Many Viewers.  Journalism Quarterly, 
45(3), 533-535. 
Center for Media & Public Affairs at George Mason University (2010). Late Night Partisans: 
Major Late Night Comedy Programs in 2010. Media Monitor, 24(3). Retrieved from 
www.cmpa.com/pdf/media-monitor_q4_2010.pdf 
Chaffee, S. H., Zhao, X., & Leshner, G. (1994). Political Knowledge and the Campaign Media of 
1992. Communication Research, 21(3), 305-324. 
Chaffee, S. H., & Frank, S. (1996). How Americans Get Political Information: Print versus 
Broadcast News. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 546, 
48-58. 
Citrin, J., & Green, D. P. (1990). The Self-Interest Motive In American Public Opinion. 
Research in Micropolitics, 3(1), 1-28. 
213 
 
Claassen, R. L., & Highton, B. (2009). Policy Polarization among Party Elites and the 
Significance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public. Political Research Quarterly, 
61(3), 538-551. 
Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1984). How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic 
Model. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 95-126. 
Converse, P.E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), 
Ideology and Discontent (pp. 206-261). New York, NY: Free Press. 
Converse, P. E. (1972). Change in the American Electorate. In A. Campbell & P. E. Converse 
(Eds.) The Human Meaning of Social Change (pp. 263-337). New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Converse, P.E. (1990). Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information. In J.A. 
Ferejohn & J.H. Kuklinski (Eds.) Information and Democratic Processes (pp. 369-388). 
Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Converse, P.E. (2000). Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 3(1), 331-353. 
Converse, P. E. (2006). Democratic Theory and Reality. Critical Review, 18, 297-329. 
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press (Republished in 1998).  
Davis, R., & Owen, D. (1998). New Media and American Politics. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Deacon, T. W. (1997). The Symbolic Species. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. 
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1991). Stability and Change in the U. S. Public's Knowledge 
of Politics. Public Opinion Quarterly, 55(4), 583-612. 
214 
 
Delli Carpini, M. X,. & Keeter, S. (1993). Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First Things 
First. American Journal of Political Science, 37(4), 1179-206. 
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans Know about Politics and Why it 
Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (2001). Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media 
Environment. In W. L. Bennett, & R. M. Entman (Eds.), Mediated Politics: 
Communication in the Future of Democracy (pp.160-181). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Delli Carpini, M. X. (2012). Entertainment Media and the Political Engagement of Citizens. In 
H.A. Semetko, & M. Scammell (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Communication 
(pp. 9-21). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Denzau, A. D., & North, D. C. (2000). Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. In A. 
Lupia, M. C. McCubbins, & S. L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice 
and the Bounds of Rationality (pp. 23-46). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Derryberry, D., & Tucker, D. M. (1994). Motivating the Focus of Attention. In P. M. 
Neidenthan, & S. Kitayama (Eds.), The Heart’s Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception 
and Attention (pp. 167-196). San Diego, CA: Academic. 
Downs, A.  (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper. 
Esralew. S., & Young, D. G. (2012). The Influence of Parodies on Mental Models: Exploring the 
Tina-Fey—Sarah Palin Phenomenon. Communication Quarterly, 60(3), 338-352. 
Federico, C. M. (2007). Expertise, Evaluative Motivation and the Structure of Citizens’' 
Ideological Commitments. Political Psychology, 28(5), 535-561. 
215 
 
Federico, C. M., & Schneider, M. C. (2007). Political Expertise and the Use of Ideology: 
Moderating Effects of Evaluative Motivation. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(2), 221-252. 
Federico, C. M., & Hunt, C. V. (2013). Political Information, Political Involvement, and 
Reliance on Ideology in Political Evaluation. Political Behavior, 35(1), 89-112. 
Feldman, L., & Young, D. G. (2008). Late-Night Comedy as a Gateway to Traditional News: An 
Analysis of Time Trends in News Attention among Late-Night Comedy Viewers During 
the 2004 Presidential Primaries. Political Communication, 25(4), 401-422. 
Feldman, L., Leiserowitz, A., & Maibach, E. W. (2011, May). The Impact of The Daily Show 
and The Colbert Report on Public Attentiveness to Science and the Environment. Paper 
presented at The Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, 
Boston, MA. 
Feldman, L. (2013). Learning about Politics from The Daily Show: The Role of Viewer 
Orientation and Processing Motivations. Mass Communication and Society, 16(4), 586-
607. 
Fiorina, M. P. (1990). Information and Rationality in Elections. In J.A. Ferejohn, & J.H. 
Kuklinski (Eds.), Information and Democratic Processes (pp.329-342). Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Fiorina, M. P., Samuel, A., & Pope, J. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. 
New York, NY: Pearson Longman. 
Fiorina, M. P., Samuel, A., & Pope, J. (2008). Polarization in the American Public: 
Misconceptions and Misreadings. Journal of Politics, 70(2), 556-60. 
Fowler, S. (2008). The Colbert Bump in Campaign Donations: More Truthful than Truthy. PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 41(3), 533-539. 
216 
 
Fox, J. R., Koloen, G., & Sahin, V. (2007). No Joke: A Comparison of Substance in The Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart and Broadcast Network Television Coverage of the 2004 
Presidential Election Campaign. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 51(2), 
213-227. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What Good are Positive Emotions? Review of General Psychology, 
2(3), 300-319. 
Fredrickson, B. L., & Levenson, R. W. (1998). Positive Emotions Speed Recovery from the 
Cardiovascular Sequelae of Negative Emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 12(2), 191-220. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broaden-
and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 218-226. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions. Transcripts of 
the Royal Society of London, 359, 1367-1377. 
Gamson, W. (1992). Talking Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Gervais, M., & Wilson, D. S. (2005). The Evolution and Functions of Laugher and Humor: A 
Synthetic Approach. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 80(4), 395-430. 
Graber, D. A. (2004). Mediated Politics and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 55(2), 545-571. 
Graber, D. A. (2008). Why Political Humor is Serious Business. In J. C. Baumgartner, & J. S. 
Morris (Eds.), Laughing Matters: Humor and American Politics in the Media Age (pp 
333-342). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Guggenheim, L., Kwak, N., & Campbell, S. W. (2011). Nontraditional News Negativity: The 
Relationship of Entertaining Political News Use to Political Cynicism and Mistrust. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 23(3), 287-314. 
217 
 
Hamill, R., Lodge, M., & Blake, F. (1985). The Breadth, Depth and Utility of Class, Partisan and 
Ideological Schemata. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 850-870. 
Hastie, R., & Park, B. (1986). The Relationship between Memory and Judgment Depends on 
Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-Based or On-Line. Psychological review, 93(3), 
258-268. 
Highton, B. (2009). Revisiting the Relationship between Education Attainment and Political 
Sophistication. Journal of Politics, 71(4), 1564-1576. 
Hoffman, L. H., & Thompson, T. L. (2009). The Effect of Television Viewing on Adolescents' 
Civic Participation: Political Efficacy as a Mediating Mechanism. Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 53(1), 3-21. 
Hoffman, L. H., & Young, D.G. (2011). Satire, Punch Lines, and the Nightly News: Untangling 
Media Effects on Political Participation. Communication Research Reports, 28(2), 159-
168. 
Holbert, R. L. (2005). A Typology for the Study of Entertainment Television and Politics. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 49(3), 436-453. 
Holbert, R. L., Lambe, J. L., Dudo, A. D., & Carlton, K. A. (2007). Primacy Effects of The Daily 
Show and National TV News Viewing: Young Viewers, Political Gratifications, and 
Internal Political Self-Efficacy. Journal of Broadcasting and electronic Media, 51(1), 20-
38. 
Holbert, R.L., Hmielowski, J., Jain, J., Lather, J., & Morey, A. (2011). Adding Nuance to the 
Study of Political Humor Effects: A Study of Juvenalian Satire versus Horatian Satire. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 55(3), 187-211. 
218 
 
Holbert, R. L., Tchernev, J. M., Walther, W. O., Esralew, S. E., & Benski, K. (2013). Young 
Voter Perceptions of Political Satire as Persuasion: A Focus on Perceived Influence, 
Persuasive Intent, and Message Strength. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 
57(2), 170-186. 
Hollander, B. A. (2005). Late-Night Learning: Do Entertainment Programs Increase Political 
Campaign Knowledge for Young Viewers?  Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic 
Media, 49(4), 402-415. 
Hovland, C. I. (1959). Reconciling Conflicting Results Derived from Experimental and Survey 
Studies of Attitude Change. American Psychologist, 14(1), 8-17. 
Huddy, L., Feldman. S., & Cassese. E. (2007). On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and 
Anger. In A. Crigler, M. MacKuen, G. E. Marcus, & W. R. Neuman (Eds.), The Affect 
Effect (pp. 202-230). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Isbell, L. M., Ottati, V. C., & Burns, K. C. (2006). Affect and Politics: Effects on Judgment, 
Processing, and Information Seeking. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), Feeling Politics: Emotion 
in Political Information Processing (pp. 57-86). New York, NY: Palgrave. 
Isen, A. M. (2000). Some Ways in Which Positive Affect Influences Decision Making and 
Problem Solving. In Lewis, M., & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 
2nd Edition (pp. 548-573). New York, NY: Guilford. 
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. F. (2000). New Perspectives and Evidence on Political Communication 
and Campaign Effects. Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 149-169. 
219 
 
Jacobson, G. C. (2000). Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection. In J. 
R. Bond, & R. Fleisher (Eds.), Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a 
Partisan Era, Vol. 5 (pp. 17-18). Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Jacoby, W. G. (1991). Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes. American Journal of 
Political Science, 35(1), 178-205. 
Jamieson, K. H., & Waldman, P. (2003). The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists and the 
Stories that Shape the Political World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Jennings, M. K. (1996). Political Knowledge over Time and Across Generations. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 60(2), 228-252. 
Jerit, J., Barabas, J., & Bolsen, T. (2006). Citizens, Knowledge and the Information 
Environment. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 266-282. 
Jones, J. P. (2005). Entertaining Politics: New Political Television and Civic Culture. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Jones, J. P. (2006). A Cultural Approach to the Study of Mediated Citizenship. Social Semiotics, 
16(2), 365-383. 
Jones, J. P. (2010). Entertaining Politics: Satiric Television and Political Engagement. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions 
and Elective Affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337. 
Judd, C. M., & Downing, J. W. (1990). Political Expertise and the Development of Attitude 
Consistency. Social Cognition, 8(1), 104-124. 
Judd, C. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (1989). The Structural Bases of Consistency among Political 
Attitudes: Effects of Political Expertise and Attitude Importance. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J.  
220 
 
Breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude Structure and Function (pp. 99-128). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Kam, C. D. (2006). Political Campaigns and Open-Minded Thinking. Journal of Politics, 68(4), 
931-945. 
Kam, C. D., & Palmer, C. L. (2008). Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political 
Participation. Journal of Politics, 70(3), 612-631. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430-454. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the Psychology of Prediction. Psychological 
Review, 80(4), 237-251. 
Kim, Y. M., & Vishak, J. (2008). Just Laugh! You Don’t Need to Remember: The Effects of 
Entertainment Media on Political Information Acquisition and Information Processing in 
Political Judgment. Journal of Communication, 58(2), 338-360. 
Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1985). Public Opinion and Political Action. In G. Lindzey, & E. 
Aronson (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd Edition (pp. 659-741). New 
York, NY: Random House. 
Koestler, A. (1964). The Act of Creation. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Kucklinski, J. H., Quirk, P. J., Jerit, J., & Rich, R. F. (2001). The Political Environment and 
Citizen Competence. American Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 410-424. 
LaMarre, H.L. Landreville, K. D., & Beam, M. A. (2009). The Irony of Satire, Political Ideology 
and the Motivation to See What You Want to See in The Colbert Report. International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 14(2), 212-231. 
221 
 
LaMarre, H. L., & Walther, W. (2013). Ability Matters: Testing the Differential Effects of 
Political News and Late-Night Comedy on Cognitive Responses and the Role of Ability 
in Micro-Level Opinion Formation. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
25(3), 303-322. 
Landreville, K. D. Holbert, R. L., & LaMarre, H. L. (2010). The Influence of Late-Night TV 
Comedy Viewing on Political Talk: A Moderated-Mediation Model. The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 15(4), 482-498. 
Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. (2001). Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in 
Political Decision-Making. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 951-971. 
Levendusky, M. (2009). The Partisan Sort. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Lippman, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Lodge, M., & Hamill, R. (1986). A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing. 
American Political Science Review, 80(2), 505-519. 
Lodge, M., McGraw, K.M., & Stroh, P. (1989). An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate 
Evaluation. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 399-419. 
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. (2000). Three Steps Toward a theory of Motivated Political Reasoning. 
In A. Lupia, M. D. McCubbins, & S. L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, 
Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (pp. 183-213). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. (2005). The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and 




Lodge, M., & Taber, C. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769. 
Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections. The American Political Science Review, 88(1), 
63-76. 
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What 
They Need to Know? New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D., & Popkin, S. L. (2000). Incorporating Reason into the Study of 
Politics. In A. Lupia, M. C. McCubbins, & S. L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of Reason: 
Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (pp. 1-20). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lusk, C. M., & Judd, C. M. (1988). Political Expertise and the Structural Mediators of Candidate 
Evaluations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 24(2), 105-126. 
Luskin, R. C. (1987). Measuring Political Sophistication. American Journal of Political Science, 
31(4), 856-896. 
Luskin, R.C. (1990). Explaining Political Sophistication. Political Behavior, 12(4), 331-361. 
Marcus, G. E., & MacKuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional 
Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns. American 
Political Science Review, 87(3), 672-685. 
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and Political 
Judgment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Martin, R. A. (2007). The Psychology of Humor: An Integrative Approach. Burlington, MA: 
Elsevier Academic Press. 
223 
 
Matthes, J. (2013). Elaboration or Distraction? Knowledge Acquisition from Thematically 
Related and Unrelated Humor in Political Speeches. International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research, 25(3), 291-302. 
McGhee, P. E.  (1983) The Role of Arousal and Hemispheric Lateralization in Humor. In P. E. 
McGhee, & J. H. Goldstein (Eds.), Handbook of Humor Research, Vol. I:  Basic Issues 
(pp. 13-37). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
McGraw, K. M., Lodge, M., & Stroh, P. (1990). Online Processing in Candidate Evaluation: The 
Effects of Issue Order, Issue Importance and Sophistication. Political Behavior, 12(1), 
41-58. 
McGraw, K. M., & Scholz, J. T. (1991). Appeals to Civic Virtue versus Attention to Self-
Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance. Law and Society Review, 25(3), 471-98. 
McGraw, K. M., Pinney, N., & Neumann, D. (1991). Memory for Political Actors: Contrasting 
the Use of Semantic and Evaluative Organizational Strategies. Political Behavior, 13(2), 
165-189 
McLeod, J. M., & McDonald, D. G. (1985). Beyond Simple Exposure, Media Orientations and 
Their Impact on Political Processes.  Communication Research, 12(1), 3-33. 
McLeod, J. M, Guo, Z., Daily, K, Steele, C. A., Huang, H., Horowitz, E., & Chen, H. (1996). 
The Impact of Traditional and Nontraditional Media Forms in the 1992 Presidential 
Election. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(2), 401-416. 
Mondak, J. J. (1994). Cognitive Heuristics, Heuristic Processing, and Efficiency in Political 
Decision Making. In M. X. Delli Carpini, L. Huddy, & R. Y. Shaprio (Eds.) New 
Directions in Political Psychology (pp. 117-142). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
224 
 
Mondak, J. J. (2001). Developing Valid Knowledge Scales. American Journal of Political 
Science, 45(1), 224-238. 
Morris, J. S., & Baumgartner, J. (2008). The Daily Show and Attitudes toward the News Media. 
In J. C. Baumgartner, & J. S. Morris (Eds.), Laughing Matters: Humor and American 
Politics in the Media Age (pp. 315-332). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Morris, J. S. (2009). The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Audience Attitude Change During 
the 2004 Party Conventions. Political Behavior, 31(1), 79-102. 
Moy, P., Xenos, M. A., & Hess, V. K. (2005a). Communication and Citizenship: Mapping the 
Political Effects of Infotainment. Mass Communication and Society, 8(2), 111-131. 
Moy, P., Xenos, M. A., & Hess, V. K. (2005b). Priming Effects of Late-Night Comedy. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(2), 198-210. 
Moy, P. (2008). The Political Effects of Late Night Comedy and Talk Shows. . In J. C. 
Baumgartner, & J. S. Morris (Eds.), Laughing Matters: Humor and American Politics in 
the Media Age (pp. 295-314). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Nabi, R. L., Moyer-Guse, E., & Byrne, S. (2007). All Joking Aside: A Serious Investigation into 
the Persuasive Effect of Funny Social Issue Messages. Communication Monographs, 
74(1), 29-54. 
National Annenberg Election Survey. (2004). Daily Show Viewers Knowledgeable about the 





National Annenberg Election Survey. (2008). National Annenberg Election Survey 2008 Phone 
Edition, NAES08-Phone [Data file and Code book]. Retrieved from 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/ 
Nerhardt, G. (1976). Incongruity and Funniness: Toward a New Descriptive Model. In A. J. 
Chapman, & H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and 
Applications (pp. 55-62). London: Wiley. 
Neuman, W.R. (1986). The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American 
Electorate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Neuman, W. R. (1991). Differentiation and Integration: Two Dimensions of Political Thinking. 
American Journal of Sociology, 86(6), 1236-1268. 
Neuman, W.R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). Common Knowledge, News and The 
Construction of Political Meaning. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Nie, N. H., Junn, J., & Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and Democratic Citizenship in 
America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Niven, D., Lichter, S. R., & Amundson, D. (2003). The Political Content of Late Night Comedy. 
The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 8(3), 118-133. 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The Rational Public. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Pankseep, J. (2000). The Riddle of Laughter: Neural and Psychoevolutionary Underpinnings of 
Joy. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(3), 183-186.   
Parkin, M. (2010). Taking Late Night Comedy Seriously, How Candidate Appearances on Late 
Night Television Can Engage Viewers. Political Research Quarterly, 63(1), 3-15. 
226 
 
Patterson, T. E., & McClure, R. D. (1976). The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in 
National Elections. New York, NY: Putman. 
Patterson, T. E. (2000). Dong Well and Doing Good. Faculty Research Working Paper Series 
(#RWP01-001), John D. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Project for Excellence in Journalism. (2008). Journalism, Satire or Just Laughs? The Daily Show 
with Jon Stewart Examined. Retrieved from http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=309 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion. In 
Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (pp. 
1-24). New York, NY: Springer. 
Pew Research Center. (2004). Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political News 
Universe. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2004/01/11/cable-and-internet-
loom-large-in-fragmented-political-news-universe/ 
Pew Research Center. (2007). What Americans Know: 1989-2007, Public Knowledge of Current 
Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolutions. Retrieved from 
http://www.people-press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-
changed-by-news-and-information-revolutions/ 
Pew Research Center. (2008). Audience Segments in a Changing News Environment, Key News 





Pew Research Center. (2010). Ideological News Sources: Who Watches and Why, Americans 
Spending More time Following the News. Retrieved from http://www.people-
press.org/2010/09/12/americans-spending-more-time-following-the-news/ 
Pew Research Center. (2012). Trends in News Consumption: 1991-2012, In Changing News 
Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable. Retrieved from http://www.people-
press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-even-television-is-vulnerable/ 
Polimeni, J., & Reiss, J. P. (2006). The First Joke: Exploring the Evolutionary Origins of Humor. 
Evolutionary Psychology, 4, 347-366. 
Polk, J. Young, D.G., & Holbert. R.L. (2009). Humor Complexity and Political Influence: An 
Elaboration Likelihood Approach to the Effects of Humor Type in The Daily Show with 
Jon Stewart. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 17(4), 202-219. 
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call 
Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Popkin, S. L. (1991). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential 
Campaigns. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Popkin, S. L. (1994). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential 
Campaigns, 2
nd
 Ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Price, V., & Zaller, J. (1993). Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and 
Their Implications for Research. Public Opinion Quarterly, 57(2), 133-164. 
Prior, M. (2003). Any Good News in Soft News? The Impact of Soft News Preference on 
Political Knowledge. Political Communication, 20(2), 149-171. 
Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in 
Political Knowledge. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 577-592. 
228 
 
Prior, M. (2007). Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in 
Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Prior, M., & Lupia, A. (2008). Money, Time and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick 
Recall and Political Learning Skills. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 169-
183. 
Prior, M. (2010). You've Either Got it or You Don't? The Stability of Political Interest Over the 
Life Cycle. Journal of Politics, 72(3), 747-766. 
Provine, R. R. (2000). Laugher: A Scientific Investigation. New York, NY: Viking. 
Rahn, W. M. (1993). The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political 
Candidates.  American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 472-496. 
Raskin, V. (1985). Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. Hingham, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in 
America. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Rottinghaus, B., Bird, K., Ridout, T., & Self, R. (2008). “It’s Better than Being Informed,” 
College-Aged Viewers of The Daily Show. In J. C. Baumgartner, & J. S. Morris (Eds.), 
Laughing Matters: Humor and American Politics in the Media Age (pp. 279-294). New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Rudolph, T. J., Gangl, A., & Stevens, D. (2000). The Effects of Efficacy and Emotions on 
Campaign Involvement. The Journal of Politics, 62(4), 1189-1197. 
229 
 
Schlozman, K. L. (2002). Citizen Participation in America: What Do We Know? Why Do We 
Care? In I. Katzelson, & H. V. Milner (Eds.), Political Science: State of the Discipline. 
(pp. 433-61) New York, NY: Norton. 
Schmidt, S. R. (1994). Effects of Humor on Sentence Memory.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning Memory & Cognition, 20(4), 953-967. 
Schmidt, S. R., & Williams, A. R. (2001). Memory for Humorous Cartoons.  Memory & 
Cognition, 10(2), 305-311. 
Schudson, M. (1998). The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. New York, NY: 
Martin Kessler Books. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Sears, D. O. (1986). College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base 
on Social Psychology’s View of Human Nature. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51(3), 515-530. 
Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1990). The Limited Effect of Economic Self-Interest on the Political 
Attitudes of the Mass Public. Journal of Behavioral Economics, 19(3), 247-271. 
Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1991). The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24(1), 1-91. 
Shultz, T. R. (1972). The Role of Incongruity and Resolution in Children’s Appreciation of 
Cartoon Humor. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 13(3), 456-477. 
Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R.A., & Tetlock, P.E. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in 
Political Psychology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Sroufe, L.A., & Wunsch, J.P. (1972). The Development of Laughter in the First Years of Life. 
Child Development, 43(4), 1326-1344. 
230 
 
Suls, J. (1972). A Two-Stage Model for the Appreciation of Jokes and Cartoons. In J. H. 
Goldstein, & P. E. McGhee (Eds.), Psychology of Humor (pp. 81-100). New York, NY: 
Academic Press. 
Suls, J. (1983). Cognitive Processes in Humor Appreciation. In P. E. McGhee, & J. H. Goldstein 
(Eds.), Handbook of Humor Research, Vol. I:  Basic Issues (pp. 39-57). New York, NY: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Taniguchi, M. (2011). The Electoral Consequences of Candidate Appearances on Soft News 
Programs. Political Communication, 28(1), 67-86. 
Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Accountability and Complexity of Thought. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 45(1), 74-83. 
Tichenor, P.J., Donohue, G.A., & Olien, C.N. (1970). Mass Media flow and Differential Growth 
in Knowledge. Public Opinion Quarterly, 34(2), 159-170. 
Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., Banks, A. J., & Davis, A. K. (2008). Is a Worried Citizen a 
Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seeking, and Learning via the Internet. 
Political Psychology, 29(2), 247-273. 
Valentino, N. A., Gregorowicz, K., & Groenendyk, E. W. (2009). Efficacy, Emotions and the 
Habit of Participation. Political Behavior, 31(3), 307-330. 
Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). 
Election Night's Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation. 
Journal of Politics, 73(1), 156-170. 
Verba, S., & Nie, N. H.H (1972). Participation in America. New York, NY: Harper. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in 
American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
231 
 
Verba, S. (1996). The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy, 
Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1995. American Political 
Science Review, 90(1), 1-7. 
Weisfeld, G. E. (1993). The Adaptive Value of Humor and Laughter. Ethology and 
Sociobiology, 14(2), 141-169. 
Williams, B. A., & Delli Carpini, M. X. (2011). Real Ethical Concerns and Fake News: The 
Daily Show and the Challenge of the New Media Environment. In A. Amarasingam 
(Ed.), The Stewart/Colbert Effect: Essays on the Real Impacts of Fake News (181-192). 
Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc. 
Wyckoff, M. L. (1980). Belief System constraint and Policy Voting: A Test of the 
Unidimensional Consistency Model. Political Behavior, 2(2), 115-146. 
Wyer, R. S., & Collins, J. E. (1992). A Theory of Humor Elicitation. Psychological Review, 
99(4): 663-688. 
Xenos, M. A.  & Becker, A. B. (2009). Moments of Zen: Effects of The Daily Show on 
Information Seeking and Political Learning. Political Communication, 26(3), 317-332. 
Xenos, M. A. Moy, P., & Becker, A. B. (2011). Making Sense of The Daily Show: 
Understanding the Role of Partisan Heuristics in Political Comedy Effects. In A. 
Amarasingam (Ed.), The Stewart/Colbert Effect: Essays on The Real Impacts of Fake 
News (pp. 47-62). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.  
Young, D. G. (2004). Late-Night Comedy in Election 2000: Its Influence on Candidate Trait 
Ratings and the Moderating Effects Political Knowledge and Partisanship. Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 48(1), 1-22. 
232 
 
Young, D. G. (2006). Late-Night Comedy and the Salience of the Candidates’ Caricatured Traits 
in the 2000 Election. Mass Communication and Society, 9(3), 339-366. 
Young, D. G., & Tisinger, R. M. (2006). Dispelling Late-Night Myths, News Consumption 
among Late-Night Comedy Viewers and the Predictors of Exposure to Various Late-
Night Shows. International Journal of Press and Politics, 11(3), 113-134.  
Young, D. G. (2008). The Privileged Roll of the Late-Night Joke: Exploring Humor’s Role in 
Disrupting Argument Scrutiny. Media Psychology, 11(1), 119-142. 
Young, D. G., & Hoffman, L. (2012). Acquisition of Current-Events Knowledge from Political 
Satire Programming: An Experimental Approach. Atlantic Journal of 
Communication, 20(5), 290-304. 
Zaller, J. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zukas, K. J. (2012). News Genre Strategy: Comparing Agendas and Frames in The Daily Show 
and ABC World News. Journalism and Mass Communication, 2(2), 399-411. 
